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ABSTRACT
Who makes claims on the state and how? This dissertation examines the processes
through which citizens seek to secure public resources from the state and, by extension,
the patterns of participation and citizen-state relations that emerge. Using the case of rural
India, I explore whether and how citizens navigate their local environments to demand
public services such as drinking water, health services and education, or access to welfare
and poverty reduction programs. My fieldwork in the state of Rajasthan, consisting of
400 in-depth interviews and a survey of 2210 households across 105 villages, reveals
variation in the incidence and practice of claim-making, ranging from those who do not
engage the state at all, to direct petitioning of officials, to strategies mediated through
non-state actors and informal institutions. Such variation cannot be adequately explained
by an individual's socioeconomic status, by the characteristics of formal institutions, or
by levels of development in a locality. Rather, I find that claim-making practice is shaped
by the degree to which a person is exposed to people and settings across such social and
spatial lines. Through ties that extend beyond the immediate community and locality, a
person encounters information and ideas about the state and its resources as well as an
array of contacts that provide linkages to the state. Socio-spatial exposure across
divisions of caste, class, neighborhood, or village expands both the opportunities and
knowledge necessary for citizen-state engagement, increasing both the likelihood as well
as the breadth of claim-making practice. These findings shed critical light on our
understanding of both distributive politics (who gets what from the state) and democratic
practice (who participates and how).
Thesis supervisor: Richard M. Locke
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Citizen and State: local participation & demand for public services
1. Introduction
In the summer of 2010, the district of Udaipur in Rajasthan, India, experienced an acute
water shortage. Dry spells of this kind are common in the region, and residents face
shortages during most summer seasons. Public infrastructure for drinking water - hand
pumps, borewells, communal taps - exist in almost all villages, and yet during the dry
season the majority is rendered useless as the water table declines. I visited one village
where residents had called on local officials, demanding visits by engineers and
technicians who worked to fix broken hand pumps and to install motors to deepen the
level from which water could be drawn. In one of the village's poorest hamlets - home to
a tribal community - a resident recounted the experience, stating:'
We know about sarkari [government] schemes.... We know our rights.
When the water is not flowing, it is the responsibility of the sarkar. They
bring the water, from god knows where, but they bring the water.
In another village, located just kilometers away in the same administrative block,
residents did not make these same demands and there was no official response; villagers
had to walk increasingly long distances to find fresh water supply and often resorted to
unprotected sources of water. A resident of that village, also from a tribal hamlet,
explained:
Sarkar? Where is it here? We have no services, no water. No one comes to
us.... We are excluded. What can we do? God willing, we survive.
Author interviews in Godunda, Udaipur, February 22 - 25, 2010.
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The men speaking in these two villages are both members of the Bheel tribal
community, a traditionally disadvantaged, economically marginalized group in
Rajasthan. They are both manual laborers, earning less than two dollars per day. They
reside in similarly sized villages in the same district and block. In terms of their caste,
gender, income, and occupation, these two individuals live under similar conditions. And
yet they express their relationship to local government in very different terms. For one,
the state is the target of direct demands. For the other, the state is felt more in terms of its
absence than its presence.
What accounts for such different relationships between citizens and the state?
This dissertation examines the processes through which ordinary people seek to secure
public resources from the state and, by extension, the different patterns of citizen-state
relations that emerge. In the chapters that follow, I explore whether and how citizens
navigate their local environments to demand public services such as drinking water, roads
and other infrastructure, health and education services, as well as access to a wide range
of welfare and poverty reduction programs. Voicing demands for material goods and
services is among the most local and quotidian forms of political participation. As such, a
study of claim-making casts light on one of the most common but understudied arenas in
which citizens encounter the state, moving beyond the realm of electoral politics to
examine service delivery as a primary site of citizen-state engagement. In so doing, I ask:
how do different people experience and engage the state? Why, within the same formal
democratic frameworks and social structures, do some citizens - but not others - demand
services? In what ways do different citizens, set apart by class, ethnicity, gender, or other
characteristics, make claims on the state? These questions, I suggest, are critical to the
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study of local democratic practice, with important implications for our understanding of
participation and representation (who speaks up? whose voice is heard?), as well as
distributive politics (who gets what from the state?). Understanding such dynamics is
essential to efforts to assess the quality of democracy in any region of the world.
I study these dynamics in rural India, home to some of the poorest citizens of the
world's largest democracy. India is a particularly compelling context in which to study
citizen-state relations. Unlike most democracies, where participation has a distinct class
bias, India's poor and lower caste communities participate vigorously in electoral
politics. India is also the site of one the world's largest experiments in decentralization;
local elections at the village, administrative block, and district levels, as well as
institutional innovations - such as the reservation of seats in local government for women
and members of the lower castes - have created new spaces for participation by
marginalized groups. At the same time, Indian politics is marked by a sense of exclusion
and low expectations, particularly by the poor, that the ordinary citizen's voice will be
heard. The result is an environment marked by both active participation and
disillusionment. Under these conditions, who participates and why? Who makes claims
on the state and how?
I examine these questions by studying the local claim-making practices among
rural residents of Rajasthan, a large, ethnically diverse state located in India's northern
"poverty belt." My fieldwork, drawing on more than 400 interviews and an original
survey of 2,210 households across 105 villages, reveals striking variation in both the
incidence and practice of state-targeted claim-making, ranging from those who do not
engage the state at all, to direct strategies involving petitioning of local officials,
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bureaucrats and politicians, to mediated strategies that engage institutional and individual
brokers in an effort to gain access to public officials.
As is the case in other developing country contexts, an uneven record of service
provision is the norm in much of rural India (World Bank, 2004, p. 13, 2011). Nearly
forty percent of the population is malnourished, fifty percent lack access to basic
sanitation, and over one-quarter of school-aged children are not enrolled in school (OPHI,
2010). Access to essential public services remains highly uneven across, as well as
within, India's states and regions (Dreze & Sen, 1995; Paul, Balakrishnan, Gopakumar,
Sekhar, & Vivekananda, 2004; P. Singh, 2008). High levels of corruption at all levels of
government - highlighted in recent public outcry and media coverage 2 - add to the sense
that the Indian state regularly fails to respond to the needs of many of its citizens.
Under these conditions, it is perhaps not surprising to encounter citizens who have
given up the expectation that the state will deliver. Indeed, the Indian state is regularly
portrayed as being beyond the reach of most common citizens: a "sovereign entity set
apart from society" (Fuller & Benei, 2001, p. 23). In this view, the expectation is that
most ordinary citizens - and in particular the poor - will not be very active claim-makers.
And yet I find that a strikingly high number of people (roughly three-quarters of those
surveyed) report that they do in fact make claims on the state for services.
To understand these dynamics, I suggest that we must examine the political and
material context in which citizens encounter the Indian state. What otherwise might
appear to be irrationally high levels of claim-making takes on new meaning if we
consider, first, the sizeable (and expanding) flow of public resources to India's villages
2 See for example: August 19, 2011, "India's Corruption Scandals," BBC News
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-1 2769214>; August 17, 2011, "India's Selective Rage Over
Corruption," New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/08/1 8/world/asia/ 18iht-letter I8.html? r=1>
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and, second, the discretionary manner in which those resources are allocated. The Indian
state remains the primary service provider in rural India and, as such, plays a critical role
in the lives and livelihoods of its citizens. Goods and services are not, however,
consistently allocated in a rule-bound fashion, but are very often the subject of
discretionary allocation by local officials and politicians (Chandra, 2004). Taken
together, these conditions mean that there are resources to be had, but that their delivery
is not automatic or programmatic. Rather, access to services is best understood as a
matter of who can "extract them from the political system" (Banerjee, 2004, p. 13). In
other words, it is a matter of who makes claims on the state.
I also find, however, that claim-making is rarely a straightforward affair. People
pursue diverse strategies, both direct and mediated, in their efforts to secure services.
Village-level officials are the first port of call for the vast majority, while contact with
higher-level officials and politicians remains more limited. This direct form of local
contact, however, is accompanied by a wide range of strategies mediated through non-
state actors and informal institutions. In fact, more than one-half of the survey sample
reports contacting some kind of a broker when seeking services from the state, ranging
from individual "fixers" to local associations. Direct and mediated practices are very
often combined, creating diverse and complex claim-making "repertoires."
What accounts for these patterns of claim-making, assessed both in terms of its
incidence and the repertoire of strategies employed? Why do some people make claims
on the state for services while others do not? Why are some people locked into a narrow
set of practices, while others pursue diverse channels of access to the state? We might
expect claim-making activity to be closely tied to socioeconomic status through income,
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wealth, social standing, and associated levels of political access. Indeed, studies around
the world, but particularly in the West, have long found a strong, positive connection
between class status and participation (cf. Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Verba, Schlozman, &
Brady, 1995). However, as the two Bheel men quoted above - both manual laborers and
members of the same low-status tribal community - illustrate, it is not simply the case
that richer people with higher social standing are more likely to engage the state. Nor can
a person's claim-making repertoire, or the diversity of practices he or she engages, be
adequately predicted by caste, class, and associated social status. Differences in claim-
making practice persist within such broad socioeconomic categories. In fact, a great deal
of claim-making activity occurs among groups - namely the poor and lower castes -
where we might least expect to see it.
Neither is it the case that differences are driven by how rich or poor a village is, or
by governance institutions that are held constant at the level of administrative block and
village. Take, for example, theses divergent statements from people in a single village:3
What can we do? For years we have suffered because of lack of water in
this neighborhood. The village council does not hear us, so why should we
waste our time going there? At election time the mota aadmi [fat men]
make many promises, then they forget us. The only way we will get water
is to dig our own well.
There are so many schemes, for electricity, for education, for rations, but
to get these things you need to be on the [beneficiary] list. But who is
going to hear the aam aadmi [common man]? We went so many times to
the meetings, but they did not hear us. Finally, we approached Mr. G [a
community leader]. He is jagruk [aware] and knows how to get things
done. When the right people speak, then they hear us.
When the teacher did not come, we organized ourselves. We went out to
the main road and we blocked it with stones. They had to pay attention.
3 Author interviews in Godunda, Udaipur, February 22 - 25, 2010.
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Even the District Collector came .... The teacher was embarrassed, and
the issue was improved. When the work is not done, go straight to the top!
As these quotes illustrate, some people in the village have simply given up hope of
government service. Others rely on influential mediators, while still others take matters
into their own hands through direct action. These practices vary among people living in
the same locality, holding constant level of development and the institutional framework
within which claim-making occurs.
Claim-making, then, is not simply the product of a person's wealth or social
standing, nor is it purely a function of where he or she lives. Rather, I argue that claim-
making practice is largely shaped by the extent to which a person is exposed to people
and settings across such socioeconomic and spatial lines, traversing boundaries of caste,
class, neighborhood, or village. Exposure across social and spatial boundaries enables
access to critical resources necessary for engagement with the state - namely information
about public services and programs, ideas about the state and its accessibility, and
contacts (direct or mediated) that provide linkages to the state. In other words, a person
needs both access and know-how; bridges to and knowledge of the state and its resources.
Such access and know-how are, I argue, the products of an individual's socio-spatial
exposure, or the degree to which a person comes into contact with people and settings
beyond his or her immediate community and locality. People embedded in
"cosmopolitan" networks with a multiplicity of ties that reach beyond tightly-knit groups
of family, kin, caste, or village are exposed both to broader sources of information and to
a greater number and diversity of links to the state, than those embedded in more
"parochial" or locally-bound networks. As such, socio-spatial exposure helps to expand
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opportunities as well as the political knowledge, skill, and motivation necessary for
citizen-state engagement.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the concept of claim-making and its importance both as a mechanism through
which citizens secure access to essential services, and as a critical but understudied form
of local political participation. Section 3 examines claim-making in relation to current
debates about the nature of citizen-state relations in India, while section 4 introduces the
empirical context of the study through an overview of the local claim-making landscape
in rural India. Section 5 briefly introduces the data and patterns of claim-making that
emerge, and explores potential explanations for this variation including theories centered
on formal institutions, level of economic development, and socioeconomic status.
Assessed in light of the data from rural Rajasthan, these theories, while partially
revealing, offer inadequate explanations of who makes claims, why, and how. I go on to
introduce the theory of socio-spatial exposure, arguing that contact with diverse contexts
and people facilitates access to resources - contacts, information, and ideas - essential for
claim-making. Section 6 concludes with an overview of the dissertation.
2. Claiming services
Around the globe, people depend on a vast range of government services: clean drinking
water, immunizations for their children and healthcare when they are sick, teachers and
schools, roads to get to the health clinic, the school, or the market, and - for many of the
poorest - cash transfers, subsidies, food rations, or other forms of social protection.
Indeed, public service delivery is among the most important of government functions,
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widely recognized as a source of state legitimacy (Levi, 1988), "good" governance
(Putnam, 1993; Tendler, 1997), and an indicator of state capacity (Soifer, 2008). Whether
or not such essential services reach the people who need them is of critical consequence
for quality of life and development, as well as the quality of governance. In many places,
however, it is a constant struggle to secure access to even the most basic services. Wells
dry up and hand pumps break, health clinics are located at prohibitive distances, teachers
are absent, roads crumble into disrepair, applications for welfare services are ignored,
lost, or are the subject of bribe requests.
Such challenges and deficiencies in service delivery are particularly common in
contexts marked by resource constraints and poor information (Besley, 2006), as well as
legacies of political and social exclusion (Houtzager & Acharya, 2010; O'Donnell, 1993).
Within localities, social barriers along class, ethnic, or gender lines contribute to
inequality in access (Beteille, 1969; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004b). Services targeted to
the poor may be the subject of local elite capture and clientelistic distribution (Besley,
Pande, & Rao, 2007a; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). This is particularly true in
ethnically divided settings, and where state actors exercise considerable discretionary
control over the allocation of public resources (Bates, 2008; Chandra, 2004; Posner,
2005). Under these conditions, services, far from being guaranteed entitlements, emerge
as the subjects of political contestation and the targets of claim-making.
I use the term "claim-making" to refer to the state-targeted strategies of action
citizens pursue when seeking access to, and articulating demands for, publicly-provided
services. The goods and services in question are not necessarily "public" in the classic
sense of being non-rival and non-excludable in their consumption, but are produced and
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provided by state agents. These include both collective goods that serve a locality (for
example, communal drinking water, roads, schools, health clinics), as well as goods of a
selective or particularistic nature that benefit small groups, households, or individuals
(such as the public distribution of food rations, cash transfers, public sector employment,
and access to a wide range of welfare and poverty-reduction programs). 4 Claim-making
may center on issues of receipt of services (service), repair (maintenance), or
functionality (resources and staff to enable people to utilize existing services). Claims
might, for example, include demands to install a new water source or repair an existing
one, complaints about an absent teacher or impassable road, or requests for inclusion in
existing income-support programs.
Access to a service does not in itself constitute a claim. Rather, claim-making is
active, and entails a "seeking" behavior, wherein a citizen makes efforts (direct or
indirect) to contact, petition, or otherwise approach a public official or agency with
administrative jurisdiction over the allocation of public goods and services. In contrast to
efforts to influence policy at the state or national levels, claim-making - as defined here -
is not an explicitly agenda-setting activity. Rather, it involves efforts to hold officials and
representatives accountable for existing, mandated, services and programs. As such,
claim-making falls in the realm of local policy implementation rather than policy
advocacy.
4 Collective goods deliver "high-spillover" benefits to broad collectives, whereas selective goods deliver
"low-spillover" benefits to much narrower groups or individuals (Besley, Pande, & Rao, 2004). Throughout
the dissertation, I refer to collective and selective goods together as "publicly-provided goods and
services," or simply "public services" for short. Because collective and selective goods are produced,
delivered, and consumed in different manners, it is also necessary to specify the type of good or sector in
question. A full discussion of this distinction is offered in Chapter 4.
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Claim-making as participation
A study of claim-making provides critical insight into questions of who engages in the
local political system and whose voice is heard; in other words, who participates, why,
and how. In broad terms, I understand political participation as "activity that has the
intent or effect of influencing government action" (Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1995: p.
38), and that "affords citizens the opportunity to communicate information to government
officials about their concerns and preferences" (p. 27). As Verba et al. underscore in their
study of political activity in the United States, participation may take many forms,
ranging from voting to campaigning and lobbying, to forms of contentious politics and
collective action, to directly or indirectly contacting officials. A great deal of
participation takes place "outside official channels" including "a vast number of contacts
and communications with government officials, as well as a large volume of problem-
solving activity among friends and neighbors in local communities" (Verba, Nie, & Kim,
1987, p. 8). Collier and Handlin (2009), in their study of participation in Latin America,
distinguish between the interest and electoral arenas of participation, defining the interest
arena as "the considerably more informal locus of specific interest articulation and
problem solving," (p. 8). It is this more informal, non-electoral arena, in which citizens
attempt (directly or indirectly) to contact public officials, that is the site of claim-making.
Claim-making remains understudied relative to other kinds of political activity
such as voting, and yet merits study for several reasons. First, claim-making - a day-to-
day process of negotiating access to services - is one of the primary political acts a
citizen undertakes, representing the most common site of citizen interaction with agents
of the state. Efforts to secure essential services constitute one of the primary arenas in
which citizens encounter the state (Corbridge, Srivastava, & Veron, 2005). Citizens
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experience the state both in terms of its absence, as well as through the provision of
services (schools, roads, wells, health clinics, food rations, and so on), and the
bureaucratic structures (personnel, buildings, paperwork) that accompany the distribution
of such services. Claim-making is also a largely local activity and, as such, focuses
attention on the micro-level determinants of participation, highlighting the local
dynamics, actors, and institutions that determine whether and how an individual exercises
his or her voice.
Second, claim-making revolves around concrete goods and services. As such, it is
a critical element of democratic practice. The ability to extract services from the state is
an essential component of citizenship which, following T.H. Marshall's (1964)
conception, encompasses both the civil and social rights that enable a "life of a civilized
being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (p.74). Negotiating access to
public services is a critical arena in which citizens assert their rights vis a vis agents of
the state (Houtzager & Acharya, 2010).
Third, claim-making is an information-rich form of participation through which
citizens articulate specific needs, interests, and demands. Voting, in contrast, is widely
recognized as a "blunt" means through which to convey interests to officials (Collier &
Handlin, 2009; Verba et al., 1995). Riker (1982), for example, states that "outcomes of
voting are, or may be, inaccurate or meaningless amalgamations [such that] what the
people want cannot be known" (p. xviii). Voting is at best an indirect means of conveying
interests, while claim-making is a more precise act in which interests are clearly stated.
Claim-making, then, is a quotidian, local, and information-rich act in which
citizens articulate specific interests and demands and, in so doing, encounter actors and
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agencies of the state. In developing this conception of claim-making, I build on a growing
body of work that investigates non-electoral forms of interest articulation in low and
middle-income democracies and, in particular, a shift in modes of participation away
from "traditional" representative institutions such as political parties and unions towards
other, more informal, local forms of political and civic participation (Collier & Handlin,
2009; Houtzager, Collier, Harris, & Lavalle, 2002). This shift began with the "third
wave" of democratization in the 1970s and continues today, driven in large part by the
processes of economic liberalization and political and fiscal decentralization. Reflecting
on these historic shifts, Manuel Castells has asserted that the "failure" of political parties
and of the labor movement to "counter economic exploitation, cultural domination, and
political oppression, had left people (by the 1980s) with no other choice than either to
surrender or to react on the basis of the most immediate source of self-recognition and
autonomous organisation: their locality" (Castells, 1998, cited in Harriss, 2005; emphasis
added).
The World Bank, noting these trends, has argued that: "In most societies,
democratic or not, citizens seek representation of their interests beyond the ballot as
taxpayers, as users of public services, and increasingly as clients or members of NGOs
and voluntary associations. Against a backdrop of competing social demands, rising
expectations and variable government performance, these expressions of voice and
participation are on the rise" (World Bank, 1997, p. 113). Others have documented the
role of traditional or informal governance institutions as vehicles for interest
5 Two major studies examine these dynamics: the Comparative Infrastructure of Representation in Latin
America (CIRELA) project developed by scholars at Berkeley (cf. Collier and Handlin, 2009), and a study
of "Rights, Representation and the Poor" developed at the London School of Economics (cf. Houtzager et
al., 2002).
25
representation (AnanthPur, 2007; Brick, 2008; MacLean, 2011; Tsai, 2007a), as well as
the ability of individual political and social entrepreneurs to act as brokers between
citizens and agents of the state (Beck, 2008; Boone, 2003; Jennings, 1997; Krishna, 2011;
Manor, 2000). As these and other studies from around the world demonstrate, citizens
pursue myriad strategies in their efforts to lay claims on the state.
3. Citizen and state in India
India is a compelling context in which to examine questions of citizen access to the state
and its resources. It is both the world's largest democracy and home to some of the
world's deepest and most persistent poverty. More than forty percent of the population
continues to live below the poverty line (US$ 1.25/day) and there are more poor and
malnourished people in India than in all of sub-Saharan Africa combined (OPHI, 2010;
World Bank, 2008). Rates of poverty, assessed according to a multidimensional index of
living standards and access to health and education services, range from as low as 16
percent in the southern state of Kerala, to over 80 percent in Bihar in the north. In
Rajasthan, almost two-thirds (64 percent) of the population is considered poor and
underserved (OPHI, 2010).6
Under these conditions, two views of Indian citizen-state relations emerge. On the
one hand there is a rather bleak view in which the Indian state and its resources are
inaccessible to a majority of its citizens, where the "chain that links peoples' need to their
felt desires to their articulated demand to its aggregation and finally to its translation to
6 Poverty also varies within regions across different populations; 81 percent of the Scheduled Tribes are
poor, as are 66 percent of the Scheduled Castes, compared to just 33 percent of the General Castes (OPHI,
2010).
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public policy is impossibly long and notoriously weak" (Yadav, 1999, p. 2399). In this
view, it follows that one would expect to see low levels of citizen participation, including
claim-making. In fact, when I first started my fieldwork for this project, I was told by the
director of a large rural development NGO that I was asking the wrong question. The
question, she said, is not why or how do citizens make claims on the state, but why don't
citizens make claims. In her view, rural India is best described by a lack of participation
and claim-making.
On the other hand, India is often held up as an example of a robust democracy
that persists despite high levels of poverty and ethnic diversity (S. H. Rudolph &
Rudolph, 2002). India is one of the few democracies in the world where the poor and
lower castes vote at high rates, unlike the majority of democracies where electoral
participation is skewed towards the rich (Alam, 2004; Mitra & Singh, 1999; Yadav,
2000). Indeed, beginning in the 1990s, India has witnessed a "democratic upsurge" in the
participation of marginalized sectors of the population, in particular among lower income
and lower caste voters (Yadav, 2000). Looking beyond the electoral arena, I find that
these patterns of citizen participation extend to claim-making. As the data presented in
the following chapters will demonstrate, citizens, including the poor and the lower castes,
voice demands for services in large numbers.
How do we square these two images of citizen-state relations in which, an uneven
record of service delivery notwithstanding, substantial numbers of citizens continue to
make claims on the state? I argue that a high level of claim-making is best understood if
we stand back to consider the political and material conditions under which public
resources are allocated. First, India has a vast public welfare and service delivery
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apparatus. Second, however, public goods and services are subject to discretionary
control by officials. In other words, India is both a "developmental state" in which people
depend on the public sector for a vast array of welfare services, and a "patronage-
democracy" (Chandra 2004) in which those services are the subject of political calculus
by citizens and politicians alike.
By the developmental state I refer to "those agencies of the state and
governmental practices that are charged with improving or protecting the incomes,
capabilities and legal rights of poorer people" (Corbridge et al., 2005, p. 7). Poverty
reduction and welfare have long occupied central positions in the language of the Indian
state,7 and the size and scope of India's development and social protection sectors have
increased over time. In fact, despite the rhetoric of liberalization accompanying the
economic reforms of the 1990s, social expenditures have increased significantly over the
last twenty years. Substantial resources are being targeted to the poor; the World Bank
estimates that India's core safety net programs, which include food security, pensions,
and employment generation, account for more than two percent of the country's total
GDP - a level of social spending higher than any other country in Asia and roughly three
times greater than China's (World Bank, 201 1).8
Public programs are both expanding and becoming more complex (Krishna, 2002,
p. 43). Growing expenditures in welfare, social protection, and service delivery have been
7 State-led efforts to combat poverty and famine formed a central concern at the time of Independence and
were enshrined in the "welfarist orientation" of the Constitution (Jayal, 1999), which encompassed both
negative rights and liberties as well as the positive obligations of the state to provide for its citizens (Guha,
2008). It is telling, however, that the rights enshrined in the Constitution's chapter on Fundamental Rights
are primarily negative rights of liberty. The positive right to welfare takes on a secondary status, listed in
the non-enforceable chapter on Divertive Principles of State Policy.
8 The 2011 budget included a 17 percent increase in social spending (including a 24 percent increase in
education spending and a 20 percent increase in spending on health). Total funds earmarked for social
spending amounted to a full 36 percent of the total budget. Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2011-12,
Government of India, <http://indiabudget.nic.in/>, accessed June 18, 2012.
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accompanied by a dizzying array of programs;9 a veritable alphabet soup of welfare
"schemes" (each referred to by its own acronym) related to health, education,
infrastructure, food security, housing, employment, and other sectors are regularly
created (and re-created) by successive governments at the state and central levels. Large
programs, like the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), Sara Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA,
the "Education for All" Campaign), the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS),
and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), to name just a few,
are funneling unprecedented amounts of goods, services, and money to rural India. The
flagship employment program NREGS, for example, accounted for a full 3.6 percent of
central government expenditures in 2010-11, at a cost of $8.9 billion USD (Sukhtankar,
2012). The central government's Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS), with an
annual budget of $6.6 billion USD, provides subsidized food commodities through a
massive network of 478,000 fair price shops serving well over 65 million households
below the poverty line.' 0
Some progress has been made. Nationally, rates of poverty are falling and the
number of people with access to basic services and infrastructure is rising.'" Progress,
however, is highly uneven and is marred by public sector inefficiencies, leakages, and
9 A review of the Planning Commission's Five Year Plans finds a proliferation of central government
development schemes that allocate funds to the state and other local implementing agencies across plan
periods 1992-2001, and an expansion of spending on these schemes as a percentage of total plan
expenditure. See, for example, Gayatri Shagal, "The Case of the Exploding Centrally Sponsored Schemes,"
Accountability Initiative, May 21, 2012, <http://www.accountabilitvindia.in/accountabilityblog/2514-case-
exploding-centrally-sponsored-schemes-
css?utm source=Accountability+lnitiative+Newsletter&itm campaign=4f58aaa7c9-
Newsletter March June 2012 Test 1 4 30 2012&utm medium=email>, accessed July 10, 2012.
Department of Food and Public Distribution, Government of India <http://dfpd.nic.in/?0=node/l0 I>,
accessed June 18, 2012.
11 Estimates of the percentage of people living on less than $1.23 USD/day declined from 60 percent in
1981 to 42 percent in 2005 (Ravallion & Chen, 2008) and are projected to keep falling to 22 percent in
2015 (putting India on track to meet the United Nations Millennium Development Goal of reducing poverty
by one-half).
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corruption. By the government of India's own estimates, 58 percent of subsidized grains
distributed under the TPDS system do not reach their intended beneficiaries (Programme
Evaluation Organisation, 2005). The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme is
similarly plagued by corruption; some accounts suggest that almost three-quarters of the
labor budget is embezzled (Niehaus & Sukhtankar, 2009; Sukhtankar, 2012). Water
sources, health clinics, and schools are physically available in a majority of villages, and
yet there is a stark gap between physical "access" to a service and the benefits citizens
derive; services are rendered unusable when infrastructure falls into disrepair, when
supplies dry up, or when public sector employees fail to report to work (World Bank
2006).
The scale of India's developmental state does not, in and of itself, guarantee
access to services. Rather, access to public resources occurs within a patronage
framework in which officials exercise considerable discretionary control over their
distribution, particularly at the local level. In this sense, India can be described as a
"patronage-democracy" (Chandra, 2004), in which the state is the primary provider of
services, infrastructure, poverty reduction schemes, and public sector employment but
where access to these resources are subject to political control by bureaucrats and
politicians. As Chandra writes of the Indian context, a patronage democracy is one in
which:
... the state monopolizes access to jobs and services, and in which elected
officials have discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs
and services at the disposal of the state. The key aspect of a patronage-
democracy is not simply the size of the state but the power of elected
officials to distribute the vast resources controlled by the state to voters on
an individualized basis, by exercising their discretion in the
implementation of state policy (2004, p. 6).
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The high levels of participation witnessed in India, including both the
voter turnout documented in the literature on electoral politics and the claim-
making that is the focus of this dissertation, are consistent with this view of a
patronage democracy in which political participation is shaped by expectation of
access to the state and its resources (Chandra 2004, p. 116). The vast (and
growing) resources that make up India's developmental state motivate citizen
action, just as the discretionary behavior of officials drives the seeking behavior
of citizens. In this sense, claim-making is consistent with uneven service delivery,
and with low (but not non-existent) expectations of access to services. The
knowledge of public resources and of politicians' discretionary control over them
motivates citizen action even in the absence of a direct, clientelistic exchange of
political support for benefits.'2 A sense of entitlement emerges through exposure
to others who have benefited from state resources. In other words, as the
remaining chapters will attempt to demonstrate, claim-making is in large part a
function of exposure to information and ideas about the state and its resources.
4. The local claim-making landscape
Claim-making in rural India, then, must be understood as product both of a large
"developmental state" and of a "patronage-democracy." In contrast to settings with
strong rule of law where services are allocated in a programmatic fashion (Kitschelt,
2000; Ziegfeld, 2009) and where claim-making is therefore a relatively simple process,
12 A similar logic may apply to voter behavior. Even where expectations (and actual service delivery) are
low, participation remains high since citizens are doing their best to maximize the likelihood that an official
will be receptive to their claims when in need (Ziegfeld, 2009).
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claim-making in rural India is rarely a linear affair. In a rule-bound setting, a citizen
might simply need to know about a program and the procedure through which to apply:
for example, which office to visit, the hours the office is open, what forms to complete,
and so on. In a setting marked by high levels of official discretion, however, this kind of
procedural information will take a person only so far. There is little reason to expect that
simply voicing a claim through the "correct" channels will produce the desired results.
Rather, claim-making takes on a more complex and necessarily more inventive nature.
Citizens pursue multiple strategies in the hopes that eventually at least some of their
effort will pay off; in this sense, claim-making activity takes on a "probabilistic" nature.
As one resident (describing efforts to secure a paved road to the village) succinctly put it:
We asked and asked. This is how work gets done - by raising the issue to
anyone with an ear... .We had to continuously raise the issue by asking
officials, both here in the village and outside, any official or neta
(politician) who came, the sanstha [NGO] people.'3
Claim-making, in this context, takes place through diverse practices involving
both direct and mediated contact with officials at various levels. To understand these
practices, it is necessary to first examine the local claim-making landscape, or the range
of potential channels of access to the state. Citizens are embedded in complex local
governance landscapes populated by actors ranging from local elected officials, to higher-
level administrators, bureaucrats, and state and national-level politicians. These public
officials, however, comprise just one slice of the governance environment in which
citizens operate, and are best understood alongside and in interaction with non-state
actors and informal institutions - unwritten rules and norms (cf. Helmke & Levitsky,
2004; IDS, 2010).
13 Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, January 14, 2011.
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Formal local governance
In India, substantial responsibility for service delivery is devolved to the local level. The
73 Amendment to the Indian Constitution, instituted in 1993, formally recognized three
tiers of elected rural local government at the village (Gram Panchayat), block (Panchayat
Samiti), and district (Zila Parishsid) levels. The most local tier, the Gram Panchayat (GP)
is an elected council that encompasses a cluster of an average of five villages (depending
on village size). GP elections are held every five years for a council president (sarpanch)
and ward councilors (wardpanch) Fifty percent of seats in the GP are reserved for
women, and seats are also reserved for lower castes, including the Scheduled Castes (SC)
and Tribes (ST), in proportion to their population.14 The GP bears at least partial
responsibility for the provision of a wide range of village public goods and services, and
plays a role in beneficiary selection for state and central government programs.' 5
Decision-making about development priorities, program implementation, and beneficiary
selection is, at least in theory, devolved to public meetings (Gram Sabha) that are open to
all adult residents of the GP.
As an exercise in political decentralization, devolution of power to the Gram
Panchayats has been at least a partial success. Panchayat elections have been regularly
held in all states since 1993, and more than three million people are elected to panchayat
offices every five years including women and members of the lower castes (Baviskar &
14 Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) refer to historically disadvantaged communities,
recognized as the targets of affirmative action and listed in "Schedules" of the Indian Constitution. Other
"backward" classes (OBC) also receive affirmative action; this list is created by a government commission
and is subject to additions and subtractions. General Castes (GC), sometimes referred to as "forward" or
"upper" castes," are a residual category referring to everybody else.
15 These responsibilities are laid out in the 11"' Schedule of the 7 3 rd Amendment and encompass 29
different functions, including water supply, housing, roads, education, and the administration of poverty
alleviation programs.
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Mathew, 2008). The effects of political reservations by caste and gender, however, are
hotly contested. Some argue that reserved seats increase access to the political system and
public resources among targeted groups (Banerjee & Somanathan, 2007; Chattopadhyay
& Duflo, 2004a; Pande, 2003). Others dispute both the representative and distributive
effects of reserved seats, arguing that GP officials are subject to capture by local elites
(Baviskar & Mathew, 2008; Palaniswamy & Krishnan, 2008; S. B. Singh, 2009). Still
others have argued that, despite these limitations, reservations are symbolically and
socially transformative as traditionally marginalized groups are given formal spaces in
the public sphere (Chauchard, 2010; Jayal, 2006a).
As an exercise in administrative and fiscal decentralization, the record of the
panchayats is similarly mixed. The Gram Panchayat has very little ability to raise revenue
locally, and is highly dependent on transfers and program implementation by state-level
line departments and national-level ministries (Jayal, 2006b). As a result, the panchayat is
often seen as a co-opted "arm of the state"(S. B. Singh, 2009, p. 399) that is "accountable
to bureaucrats rather than to the electorate" (Jayal, 2006, p. 18). GP members are
nominally non-partisan and cannot contest an election on a party ticket. In practice,
however, parties hold considerable sway over the panchayat, both through influencing the
GP nomination and electoral process (Dunning & Nilekani, 2009). GP candidates often
run on the basis of promised links to politicians such as the state-level Member of
Legislative Assembly (MLA) and national-level Member of Parliament (MP). The
autonomy of the GP is further eroded by the active role of these politicians who are
known to interfere, either directly or indirectly, in panchayat-level planning and
budgeting and in the transfer of funds to the local level (Wilkinson, 2007; World Bank,
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2000).16 All in all, the panchayat is widely considered to be a constrained and co-opted
political space that functions as an extension of the state administration and under the
sway of political parties.
And yet, seen through the eyes of ordinary citizens at the village level, the Gram
Panchayat remains the channel to which most citizens turn when seeking access to
services. Higher-level bureaucrats typically do not reside in or spend prolonged periods
of time in the village, but rather occupy offices in the block or district seats. Official
visits to the village are infrequent and, when they do occur, often cursory. Parties and
politicians, despite their resources and clout, also operate at a level disassociated from the
village. This is particularly true in rural India, where parties lack deep roots and are
weakly institutionalized (Kohli, 1990; Krishna, 2002; Weiner, 1989). Party headquarters
and constituent service offices are located in towns and cities,' 7 and visits to villages by
politicians are typically restricted to the campaign season. It follows that the state
administration, bureaucracy, parties, and politicians are, in the eyes of the common
citizen, remote entities that are not often directly encountered. In this setting, the GP
emerges as the most local and accessible point of access to the state.
Informal local governance
Formal local bodies such as the Gram Panchayat do not, however, exist in a vacuum but
co-exist with a wide range of informal institutions and non-state actors that present
16 The MLA and MP also administer Local Area Development funds allocated for discretionary spending
on public projects within their constituencies. These funds are allocated to the same 29 areas that are the
mandated purview of the panchayat (Jayal, 2006b). Scholars have suggested that these funds were
established to undermine the GP and allow party politicians to retain their control over local patronage (S.
B. Singh, 2009; Wilkinson, 2007).
17 Dynamics may therefore be different in urban India. Harriss (2005), for example, finds that politicians
and parties are a key target and channel for citizen problem-solving in Delhi. Delhi, of course, has the
additional advantage of being the national capital, reducing the physical as well as psychic distance
between citizens and the seats of state power.
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alternative or additional channels to through which citizens seek access to the state and its
resources (AnanthPur, 2006; Jayal, Prakash, & Sharma, 2006; Jha, Rao, & Woolcock,
2007; Wade, 1988). First, caste-based governance bodies continue to exist in a majority
of villages (Jayal, 2006b; L. I. Rudolph & Rudolph, 1967). These customary institutions
have no formal jurisdiction or relationship to the elected Gram Panchayat. Rather, they
serve a "social" function, governing the internal affairs of a particular caste community,
and are called on to weigh in on cases of child marriage, divorce, or land disputes. Multi-
caste traditional panchayats, which draw together leaders from different caste
communities, play a similar role in dispute resolution where conflicts spillover communal
lines. Conceptually, villagers draw a sharp line between these customary caste bodies and
the elected Gram Panchayat. Caste panchayats, in the words of many of those
interviewed, deal with communal affairs, but not with village "development" or "politics"
which are the purview of the "sarkari" (government) panchayat. In practice, however,
customary institutions exert considerable influence over the GP. In some cases, the
leadership of the elected and traditional panchayats overlaps. In other cases, caste leaders
influence the nomination and voting process through which GP candidates are selected.
They may also play a behind the scenes role in beneficiary selection and implementation
of government programs. As such, customary bodies provide an important - if informal -
platform through which citizens may seek to access the state.
Caste associations, which are ascriptive in nature, are accompanied by other,
"voluntary" or civic associations, many of which operate at the level of a neighborhood
or village. Local civic associations have received substantial attention in the literature on
citizen-state relations as platforms for interest articulation. In the Indian context,
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however, scholars have cast doubt on the degree to which models of civil society
participation developed elsewhere can be applied in Indian. Civic associations remain
few and far between (Krishna, 2011; P. Singh, 2008), and are largely an urban affair
(Chhibber, 1999) participation in which is the purview of the relatively affluent (Harriss,
2005). In fact, Chhibber (1999) goes as far as to argue that India's democracy functions
in the absence of voluntary associations. That said, the voluntary sector is growing (Jayal,
2006b), and there is reason to believe that civic organizations play an important role in
structuring citizen-state relations (Kudva, 2005). In the state of Rajasthan, NGOs have
developed different relationships with elected panchayats, in some cases working to
strengthen their capacity and in others providing alternative spaces through the support of
non-state "indigenous institutions."18 Active social and protest movements have also
emerged to demand increased transparency and accountability in governance.19 These
non-governmental and civil society organizations, while thin on the ground, are important
conduits for citizens' interests and demands where present.
Finally, having observed the relatively low rates of associational engagement in
India, other scholars have emphasized the critical role of individual brokers in Indian
politics. Corbridge et al., for example, observe that: "When poorer people meet local state
officials, they do so with reference to their non-state networks.... The state is met
through... a broad range of caste leaders, brokers (dalaals), and political fixers
(pryaveerkars)" (2005, p. 108). Manor similarly describes how "middlemen...serve as
18 These range, for example, from NGO-led programs to provide training to newly elected Gram Panchayat
members, to efforts by other NGOs to establish an alternative "citizens' forum" designed to operate in
parallel to the GP where the GP is thought to be inefficient or co-opted.
The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (Workers and Farmers Empowerment Organization), for example,
is leading efforts in Rajasthan to hold state and local officials to account through the implementation of the
national Right to Information Act and through carrying out "social audits" of public works and programs.
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crucial political intermediaries between the localities and powerful figures (bureaucrats
and, especially, politicians) at higher levels" (2000, p. 817). These actors do not hold any
formal position, but practice "the art of approaching officials for favors and making the
wheels of administration move in support of such favors" (Reddy and Haragopal, cited in
Manor, 2000, p. 817). Brokers come in many stripes, ranging from people of local social
standing (so-called "big men," who are often caste leaders, elders, or landowners) to a
younger breed of political entrepreneur or "new leaders" or "naya neta" (typically those
with higher levels of education) who work across caste lines (Krishna, 2002, 2011).
5. Assessing and explaining claim-making
Given this plurality of both formal and informal actors and institutions, how is it that
people navigate their local environments to make claims on public officials? A sub-
national, single-state research design (discussed in detail in the next chapter) allows for
nuanced comparison of localities, holding constant formal institutions and many features
of state and national-level administration. Rajasthan is a large and diverse state, home to
68 million people and close to 400 different castes and tribes. My research was centered
in four purposively selected districts that represent the primary linguistic, cultural, and
geographical regions of the state. Districts were also selected to control for variables such
as per capita income, human development status, caste composition, and colonial history.
In a first round of preliminary research, I conducted open-ended interviews with
residents and officials in two districts, as well as with NGO staff and policymakers in the
district and state capitals. On the basis of this inductive work, I then designed a citizen
survey and, working with a team of local university students, directly supervised its
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implementation across 2210 randomly selected households across 40 Gram Panchayats,
and 105 villages across the four districts. Next, I selected a sub-sample of six villages in
the two "most different" districts in which to carry out further qualitative work,
grounding the survey data in different local contexts.
Data
Through these mixed methods, I explore several dimensions of claim-making. First, I
examine its incidence: quite simply whether or not a person reports having made a claim
on a public official or agency. This is defined in intentionally broad terms of whether an
individual, in his or her own personal experience, has articulated demands for services to
public officials. This includes a wide range of activities - formal and informal, direct and
indirect - surrounding a range of services, collective and selective. By casting this wide
net, I capture a range of political practice, casting light on the basic question of who
participates in the local arena of distributive politics.
Of equal concern, however, is how a person participates. To this end, I explore
not just the incidence, but also the claim-making practices employed. The particular
channels through which claims are made reflect differences in degrees of distance from
and ease of access to the state, as well as in the lines of accountability at play. These
claim-making practices are not mutually exclusive, and people can and do combine
different strategies. I refer to the number or diversity of practices as the claim-making
repertoire, capturing the range of citizen activity. The breadth of the claim-making
repertoire casts light on an important dimension of a person's relationship to the state,
namely the extent and diversity of a person's contact with officials, ranging from those
who do not engage the state at all, to those who depend on a single point of access, to
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those who seek out multiple points of contact with officials. Far from being locked into
singular or static patronage relationships, these citizens navigate the local governance
environment in different ways.
The data reveal that a majority of citizens - including many of the poorest and
most marginalized - do make claims on the state, but do so through divergent practices,
reflected in different claim-making repertoires. First, citizens may directly approach
public officials and representatives. This personal, face-to-face contact of state actors
takes place at different levels including the elected panchayat, the block and district
administration, and through elected politicians at the state and national levels. The vast
majority of this direct practice takes place at a very local level, with the Gram Panchayat
standing head and shoulders above other bureaucratic or overtly partisan channels as the
most common site of citizen-state interface. In contrast to portrayals of a distant and
impenetrable state, we find that a large majority (almost two-thirds) of the sample report
engaging in these direct forms of claim-making.
Second, citizens may pursue mediated practices, seeking out local institutions and
individuals with political connections or knowledge of the political system who, in turn,
facilitates access to public officials. Intermediaries range from local associations at the
neighborhood or village level or beyond, to individual brokers including both caste and
non-caste bound leaders and local "fixers." Here again we find that a majority (just over
half) of the sample report engaging one or more intermediary. Moreover, claim-making
practices are often combined, and a majority report engaging in more than one kind of
practice. Direct and mediated practices are often coupled, suggesting a complementary
relationship in which intermediaries - rather than decreasing levels of citizen-state
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engagement - contribute to higher rates of direct contact.
In sum, the data reveal differences in the incidence and practice of claim-making,
reflected in claim-making repertoires of varying breadth. These patterns of claim-making
raise a set of questions concerning the nature of local citizen-state relations. Why are
some citizens more active than others in voicing demands on the state? Why do some
people directly pursue contact with officials, while others turn to mediators? And why are
some dependent on a single point of contact, while others pursue multiple channels of
access to the state? It is the task of this dissertation to explain this variation, and to reflect
on the broader patterns of political participation that are revealed.
Explaining participation: existing approaches
Cross-national studies have examined the role of formal democratic institutions, such as
electoral laws or balance of power between the executive and legislature, in shaping
citizen-state relations (cf. Kitschelt, 2000). Similarly, historical institutional accounts
examine the effects of state formation and the institutionalization of property rights on
patterns of political participation today (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Banerjee, Iyer, &
Somanathan, 2005). While effective in drawing our attention to the role of institutional
and historical processes, this literature cannot account for variation in participation
among citizens residing in the same sub-national units, where state structure, capacity,
and formal institutions are held constant. Moreover, the study of rural Rajasthan reveals
variation both across and within districts with different colonial histories, caste
composition, distances to the state capital, and geography.
Other scholars have argued that citizen participation reflects varying levels of
modernization and economic development across regions and localities. And yet
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fieldwork in Rajasthan reveals that claim-making varies both across and within localities
with differing levels of wealth, per capita income, and literacy. A closely related school
of thought shifts the focus from aggregate levels of development to individual-level
socioeconomic status (Bennett & Bennett, 1986; Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Rosenstone &
Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995). In its simplest version, this socioeconomic model
predicts that wealthier and more educated people will participate with greater vigor. This
expectation extends beyond income to higher social standing, for example by race or
caste. Studies from around the world, but particularly in the West, have confirmed these
patterns.
India, however, appears to be something of an anomaly. As noted, the poor and
lower castes vote at high rates. Looking beyond the voting booth, I find similar puzzles
surrounding non-electoral participation and claim-making in Rajasthan. It is not the case
that the rich consistently out-claim the poor, and nor do the poor out-claim the rich.
Similarly, there are few significant differences in claim-making behavior across caste
categories, particularly at the upper and lower ends of the caste hierarchy. Members of
the "low" status Scheduled Castes and Tribes are as likely as the "upper" castes to make
claims. Caste, despite its salience as a social marker, provides us with little direct
information about whether or how a person will engage the state.
Gender, however, is a strong predictor of claim-making behavior. Anyone
familiar with gender dynamics in rural India will note glaring disparities in women's
social and political standing compared to men, where women's engagement in the public
sphere is highly restricted. Under these conditions, women are significantly less likely
than men to engage in claim-making of all kinds, direct or mediated. And yet, among
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women, patterns diverge. Women at the very bottom of the caste hierarchy are
significantly more likely to engage in claim-making than more affluent women from the
higher castes. Indeed, lower caste women are - among women - the most likely to
engage in claim-making.
A theory of socio-spatial exposure
We find, then, that socioeconomic and ascriptive characteristics such as class, caste, and
gender provide at best a partial explanation for differences in claim-making activity.
Neither is claim-making adequately explained by level of development in a village, or by
formal institutions that are held constant. Rather, I suggest that claim-making practice is a
product of a person's exposure to sources of difference across both socioeconomic and
spatial divides. Exposure to diverse people and settings - across barriers of caste, class,
neighborhood, and village - is a critical resource for participation, providing access to
both the knowledge and the contacts necessary for citizen-state engagement.
In order to make claims on the state, a person requires information about
government services and programs, as well as knowledge of how best to engage the state.
This includes both procedural information about programs and how to apply, as well as
narratives and ideas about the accessibility of the state and the realm of possible claim-
making practice. In order to act on this information, a person also needs access to the
actors and agencies that control public resources. In the chapters that follow, I will
demonstrate how people who are situated in different kinds of social and occupational
networks are differently exposed to information, ideas, and contacts that facilitate claim-
making. Through ties that extend beyond local and insular groups, people are exposed to
more and different information and ideas about the state and its resources. At the same
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time, people embedded in broad and cross-cutting networks are also exposed to a greater
number and diversity of potential linkages to the state. In other words, claim-making
practice is a function of the degree to which a person comes into contact with people and
places beyond his or her immediate community and locality, referred to here as "socio-
spatial exposure."
I examine different dimensions of socio-spatial exposure across caste,
neighborhood, and village lines. Drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data, I find
that exposure across these dimensions is associated with a significant increase in the
likelihood of engaging in claim-making, as well as an expansion of the number of claim-
making practices employed. Those who regularly socialize with peoplefrom different
neighborhoods (which are divided along caste and class lines) are more likely to engage
in both direct and mediated claim-making practices. Those who report working with
people from different castes are also more likely to make claims, and do so through a
greater diversity of channels, than those who primarily work with people from their own
caste community. Travel beyond the village also has the potential to expose an individual
to new people and practices. In villages with a low land-to-labor ratio (where cultivable
land is scarce relative to labor), people are more likely to look beyond the village for
sources of employment. In such villages, residents are also more likely to engage in
claim-making, and do so through a wider repertoire of action, than those living in
villagers with ample land.
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6. Overview of the dissertation
This dissertation provides a bottom-up view of citizen-state relations in rural India,
documenting the diverse strategies through which citizens lay claims on the state for
public services. In the following chapters, I develop and test the theory that exposure
across both social and spatial boundaries drives important differences in the incidence
and practice of claim-making.
Chapter 2 places my study in empirical context. I begin by describing the
project's scope, introducing the case of rural Rajasthan, and the research design and
methods applied. I go on to describe patterns of claim-making in Rajasthan, drawing on
survey data from 2210 households across 105 villages, disaggregating the findings by
location, class, caste, gender, and other characteristics. I examine these data in light of
existing theories of citizen participation, including work that variously emphasizes the
role of formal institutions, levels of development, and socioeconomic status. I find that
existing theories, while helpful in illuminating the context in which claim-making takes
place, are unable to adequately account for variation in claim-making across and within
localities and social groups.
Chapters 3 through 5 attempt to explain this variation. Chapter 3 develops the
theory of socio-spatial exposure in detail, arguing that claim-making is driven by
exposure to information, ideas, and contacts that both enable and motivate engagement
with the state. I build, in theoretical terms, on insights from social network theory that
demonstrate the ways in which weak and bridging ties expose a person to information, as
well as on work that examines the role of network structure in creating bridges to external
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resources and, in particular, the state. I illustrate this theory in the rural Indian context,
and go on to show in qualitative terms how people use the information, ideas, and
contacts to which they are exposed to inform their claim-making practice.
I test this theory empirically in Chapter 4, drawing on the survey data. I begin by
introducing a range of measures of socio-spatial exposure across caste, neighborhood,
and village lines. Controlling for a wide range of village and individual-level features, I
find that those who socialize across neighborhood lines, who work alongside people from
other castes, and who venture beyond the village are more likely to make claims on
public officials, and do so through a greater range of practices, than those embedded in
networks with more limited exposure.
Chapter 5 examines the conditions that shape a person's social and occupational
networks. I begin by demonstrating that differences in exposure are not simply a function
of village-level development or individual socioeconomic status. Rather, exposure is
driven by a multiplicity of factors that foster increased cross-caste and cross-class
interaction and greater engagement beyond the village. These include structural changes
in the rural labor market that are reflected in changes in caste-based occupation and
increased rural-urban ties; the expansion of educational opportunity in rural India,
particularly among the lower castes; and institutional interventions by the state and NGOs
to promote the participation of marginalized groups in local politics. Importantly, there is
no one driver of socio-spatial exposure - no single omitted variable. Rather, various
factors (structural, institutional, and individual) are combined, reflecting a changing rural
environment marked by greater levels of inter-caste interaction and more porous village
boundaries. These changes, however, are far from uniform; change has not come to all
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places or people equally, and different people are embedded in more or less expansive or
closed networks within the same local settings.
Chapter 6 examines the consequences of claim-making and the broader
implications of the theory of socio-spatial exposure. The chapter begins by reflecting on
what claim-making means for access to services, drawing on survey data on the perceived
effectiveness of claims and on qualitative accounts of service delivery. The chapter goes
on to discuss claim-making as it relates to wider patterns of political participation
including citizens' expectations of the state and participation in other electoral,
deliberative, and contentious arenas of politics. I go on to discuss the broader theoretical
and applied implications of my study for broader questions of service delivery and
political participation. The dissertation concludes by considering the generalizability of
the findings to contexts elsewhere in India and beyond, and by reflecting on a set of
open-ended questions for further investigation.
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CHAPTER 2
Patterns and puzzles: claim-making in rural Rajasthan
1. Introduction
A large literature, developed primarily in the West, examines a range of institutions that
link citizens to the state, such as political parties, unions, or civil society organizations.
Comparatively little is understood, however, about how citizens in less developed
countries, where the formal institutions of democracy are often weaker, seek and access
the state in their day-to-day lives (Houtzager et al., 2002). This is particularly true in
India, where political parties lack deep local roots (Kohli, 1990; Krishna, 2007a), where
rates of union membership are low (Harriss, 2005), where associational membership is
sparse (Chhibber, 1999; Singh, 2008), and where formal democratic institutions co-exist
alongside a wide range of informal institutions (Jayal et al., 2006). How, in this context,
do citizens of the world's largest democracy seek and make claims on the state?
In this chapter, I present data from the state of Rajasthan to build a bottom-up
view of citizen access to the state. Section 2 describes the context of my study, its scope,
and methods. Section 3 presents the aggregate data on claim-making, drawn from a
survey of 2210 citizens across 105 villages. The data reveal that rural citizens engage in
high levels of claim-making, but do so through diverse practices ranging from direct
engagement of public officials, to mediated practices that engage a diversity of local
actors and institutions. This view calls into question conventional wisdom about the
nature of rural politics in India. Rural citizens, despite their relative poverty and distance
from state and national seats of power, are not disengaged from the state; nor are they
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locked into singular patronage relationships.
Section 4 examines patterns of claim-making in local context, examining a range
of institutional and structural factors that might influence whether and how individuals
engage the state. A substantial literature in comparative politics examines the ways in
which formal democratic institutions, such as electoral laws or party systems, shape
citizen-state relations. Such explanations cannot, however, account for variation in claim-
making practice in a single state under the same administration and formal institutions.
Other scholars have argued that economic and social development creates the conditions
for active civic participation. And yet we find differences in claim-making within
localities with varying levels of wealth, per capita income, and literacy. This variation
cannot be adequately explained by differences in formal institutions or by levels of
development in a locality.
Section 5 asks who makes claims, examining the individual-level attributes that
foster or inhibit political participation. Studies around the world suggest that richer
people, as well as those with higher social standing, are expected to be the most active
participants. And yet poor and low caste populations participate vigorously in Indian
electoral politics. The data from Rajasthan reveal similar patterns beyond the electoral
arena. Substantial claim-making activity occurs among groups - the poor and lower
castes - that, according to conventional wisdom, are least well positioned to engage the
state. Moreover, differences in claim-making persist within categories of class, caste, and
gender. Simply knowing where someone stands in the local social structure is not enough
to predict whether or how he or she will engage the state. While an individual's
socioeconomic status does play a role in shaping his or her relationship to the state, such
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characteristics do not consistently or adequately predict claim-making. We are left with a
series of puzzles about the nature and determinants of local participation. Section 6
concludes by reflecting on these puzzles, asking: who makes claims on the state, through
what channels, and to what ends?
2. Rural Rajasthan: study scope and methods
I examine claim-making practices in Rajasthan - one of India's poorest and largest states.
A study of a single state has several advantages. A sub-national and sub-state research
design allows for nuanced and contextualized comparison of localities while holding
constant macro-level features that would otherwise obfuscate important local sources of
variation (Snyder, 2001; Trounstine, 2009). Examining villages within the same
administrative block, district and state administration increases our ability to draw valid
causal inference of the micro-level determinants of participation. By holding constant
state administrative structure and capacity, we are able to examine the very different
ways in which people navigate and approach the state. This enables us to build a bottom-
up view, seen through the eyes of different citizens living in and under the same
institutional and administrative environments. The village is a critical site of politics and
day-to-day interaction of citizens and the state. Citizens live, vote, make claims, and seek
to extract public resources at this most local level. Understanding what drives variation
across and within these localities is of vital importance to the study of democratic
practice in rural India.
Rajasthan's internal diversity offers considerable leverage in research design.
Modem-day Rajasthan, inhabited by more than 68 million people (a population larger
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than that of England), is home to at least nine distinct linguistic divisions and close to 400
castes and tribes (Lodha, n.d.). Formerly 19 independent Princely States, Rajasthan only
emerged as a single territory in 1949, two years after Independence. Today Rajasthan is
divided into administrative districts and, within them, blocks. I carried out research in
four, purposively selected districts - Udaipur, Kota, Ajmer, and Jodhpur - chosen to
represent the primary linguistic, cultural, and geographical regions of the state.
Table 2.1. Selected Districts
District Pop P.C. Raj HDI % SC % ST Colonial Rule
Income/year (1-32)
Udaipur 2,633,312 $ 358.50 20 6.01 47.86 Princely State
Ajmer 2,181,670 $ 369.66 10 17.71 2.41 Direct Rule
Jodhpur 2,886,505 $ 335.82 9 15.81 2.76 Princely State
Kota 1,568,525 $ 425.28 2 19.16 9.69 Princely State
The districts were also selected to allow for the control of a number of variables, such as
per capita income, human development status, caste and tribal composition, and colonial
history (Table 2.1).20 Jodhpur is the poorest district, assessed in terms of per capita
income. Udaipur, however, has the lowest human development rank of the four (scoring
in the bottom 3rd of the state index). Kota has both the highest per capita income and the
highest human development score in the sample, ranking 2 nd in the state index. Ajmer and
Udaipur have mid-range per capita income, while Jodhpur and Ajmer represent mid-
range cases on the human development index.
The four districts have very different caste compositions, both in terms of the
percentage of Scheduled Castes and Tribes but also in terms of the dominance of specific
caste groups in each district. The districts also span distinct geographical regions:
2 All figures from the Government of Rajasthan Directorate of Economics and Statistics,
<http://www.statistics.raiasthan.gov.in/Default.aspx>, accessed August 20, 2012.
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Udaipur and parts of Ajmer are mountainous, Kota lies in the plains and is home to some
of the state's most productive agriculture, while Jodhpur lies to the west in the desert
region. Finally, the districts carry the historical legacies of different colonial experiences;
Udaipur, Kota, and Jodhpur were each part of a distinct Princely State through which the
British ruled by proxy, while Ajmer was the center of the colonial administration in
region and was under direct British rule.
In addition to its economic, demographic, geographic and historical diversity,
Rajasthan is a fruitful environment for research for a second important reason, namely its
level of administrative capacity. While traditionally considered a "BIMARU" ("sick" or
"backward") state,2 ' Rajasthan has enjoyed relatively high rates of growth and improved
human development standing in recent years. Social spending has increased, outpacing
other BIMARU states although still lagging far behind the forerunners in India (Singh,
2008). In administrative terms the government of Rajasthan has proved itself capable of
implementing a wide array of programs; for example, its record in administering the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (a national program that provides
employment on government worksites rural household that request it) is one of the best in
the country (Khera & Dreze, 2010). This is due in large part to the presence of an active
social movement sector that has pushed for and monitored the administration of this and
other social programs. Rajasthan's relative progress and administrative capacity make it
an ideal site for study of citizen-state relations and public distribution. The expansion of
state services means, in crude terms, that there is a bigger pie to divide. At the same time,
BIMARU, which also means "sick" in Hindi, is an acronym derived from the names of four states in the
Hindi-speaking belt of north India that have traditionally lagged behind in human and economic
development: Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.
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more and new actors have emerged at the local level, attempting to facilitate a link
between citizens and the agents of the state that hold the purse strings.
Field research and data collection
Fieldwork consisted of eighteen months between Spring 2009 and Spring 2011, including
iterative stages of qualitative and quantitative data collection. Exploratory research,
carried out in two districts, consisted of roughly 80 interviews with village leaders and
groups of men and women from different caste communities, as well as state and district
officials and NGO staff. Based on this work, I designed and implemented a citizen survey
of 2210 households across 105 villages in the four districts.2 2
Within each district, I ranked all blocks by literacy rate as a proxy for the block's
level of development, before randomly selecting one above and one below the mean.
Within each block, I randomly selected five Gram Panchayats, for a total of 40 GPs
across the four districts. Within each GP, I chose up to three villages, always including
the GP administrative headquarter and randomly selecting up to two other villages. 23 In
all, 105 villages were selected. (Descriptive statistics for village and GP are presented in
the Appendix, Table A2.1).
Within each village, I drew a random sample of an average of twenty households
stratified by caste category in order to ensure representative inclusion of different castes.
There is no detailed census data on caste composition at the village level so I employed
rapid participatory mapping techniques to capture the distribution of castes within a
22 I administered the survey with a group of BA and MA students from a local university in Udaipur. To
ensure accuracy in the sampling procedure and quality control, I personally supervised the on-the-ground
implementation of the survey, traveling and living with the team in different villages and towns across the
state for over three months.
23 Some GPs contain only one or two large villages, and in these cases all villages were selected. Villages
with fewer than fifty households were dropped from the sample.
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village. Since caste communities tend to be spatially segregated in a village, I used
neighborhood ("mohalla") boundaries as a proxy for caste. Working with village key
informants, I mapped the neighborhoods and listed them by population and caste
composition. I then selected neighborhoods to provide a representative village sample
that included "Scheduled" (SC and ST) and "Non-scheduled" (OBC and GC) respondents
in proportion to their share of the village population. In each village, the maps and
population data were confirmed with at least three local sources, and were checked
against census data (which, while lacking detailed caste data, provides an estimate of the
percentage of SC and ST in a village).
Within neighborhoods, households were randomly selected using a systematic
sampling approach. Beginning at a central neighborhood landmark, the surveyors were
assigned transects by rolling dice to generate a random number and then reading off the
corresponding degrees on a compass. Surveyors were also assigned random start numbers
by rolling dice, ensuring that houses both close to and far from the center had the same
chance of being included in the sample. Surveyors were then given an interval number K
= n/N, where n = the required number of interviews and N = the estimated number of
households in the neighborhood. The surveyor interviewed every Kth house along his
randomly assigned transect, turning right and left at every other corner, in order to ensure
the inclusion of houses on and off the main roads.
The survey collected data on the claim-making practices reported by respondents,
as well as on the nature, prevalence, and activities of a range of village institutions
including the Gram Panchayat, local bureaucracy, political parties, and neighborhood,
village, and civil society organizations, as well as a range of brokers including caste
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leaders and political fixers. The survey also collected data on household access to a range
of publicly-provided goods, services, and benefits. In roughly one-third of the villages I
carried out additional qualitative work, consisting of interviews with village officials,
elders, and caste leaders. I also spent considerable time in informal conversation with
village residents, often in gatherings next to water sources. I carried out interviews in a
mixture of Hindi and English, working with an interpreter when necessary - particularly
where local dialects were prevalent.
Following initial analysis of the survey data, I selected a sub-sample of six
villages in which to ground the findings from the survey in specific local context. The
villages were selected from two Districts, Udaipur and Kota, representing the low and
high ends of the human development index. The villages represent different local
environments in terms of economic and human development, caste composition, presence
and absence of NGOs, distance from the district seat, and other salient features.
In these six villages, I carried out 160 in-depth interviews with village key
informants who could provide information on both formal and informal governance
structures in the village, service delivery, and the claim-making practices carried out by
residents. In each village I began by seeking out local elected officials (members of the
Gram Panchayat) as well as civil servants (school teachers, childcare providers, nurses,
doctors, and appointed village administrators). From there I used a snowball method to
develop and expand a list of "knowledgeable" and "active" people in the village
representing different caste groups, neighborhoods, income levels, and men and women.
These included caste leaders and elders, local party representatives, NGO staff, and
members of women's and youth groups where present. I also designed a protocol for a
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semi-structured interview that was administered by two students among a random sample
of village residents, stratified to reflect the major caste communities. The students carried
out roughly 40 interviews in each village, for a total of 240 across the six research sites.
At the end of each randomly sampled interview, the students administered a rapid survey
to collect basic demographic, economic, occupational, and social information for each
respondent.
3. Data: a bottom-up view of claim-making
I define claim-making as the state-targeted strategies of action citizens pursue when
seeking access to, and articulating demands for, publicly-provided services (Table 2.2).
The citizen survey collected information on individual claim-making practices and access
to services. Respondents were asked about their interactions with different levels of
government as well as non-state actors and informal institutions. The categories
referenced in the survey were inductively derived, building on prior stages of qualitative
work, and thus represent a bottom-up view of the range of practices through which
ordinary citizens seek and access the state.
The data are unique in two respects. First, in contrast to other studies that simply
measure the presence or absence of infrastructure across villages, the data offer a detailed
picture of intra-village distribution defined in terms of household access to services.
Second, they enable systematic, comparative analysis of channels of access as seen
through the eyes of ordinary villagers. A study of claim-making reported by ordinary
citizens offers an unique view of rural politics in India. Rather than being singularly
locked in to caste or party-based patronage networks, people navigate their local
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environment by engaging with a multiplicity of local actors and institutions. There is
constrained room to maneuver at the local level, but the range of options (the claim-
making repertoire) looks different to different people.
Table 2.2. Defining claim-making practice
Claim-making Practice Description Mean
(n = 2210)
INCIDENCE Engagement in state-targeted claim-making practice (direct or mediated) 0.76
that seeks access to publicly -provided services.
DIRECT Personal contact with public officials (both appointed & elected) for 0.65
assistance related to public services
Administrative Contact local officials with jurisdiction over given area or sector 0.63
Gram Panchayat Contact elected members of the Gram Panchayat 0.62
Bureaucrat Contact block or district-level administrators 0.21
Partisan Contact p arty -affiliated p oliticians or p arty workers 0.22
Politician Contact state (MLA) or national (MP) representtives, or staff 0.22
MEDIATED Contact non-state actors & institutions who use influence or knowledge 0.54
facilitate access to public officials
Associational Contact collective organizations in village or beyond 0.35
Neighborhood Assoc Contact formal or informal organization at level of neighborhood 0.22
village Assoc Contact formal or informal organization that is village-wide 0.15
Civil Society Assoc Contact non-governmental and/or social movement organization 0.11
Brokered Contact individuals with political/social influence or knowledge 0.41
Caste leader Contact caste leaders, often in caste council 0.23
Inter-caste leader Contact village leaders across caste lines, often in multi-caste council 0.14
Fixer Contact influential/knowledgeable individuals 0.17
REPERTOIRE An index of the number of claim-making practices employed (0-9) 2.07
Structure of the citizen survey
The citizen survey was organized into modules, each of which explored different sectors
of service delivery or interaction with different local institutions. Respondents were asked
about the levels of government with which they interact, ranging from members of the
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Gram Panchayat, to block and district administrators, to elected politicians with state and
national-level constituencies. Respondents were also asked about their relationship to
different sets of non-state actors and institutions. For each set of officials, actors, or
institutions in question, respondents were asked: "In your own (personal) experience,
have you contacted this (person/organization) for assistance related to issue X?" 24 They
were then given a range of different issues, including public works and village services
("collective" goods), and access to government schemes at the individual or household
level ("selective" goods). If they responded in the affirmative, the survey went on to ask
them more detailed questions related to the experience, including their opinions
concerning the efficacy of their interaction in solving the problem at hand.
Claim-making incidence
I first assess the overall incidence of claim-making, that is, whether or not a person
engages in claim-making of any kind (as reported in table 2.2). Roughly three-quarters of
those interviewed report contacting officials - either directly or through mediators - in an
attempt to access services. Such high rates of claim-making activity call into question
some of the academic and popular wisdom about the nature of rural politics in India,
discussed in Chapter 1, in which the state is depicted as inaccessible and impenetrable by
the common citizen. Without denying the physical and psychic distance from the state
24 The questions did not specify a timeframe, but let respondents reflect over their cumulative experiences.
In pilot versions of the survey, the timeframe was restricted to one and five years. This, however, created a
great deal of confusion among respondents as well as problems regarding recall within a specified period. I
therefore decided to allow the respondents to reflect on their relationship to the state over time. In analysis
of the survey data, it is necessary to adjust and control for the age of the respondent, as older people simply
will have had more time over which to interact with officials.
25 Issues included: village public works and infrastructure, government poverty alleviation and household
welfare schemes, financial issues (such as access to credit and financial institutions), employment, caste or
religious issues, land disputes, or "other." In defining claim-making with regard to public service delivery, I
examine responses regarding only the first two of these categories (public works and government schemes),
as they require state-targeted action.
58
that many citizens experience, it is clear that a majority of people can and do engage the
state at the local level. Roughly one-quarter, however, report that they do not engage the
state at all around issues of service delivery. Given the primary role of the state in service
delivery, and the essential nature of these services, this is not an unsubstantial number.
We can think of this absence of claim-making as a kind of "exit" (opting out and seeking
private alternatives to public services) or "silence," under which a person simply does
nothing even when faced with serious wants and needs.
Among those who do voice their demands for services, there is substantial
variation in the kinds of claim-making practice employed. This raises questions about the
modes of claim-making employed; not just whether a citizen articulates his or her
demands, but how he or she does so. I classify practices by whether the action taken is
direct (involving face-to-face contact with a public official or representative) or mediated
(involving a third party that facilitates access to an official). The claim-making
repertoire, understood as the set of strategies a person undertakes. Repertoires are
"modes of action" (Hannerz, 1969) or a "toolkit of habits, skills, and styles from which
people construct strategies of action" (Swidler, 1986, p. 273). The idea of a repertoire
rests on the notion that people are only likely to engage in particular action if it is part of
the set of ideas or possibilities that they hold in their mind (Small, Harding, & Lamont,
2010). In other words, if you know how to do something, you are more likely to do it.
Variation in the composition and breath of the claim-making repertoire highlights
important differences in local citizen-state relations. Whether a person directly purses
contact with officials or acts through mediators reflects different degrees of distance
between citizens and state. By the same token, the range of actors and institutions
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contacted when making claims on the state highlights different patterns of representation
and lines of accountability, both direct and mediated. The breadth of the claim-making
repertoire calls our attention to variation in local patronage structures, which range from
those individuals who are dependent on a single patron to those who pursue a broader
range of channels of access to the state.
Direct practice
Direct practices entail the personal, face-to-face engagement of public officials, at the
level of the village, the panchayat, or beyond. About two-thirds of the sample (65
percent) report directly contacting public officials concerning public services. While
these practices vary in terms of scale and degree of formality, they all entail personal,
face-to-face contact with a public official. As such, they involve an individual's direct
participation in the public sphere.
Administrative practice
The most common set of direct practices is administrative, engaging officials with formal
jurisdiction over a given area, sector, or service. The most frequent and local approach
(practiced by a full 62 percent) is to contact elected members of the Gram Panchayat who
are, by constitutional design, the lowest tier of formal administration. GP members,
including the sarpanch (council president) and ward members (wardpanch) are directly
elected every five years and are charged with the delivery and administration of a wide
array of village services as well as beneficiary selection for government schemes. People
may engage members of the GP in informal settings, for example by visiting his or her
home or place of business, or in formal panchayat meetings. Attending a panchayat
meeting, which takes place at the administrative headquarters on designated day, presents
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a somewhat higher bar for citizen action. We find that about two-fifths (37 percent)
report engaging the GP in these formal arenas. Even using this more restrictive definition
of "contact," the GP rises above all other channels of claim-making.
As the most local tier of government, it is not altogether surprising that such high
numbers approach the GP. Indeed, India's tradition of village-based governance stems
from the Gandhian vision of self-governing "village republics" that stand at the frontlines
of democracy. Yet critics have long pointed out the potential for corruption and elite
capture with the Gram Panchayat. Bhimrao Ambedkar, author of the Indian constitution
and a lower caste activist, famously described Indian villages as "dens of iniquity,"
asking: "What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-
mindedness, and communalism?" (cited in Guha, 2008, p. 119). More recently, scholars
have described the GP as both lacking in capacity and plagued by corruption. Krishna
(2011), for example, writes:
... .official panchayats [GPs] are hampered by their institutional design.
They are equipped to provide downward communication on behalf of the
government, but they are not very effective for transmitting villagers'
demands and grievances upward to public officials.... Furthermore,
because panchayats are not well grounded in the norms and mores of
village social life, and control from below is virtually non-existent for
these bodies, corruption is a frequent problem (p. 111).
These very real concerns about elite capture notwithstanding, the Gram Panchayat
remains the single-most common site for citizen claim-making. Moreover, as we will see,
the GP is utilized by high and low class and caste members alike and, among women, is
the most frequent site of claim-making. As such, the GP represents an arena in which
diverse groups of citizens can and do engage.
At a level above the panchayat, villagers may also seek out the assistance of state
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administrators at the block or district level. However, as noted, bureaucrats do not
frequent the village. Rather, they operate from offices and agencies located at the district
or block level, making periodic and often very cursory visits to the village. Local
administrators and bureaucrats are therefore not a regular or visible presence at the
village level. As a result, substantially smaller numbers (21 percent) report contacting
local bureaucrats.
Partisan practice
Partisan practice specifically invokes party ties and political connections. This takes place
through contact with elected politicians who run on party platforms and who serve state
or national-level constituencies (including members of the state Legislative Assembly
[MLA] and Members of Parliament [MP]). These constituencies are much larger than the
GP, and operate at a level removed from the village. Where immediate access to the
politician is not possible, contact with his or her staff (party workers) is included in the
category of partisan practice. Elected politicians may be directly engaged in provision of
services through the allocation of Local Area Development funds within their
constituencies, or may be called upon to lobby or pressure local administration.
We might expect politicians and parties to become a key target of citizen claim-
making. And yet, only 22% of the sample reports contacting politicians or party
workers. 6 This is, in fact, consistent with the fact that parties, despite their prevalence
and resources, are weakly institutionalized at the local level (Kohli, 1990; Krishna, 2002,
2011; Weiner, 1989). Parties in rural India may be well organized to get out the vote, but
26 Krishna (2002; 2011) finds similarly low rates of citizen engagement of politicians in his study of rural
Rajasthan. In a cross-state study, Bussell (2011) also finds relatively low contact with politicians around
issues of service delivery, although this varies by state and by public agency.
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they do not appear to be common or effective upward conduits for citizens' concerns. 27
Studies elsewhere in India have suggested that access to a party may itself be mediated
by members of the Gram Panchayat who, while formally non-partisan, often have strong
ties to a party.2 1 In fact, in the Rajasthani case, of those who contact politicians, over 90
percent also engage members of the GP (Table A2.2, Appendix). Direct claim-making, it
appears, is by and large a highly local affair.
Mediated practice
Claims may also be made on state actors through more circuitous channels through local
associations or brokers. Mediated practices are those that seek to engage public officials
through the assistance of a non-state third-party who uses his or her political influence,
social standing, or knowledge of the political system to facilitate access. In the Rajasthani
context it is clear that non-state intermediaries, both groups and individuals, play a large
role in structuring citizen access to the state. Over one-half (54 percent) of the sample
reports seeking assistance from third-parties who assist in efforts to contact public
officials.2 9 Mediated practices do not, however, surpass the direct approach taken up by a
large majority of citizens; rather, mediated channels appear to complement, rather than
substitute, direct practice (as described in Table A2.2, Appendix).
There is a diversity of potential mediators, ranging from local associations to an
27 Bussell (2011) argues that the low rates of citizen engagement with parties masks the fact that politicians
do, in fact, spend considerable amounts of time dedicated to constituency services related to public service
delivery. The size of their constituencies, and limitations on their time and resources, mean that - despite
considerable effort on the part of politicians - a relatively small number of people benefit from their
services.
28 While GP officials are formally prohibited from aligning themselves with a party, parties may play an
important behind-the-scenes role in the GP, financing and mobilizing support for GP candidates (Dunning
& Nilekani, 2009), and influencing the GP planning and budgetary meetings (Wilkinson, 2007). The GP, in
turn, may provide a conduit to the party.
29 To be clear, mediated practices still constitute state-targeted claim-making. While local associations and
even private individuals may also act as service providers, offering private alternatives to state services, this
kind of interaction does not constitute claim-making as it is understood here.
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array of individual brokers, and no more than a quarter of respondents report using any
single category of mediator. The channels of mediation available depend on a given
locality and its environment. While the formal arena in which direct claim-making takes
place is held constant across villages, the range of local associations and brokers varies
from one village to another. Table 2.3 describes mediated practices controlling for such
differences in local institutional environment, first presenting the incidence of different
practices across the full sample, followed by the incidence of practice conditional on the
presence of a given actor or association in a village.
Table 2.3. Channels of mediated practice conditional on presence
Mediated Claim-Making Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
conditional on presence
Associational
NH Assoc. 696 0.69 0.46
Village Assoc. 539 0.63 0.48
Civil Society Org. 367 0.65 0.48
Brokered
Caste leader 1463 0.35 0.48
Inter-caste leader 620 0.49 0.50
Fixer 703 0.52 0.50
Associational practice
Associational practices are mediated through collective organizations that operate at the
level of the neighborhood, village, or beyond. A little over two-thirds of the sample
engages in this type of practice. At the most local level this includes contacting
neighborhood associations that operate in bounded localities within a village (often with
members from a single caste community). Village associations are broader entities that
include members from multiple neighborhoods and caste communities (and which are
sometimes established with assistance from external organizations, such as NGOs). Civil
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society organizations are broader still, and include non-government organizations or
charitable organizations, as well as a range of social movement organizations that
typically operate at a regional or even state or national level, encompassing members
from a range of localities.
As noted, however, rates of membership in civic associations are relatively low in
India. In the Rajasthani context, local associations are similarly sparse; 18 percent of the
sample villages are home to an active neighborhood association, while just 6 percent have
active NGO presence. 30 It follows that small numbers report turning to either
neighborhood or village associations (22 and 15 percent, respectively), and only a small
portion of the sample (11 percent) reports seeking assistance from NGOs or other kinds
of civil society organization. Such low rates of associational practice may, however,
simply reflect that such associations are few and far between. In villages with an active
association, we find that more than two-thirds of the sample is engaged in mediated
practice. Moreover, as we will see in section 4 (below), there is evidence to suggest that
local associations- where present - may have a profound effect in shaping patterns of
citizen-state engagement. In sum, local associations play a critical role in citizen-state
intermediation where present, but given their low numbers and uneven distribution, they
are not a primary platform for citizen claim-making.
Brokered practice
Unlike associational practices that engage a collective, brokered practices involve contact
with individuals who, for economic or social rewards, help others to navigate the local
bureaucracy. Just over forty percent of the sample reports turning to "influential or
30 The presence of a given association is determined if over 50 percent of the village sample report its
activity.
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knowledgeable people who are well connected and know how to get things done both
inside and outside the village. These people can help others with their problems, assisting
them to make contact with government agencies and to access government schemes and
benefits." The nature of these brokers, however, varies considerably, ranging from those
who are embedded in traditional caste and patron-client power structures (often referred
to as the mota aadmi or "big men" of the village) to younger, more educated political
entrepreneurs that are less bound by traditional structures of caste or social status.
Caste councils (jatipanchayats) remain active in most villages (80 percent of the
sample). The leaders of these caste bodies, often elders within a caste community, may
play the role of go-between, acting as brokers between members of their caste community
and agents of the state. Despite the prevalence of the jati panchayat, just under a quarter
of the sample (23 percent) report turning to caste leaders for assistance in accessing
public officials and resources. A minority of villages (20 percent) do not have an active
caste panchayat. Adjusting for this, we find that the rate of brokerage through caste
leaders in those villages where a caste panchayat is present increases to 35 percent. Some
localities (roughly 20 percent of the sample villages) also have mixed-caste panchayats
that include leaders from multiple caste communities. A much smaller number of survey
respondents (14 percent), however, report turning mixed-caste leaders for assistance
contacting officials. And yet, adjusting for the fact that they are less prevalent than
single-caste councils, these mixed-caste bodies appear to play an important role;
conditional on the presence of a mixed-caste council, brokerage through inter-caste
leaders rises to almost 50 percent.
The status and influence of these traditional leaders (both single and multi-caste)
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may, however, be on the decline as rural education expands, and as "ability, rather than
caste" emerges as "the new currency of political exchange" (Krishna 2010). A number of
scholars have documented the role of a new class of political entrepreneurs (Krishna,
2002, 2011; Manor, 2000; Mitra, 1991; Reddy & Haragopal, 1985) who act as links
between citizens, parties, and state agencies. Krishna (2002) describes these as "new
leaders" (naya netas) who typically hail from the lower castes, are younger, and have
higher levels of education than traditional village power brokers. These new leaders play
a critical two-way role, not only linking citizens to the state but also providing local
inroads for parties and bureaucrats. Importantly, they are also known to operate across
caste lines.
Consistent with this literature, I do find a role for individual fixers of this nature.
However, a relatively small proportion of my sample (just 17 percent) reports seeking
assistance through such individuals. These fixers are not, however, evenly distributed
across all localities. When asked to report whether their village had any such fixers, only
about one-third responded affirmatively. Controlling for this, rates of brokerage through
fixers rise to over 50 percent in those localities where they are active.3 1
31 Krishna (2002, 2011) finds a role for non-caste-based fixers ("naya neta") in his study of rural India
(including cases in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh). A majority of people in his study
state that they would "prefer" to contact naya neta over other channels such as the Gram Panchayat. Some
of the differences in our data might be explained by differences in the wording of our surveys, where
Krishna asked people to report on who they would contact or prefer to contact, and where my survey asked
people to report on actions personally taken. Other differences might be explained by the fact that Krishna
focused on particular sectors (dealing with land administration and the police; getting a bank loan;
replacing a non-performing teacher; and getting wage employment), whereas I asked people to report on
action taken to secure broader, unspecified bundles of collective (village level) and selective (welfare)
services. Across the two studies, however, there is a consistent finding regarding the importance of brokers
(whether "new" or "traditional") as a key set of players that negotiate access to the state and who very often
accompany other, direct approaches to the state.
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Claim-making repertoire
Finally, people are not restricted to just one set of practices; rather there is a multiplicity








0 1 2 4 5
Number of CM Practices
6 7
Figure 2.1. Distribution of the claim-making repertoire
In fact, a majority (54 percent) report engaging in more than one channel (Table 2.4). A
substantial number (43 percent) combine both direct and mediated practices. Of those
who report contacting the Gram Panchayat, more than two-thirds also engage in mediated
practices.
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Table 2.4. Claim-making repertoire
REPERTOIRE Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Multiple practice 2210 0.54 0.50
Direct and mediated 2210 0.43 0.50
Direct only 2210 0.22 0.41
Mediated only 2210 0.10 0.31
Freq. Percent Cum.
0 practice 540 24.43 24.43
1 practice 466 21.09 45.52
2 practice 405 18.33 63.85
3 practice 327 14.8 78.64
4 practice 221 10 88.64
5 practice 136 6.15 94.8
6 practice 71 3.21 98.01
7 practice 38 1.72 99.73
8 practice 4 0.18 99.91
9 practice 2 0.09 100
Total 2,210 100
In contrast, only 20 percent of those who engage the GP report doing so as a single
practice, uncombined with any other approach. Of those who report contacting
politicians, almost three-quarters also turn to mediated channels, while just four percent
turn to a politician alone. It appear that the relatively high rates at which individuals turn
to brokers and other mediators does not indicate an exodus away from direct engagement
of officials; rather, mediation accompanies, and even spurs, direct practice.
4. Claim-making in context: structural and institutional factors
How are we to understand this diversity of claim-making activity? A large, comparative
literature examines a range of structural and institutional factors that shape the nature of
citizen-state relations across states. Scholars have examined features ranging from
historical institutional accounts of state formation (cf. Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006;
Shefter, 1994); to levels of development and modernization (cf. Huntington, 1968;
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Lipset, 1994); to democratic institutions such as party systems and electoral laws (Boix,
1999; Grofman & Lijphart, 1986).32 At a sub-national level within India, scholars have
examined which party is in power at the state level and the degree of party competition
(Bussell, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007); state-center relations and the depth of decentralization
(Chuadhuri, 2006); and the autonomy and administrative capacity of state bureaucracy
(Bussell, 2011; Paul et al., 2004). All of these features, however, are held constant in the
analysis of citizen claim-making within the single state of Rajasthan. Detailed data
gathered within a single state allow us to hone in on more local factors that might drive
differences in citizen-state relations.
Sub-state variation
As discussed, my study encompasses four districts of Rajasthan that vary in terms of their
levels of development, geography, colonial history, and demographic features such as
population size, density, and caste composition. These districts were selected precisely
because of their difference from one another, to provide a representative picture of claim-
making practice across different environments within Rajasthan (Table 2.5). As one
would expect, there are some significant differences in claim-making practice across the
districts. For example, residents of Udaipur, the district with the lowest human
development ranking and greatest tribal population, are five percent less likely to engage
in claim-making than residents of the other districts (p = 0.065), while residents of Kota,
the district with the highest human development ranking and per capita income, are 10.6
percent more likely than everyone else to engage in claim-making (p = 0.000).
32 For a review of different theoretical approaches to the study of citizen-state linkages, see Kitschelt
(2000).
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Table 2.5. Claim-making by district
District Incidence Direct Mediated Admin Partisan Assoc Brokered
Jodhpur 0.72 0.62 0.43 0.62 0.15 0.30 0.32
Ajmer 0.76 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.18 0.44 0.48
Udaipur 0.73 0.63 0.53 0.60 0.26 0.29 0.45
Kota 0.81 0.72 0.57 0.71 0.27 0.37 0.38
These differences notwithstanding, the data also reveal substantial variation in
claim-making practice within districts. In fact, analysis of variance reveals that district
fixed effects account for less than one percent in the total variation in incidence of claim-
making (R-squared = 0.008) as well as variation in the claim-making repertoire (R-
squared = 0.009). The remaining variation cannot be explained by sub-state regional
differences in levels of development, caste and other demographics, geography, or
history. It is therefore necessary to turn our attention to a more local set of factors.
Village development and demography
What might these local factors be? To answer this question I explore the context in which
an individual's claim-making practice is situated. The village is recognized both in the
Indian census and in terms of social boundaries that have remained relatively stable over
centuries of history. As noted, the majority of villages are divided into distinct
neighborhoods along caste lines. The village and its neighborhoods are the most local
arenas in which people live, work, and socialize, and as such is an appropriate unit at
which to examine patterns of claim-making.
I first examine levels of village development, measured in both economic and
social terms. One might, expect that where people are better off economically they will
develop preferences and voice demands for more and better services (Lipset, 1959;
Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). Similarly, an educated citizenry may be better equipped
with the knowledge and skills necessary to make demands on the state. Residents of
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larger localities, and those living in proximity to urban and administrative centers, might
also be better positioned to access officials and public resources. In practice, however, the
relationship between local development and governance is far from clear (cf. Kraay &
Kaufmann, 2002; Tsai, 2007a). There is nothing about living in a rich place that
guarantees that residents will be actively engaged in local politics and claim-making. In
fact, people in wealthier or more developed places may quite simply have less need for
government services and may therefore be less engaged in the local political process (cf.
Hirschman, 1970).
The data from Rajasthan call the relationship between levels of development and
participation into further question. Indicators of village wealth are not consistently
associated with higher rates or greater diversity of claim-making practice (Table 2.6)."
For example, the average level of landownership in a village does not significantly
predict a change in the overall likelihood of engaging in claim-making in that locality. 34
The village literacy rate, which is an indicator both of levels of education as well as
social development, is also not a significant predictor of claim-making activity.
33 The full model and results are presented in the Appendix (Tables A2.3-A2.5). All models include a
range of individual, village, and GP controls and district fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at
the village level. See the appendix for the full specification and list of controls. Unless otherwise noted, the
same models are applied throughout this chapter.
34 Average asset-ownership, however, is associated with a decline in claim-making. The size of this effect,
however, is small; a one unit increase in asset-ownership (on an index of zero to ten) is associate with a five
percent drop in the incidence of claim-making (p = 0.036).
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Table 2.6. Effects of village characteristics on claim-making
Village land Effect Std. Err.
INCIDENCE -0.003 0.002 0.153
DIRECT -0.002 0.003 0.426
MEDIATED -0.004 0.002 0.040
REPERTOIRE -0.003 0.008 0.738
Village assets Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE -0.040 0.019 0.036
DIRECT -0.064 0.024 0.007
MEDIATED 0.045 0.023 0.057
REPERTOIRE -0.053 0.079 0.501
Village literacy Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.139 0.175 0.432
DIRECT 0.235 0.222 0.292
MEDIATED -0.105 0.229 0.645
REPERTOIRE 0.332 0.822 0.687
Village population Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.000 0.000 0.525
DIRECT 0.000 0.000 0.297
MEDIATED 0.000 0.000 0.772
REPERTOIRE 0.000 0.000 0.329
Population Density Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE -0.004 0.012 0.724
DIRECT -0.018 0.015 0.239
MEDIATED -0.010 0.012 0.436
REPERTOIRE -0.014 0.044 0.742
Distance to urban center Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE -0.001 0.001 0.431
DIRECT 0.000 0.001 0.683
MEDIATED 0.001 0.001 0.415
REPERTOIRE 0.000 0.003 0.895
Demographic and geographic features similarly lack predictive power. Total
village population is not associated with any significant change in claim-making
incidence or repertoire, and neither population density nor proximity to an urban center
has a significant effect. In sum, it is simply not the case that people residing in richer,
larger, or otherwise more developed villages demonstrate a greater propensity to engage
in claim-making than those who live in localities with fewer resources.
A substantial literature identifies social cleavages such as ethnic fragmentation as
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primary obstacles to collective action and, by extension, to participation (Alesina & La
Ferrara, 2000; Putnam, 1993). Others, however, have argued that heterogeneity may in
fact increase levels of participation, since individuals exposed to diverse networks
increase their political knowledge and skill (Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004;
Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004).
To explore the relationship between social fragmentation and participation, I
examine the effects of village caste composition on citizen claim-making (Table 2.7). I
first measure caste fractionalization as the number of castes in a village weighted by the
estimated number of households in each caste. 35
Table 2.7. Effects of village caste composition on claim-making
Caste fractionalization Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE -0.074 0.076 0.330
DIRECT -0.101 0.099 0.308
MEDIATED -0.030 0.095 0.750
REPERTOIRE -0.243 0.349 0.488
Percent SC Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE -0.191 0.198 0.332
DIRECT -0.265 0.238 0.265
MEDIATED 0.061 0.198 0.757
REPERTOIRE -0.083 0.750 0.912
Percent ST Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE -0.170 0.079 0.030
DIRECT -0.135 0.101 0.179
MEDIATED -0.026 0.111 0.814
REPERTOIRE -0.002 0.390 0.996
NOTE: Caste fractionalization and percent SC/ST are run in separate models, since
caste fractionalization is, in part, computed using the % SC and ST in a village.
35 The Indian census does not collect data on caste; official data are therefore restricted to broad
government caste categories (SC, ST, and everybody else) but not actual castes ('jati"). I therefore
construct my own estimates of fractionalization, drawn from interviews with key informants. Wherever
possible, estimates were made by triangulating between the responses of several informants. The index of
fractionalization is equal to 1- I (castei) 2, where i is the number of each jati in the village. For further
discussion of this index, see Alesina et al. (1999).
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I find no significant effect of caste fractionalization on the overall incidence of claim-
making, on rates of direct or mediated claims, or on the claim-making repertoire. In a
separate model, I examine other features related to caste composition by examining the
percentage of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in a village. One might expect that
localities with a high proportion of SC and ST residents might see lower rates of claim-
making due to legacies of social, economic, and political marginalization. On the other
hand, state policies that target resources to SC and ST populations might also create the
conditions for increased claim-making among such groups. Here there are notable
differences between the SC and ST populations. The proportion of SC living in a village
has no significant bearing on the overall incidence of claim-making for residents of that
locality. However, as the concentration of ST population rises, residents are less likely to
engage in claim-making; a one unit increase in ST as a percentage of total village
population is associated with a 22 percent drop in claim-making (p = 0.030). This
suggests that the ST lag significantly behind the SC in their ability or proclivity to engage
the state - a dynamic that has been noted by scholars elsewhere in India (Banerjee, 2004;
Prakash & Chin, 2011).
Local governance institutions
Perhaps the drivers of claim-making lie not so much in the economic and social structure
of a village but in its local governance institutions. The citizen's encounter of the state
typically takes place at the level of the Gram Panchayat, and the majority of claim-
making takes place in this arena. One would therefore expect the nature of the panchayat
to play a key role in shaping the claim-making environment. The basic structure and
function of the GP remains constant across all villages. However, certain political
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geographic and demographic features of the panchayat do vary.
I first examine the political geography of the panchayat; that is, the village's
position within the larger administrative structure of the panchayat (Table 2.8). In their
study of south Indian villages, Besley, Pande & Rao (2007b) find that the GP president's
home village receives a greater share of public goods. Similarly, they find that residents
of villages that are the designated headquarter of the GP will have increased opportunities
for interaction with officials.
Table 2.8. Effects of GP political geography on claim-making
President's village Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE -0.038 0.049 0.428
DIRECT -0.063 0.057 0.258
MEDIATED -0.014 0.052 0.793
REPERTOIRE -0.215 0.172 0.215
GP headquarter Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.076 0.045 0.099
DIRECT 0.109 0.058 0.067
MEDIATED 0.037 0.048 0.435
REPERTOIRE 0.226 0.192 0.241
Vill pop/GP pop Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.450 0.251 0.071
DIRECT 0.018 0.306 0.952
MEDIATED 0.674 0.301 0.025
REPERTOIRE 0.451 1.040 0.666
GP population Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.000 0.000 0.875
DIRECT 0.000 0.000 0.478
MEDIATED 0.000 0.000 0.950
REPERTOIRE 0.000 0.000 0.222
NOTE: GP H.Q. and village pop as percent of GP are run in separate models,
since the headquarter village is very often the largest village in the GP.
Examining the Rajasthani data, I find that whether or not a person lives in the GP
president's home village has no significant effect on his or her claim-making practice.
Living in the GP headquarter village, however, is associated with a 10 percent increase in
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the likelihood of making a claim (p = 0.099), including a 16.8 percent increase in direct
practices (p = 0.067). This, as one would expect, reflects the physical proximity of the GP
offices and, by extension, the relative ease of access to officials in that village. The GP
headquarter village also tends to be the largest village in the panchayat. In a separate
model, I also examine the size of the village population as a proportion of the GP, to
assess whether residents of larger villages might have greater access to officials relative
to residents of other, smaller villages in the same GP. Here I also find large and
significant effect; residents of larger villages are almost 60 percent more likely to engage
in claim-making (p = 0.071).
Other scholars have suggested that the social composition of the panchayat plays a
role in determining the degree to which a person engages local officials. In particular, the
caste and gender of the GP members, and whether or not they fill seats reserved for
women or for members of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes might create increased
opportunities for marginalized groups to contact local officials. Indeed, the policy of
reserving seats in the GP for women and members of the SC and ST is built on the
premise that it will increase the participation of populations that historically have been
politically excluded. As discussed, however, the effects of political reservations remain a
topic of debate, as studies have demonstrated both increased public access among
targeted groups (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004a; Pande, 2003) as well as local elite
capture (Dunning & Nilekani, 2009; Palaniswamy & Krishnan, 2008).
To examine these dynamics, I explore the effects of reservations where an
individual respondent shares either gender or caste characteristics with the GP president
(what I refer to as a caste or gender identity "match" (Table 2.9).
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Table 2.9. Effects of sarpanch identity match on claim-making
Female match Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.004 0.043 0.920
DIRECT -0.001 0.049 0.983
MEDIATED -0.063 0.058 0.276
REPERTOIRE -0.133 0.166 0.426
SC match Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.101 0.041 0.068
DIRECT 0.153 0.054 0.021
MEDIATED 0.154 0.101 0.161
REPERTOIRE 0.669 0.365 0.069
ST match Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE -0.008 0.073 0.909
DIRECT 0.102 0.071 0.188
MEDIATED -0.054 0.107 0.614
REPERTOIRE 0.174 0.317 0.584
One might expect, as Chattopadhyay and Duflo have suggested, that political reservations
for marginalized groups will increase opportunities for participation by members of those
groups. This does not, however, appear to be the case for women in the sample villages.
Women living in a GP with a female president are no more or less likely to engage in
claim-making than women living in places with a male president. The same is true for
members of the Scheduled Tribes, who are not significantly more likely to make claims
where the president is also ST. For Scheduled Castes, however, the story is different. SC
members living in GPs with a SC president are 13 percent more likely to engage in claim-
making (p = 0.068), both direct and mediated, reflected in a 32 percent expansion of the
claim-making repertoire (p = 0.069). This again suggests that the SC are better equipped
than the ST to take advantage of political reservations, something that has been suggested
by other scholars elsewhere in India.
Finally, the formal Gram Panchayat needs to be considered alongside non-state
institutions that have the potential to influence local politics and patterns of participation.
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To this end, I examine the presence or absence of a range of village institutions that, as
we have seen, comprise potential channels for mediated claim-making (Table 2.10).
Table 2.10. Effects of informal institutions on claim-making
NH Assoc Effect StdErr p-value
INCIDENCE 0.092 0.035 0.022
DIRECT 0.118 0.048 0.024
MEDIATED 0.167 0.055 0.004
REPERTOIRE 0.406 0.177 0.022
Village Assoc Effect StdErr p-value
INCIDENCE -0.064 0.068 0.308
DIRECT -0.099 0.073 0.161
MEDIATED -0.066 0.082 0.419
REPERTOIRE -0.232 0.227 0.308
Civil Society Org Effect StdErr p-value
INCIDENCE 0.056 0.047 0.290
DIRECT -0.020 0.079 0.796
MEDIATED 0.170 0.071 0.029
REPERTOIRE 0.241 0.228 0.290
Caste Assoc Effect StdErr p-value
INCIDENCE -0.136 0.031 0.001
DIRECT -0.218 0.043 0.000
MEDIATED 0.100 0.054 0.061
REPERTOIRE -0.643 0.189 0.001
Inter-Caste Assoc Effect StdErr p-value
INCIDENCE -0.039 0.044 0.358
DIRECT -0.072 0.058 0.208
MEDIATED 0.042 0.054 0.441
REPERTOIRE -0.147 0.160 0.358
There is clearly a correlation between the presence of a given body and claim-
making through that body; villagers, for example, are of course more likely to approach a
NGO if a NGO is active in the village. We can move beyond such obvious relationships,
however, to ask whether the presence of a particular kind of institution shapes claim-
making through other channels, suggesting a kind of spillover effect from one practice to
another. Where a neighborhood association is present, for example, the residents are 12
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percent more likely to engage in claim-making (p = 0.022), both direct and mediated, and
the repertoire of practices expands by 19.7 percent (p = 0.022), suggesting that the
presence of this local association, and the kinds of social interaction that take place
within it, spur claim-making activity through a diversity of channels. The presence of a
caste association, in contrast, accompanies an 18 percent decline in claim-making (p =
0.001), seen in a 31 percent drop in the number of claim-making practices engaged (p =
0.001). This strongly suggests that the presence of a caste association - which is often
portrayed by villagers as an "alternative" to the government panchayat - has a chilling
effect on both direct and mediated forms of citizen-state engagement.
In sum, the economic and social structure of a village leave substantial amounts of
variation in claim-making unexplained. The local governance environment - consisting
of both formal and informal linkages to the state - does, however, play an important role
in shaping the context in which claim-making occurs. This local environment, however,
appears differently to different people, and different people navigate the same local
opportunity structures in different ways.
5. Who makes claims? Individual characteristics and socioeconomic status
It is therefore necessary to turn our attention to the individual attributes that might shape
claim-making. Examining differences among individuals in a community or locality,
rather than studying the average or "most common" behavior, is essential if we are to
uncover the factors that make certain forms of engagement with the state possible for
some people but not others (Small, 2004, p. 145). Numerous studies have found a
positive relationship between socioeconomic status and levels of political activity
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(Bennett & Bennett, 1986; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995). Milbrath and
Goel (1977), for example, argue that: "No matter how class is measured... higher class
persons are more likely to participate in politics than lower class persons" (p. 92,
emphasis in original). Other scholars examine the degree to which ascriptive, identity-
based structures of ethnicity, caste, or gender influence patterns of citizen-state
engagement (MacKinnon, 1989; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). Across these
works, a common expectation emerges that those with higher economic and social
standing will be among the most active participants and claimants.
And yet, as discussed in chapter one, there is an apparent "paradox" of
participation in India, where poor and lower-caste citizens vote at rates as high or higher
than elites despite persistent social and economic exclusion. The data from Rajasthan
suggest that the "paradox" of Indian political participation extends beyond the electoral
arena to other forms of political activity such as claim-making. In fact, a great deal of
claim-making activity occurs among groups - the poor and lower castes - who we might
least expect to engage in local political activity.
Rich and Poor
Studies from around the world have explored the relationship between economic well-
being and participation. In their study of participation in the United States, Verba et al.
(1995) document a positive relationship between economic class and both civic and
political participation. The relationship between higher class status and increased political
activity has been firmly established in the West and confirmed in broader comparative
context (cf. Dunning & Nilekani, 2009; Verba et al., 1987). These patterns extend beyond
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the electoral arena to other forms of participation including campaign work, contacting
officials, protest, and collective action to solve problems.
As we have seen, however, India appears to buck this trend. In a study of Delhi,
Harriss (2005) finds that lower income groups are more likely to engage in a range of
problem-solving and political activities, including protest and contacting officials, than
higher-income groups. In a rural Indian setting, Krishna (2002) finds that there is no
significant relationship between higher levels of wealth and political participation across
a range of activities including voting, campaign activity, contacting officials, and protest.
The data from Rajasthan also reveal an uneven relationship in which neither the
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Figure 2.2. Claim-making by landownership (quintiles)
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Operationalizing class is a notoriously difficult task. I therefore apply three
different measures in order to probe the relationship between individual socioeconomic
status and claim making. I first examine landownership which, given the agrarian
context, is a salient measure of relative wealth. Examining the raw data, we find evidence
of a non-uniform relationship; those in the middle appear to be more active claim-makers
than those at either end of the landownership spectrum.
Multivariate analysis, in which I control for a wide range of individual, village,
and GP attributes, as well as district fixed effects, confirms this pattern, revealing that
there is no significant difference between those with the least and those with the most
land (Table 2.11). Dividing landownership into quintiles, and comparing the first through
fourth quintiles to the top, we find that those at the bottom and lower end of the
distribution are not any more or less likely to engage in claim-making than those at the
top. However, those in the fourth quintile (that is, those with a substantial - but not the
most - land), are 8.4 percent more likely to make claims (p= 0.050) and do so through a
larger repertoire of action (p = 0.065).
In other words, those in the middle (not the richest or the poorest) appear to be the
most active claim-makers.36 A modicum of wealth appears necessary in order to engage
in claim-making activities, whether to pay brokers, to bribe officials, to pay for
transportation to government offices, or to take time off work to attend meetings. At the
highest levels of wealth, however, claim-making may become less necessary; local
36 A non-linear relationship between wealth and claim-making is also suggested by an examination of
asset-ownership, measured as an index of personal and household items. While greater assets are, at first,
associated with a greater likelihood of engaging in claim-making, the relationship becomes negative at
higher levels. This is reflected in a bell-shaped pattern in which an index of assets is positively correlated
with the incidence of claim-making (p = 0.011), but where the squared-term of assets is negatively
correlated (p = 0.012).
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landed elite rely less on government services, opting instead to self-provide in the form of
private schools, private clinics, private water provision and generators, and so on. The
middle sections, those with the resources to engage who also rely heavily on government
services and lack the exit opportunities of the very rich, appear the most likely to engage
in claim-making.
Table 2.11. Individual wealth (land and assets) and claim-making
Landownership (in quintiles, compared to most land)
Quintile 1 Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.008 0.037 0.826
DIRECT 0.048 0.044 0.289
MEDIATED -0.047 0.048 0.322
REPERTOIRE -0.033 0.141 0.814
Quintile 2 Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.027 0.035 0.452
DIRECT 0.057 0.045 0.226
MEDIATED 0.082 0.044 0.066
REPERTOIRE 0.203 0.143 0.159
Quintile 3 Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.020 0.030 0.522
DIRECT 0.019 0.040 0.63
MEDIATED 0.035 0.039 0.373
REPERTOIRE 0.084 0.112 0.455
Quintile 4 Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.064 0.030 0.05
DIRECT 0.053 0.043 0.238
MEDIATED 0.064 0.040 0.121
REPERTOIRE 0.279 0.149 0.065
Asset-ownership Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.039 0.015 0.011
DIRECT 0.046 0.020 0.023
MEDIATED 0.026 0.024 0.273
REPERTOIRE 0.072 0.077 0.35
AssetsA2 Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE -0.005 0.002 0.012
DIRECT -0.005 0.002 0.028
MEDIATED -0.003 0.003 0.298
REPERTOIRE -0.006 0.009 0.538
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Education is also considered a key component of socioeconomic status. As one
might expect, I find that individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to
engage in claim-making (Table 2.12).
Table 2.12. Education level and claim-making
Education Level
Primary Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.015 0.029 0.613
DIRECT 0.021 0.038 0.588
MEDIATED 
-0.002 0.039 0.95
REPERTOIRE 0.122 0.124 0.326
Secondary Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.071 0.030 0.027
DIRECT 0.064 0.038 0.097
MEDIATED 0.075 0.041 0.071
REPERTOIRE 0.307 0.136 0.026
Higher Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.054 0.049 0.321
DIRECT 0.130 0.053 0.03
MEDIATED 0.000 0.075 0.996
REPERTOIRE 0.625 0.266 0.02
Education is often used as a proxy for levels of wealth and, as such, the observed effects
of education may simply indicate higher socioeconomic status. I suggest, however, that
education plays an additional role as driver of exposure. It is necessary to leave one's
immediate locality in order to attend school, particularly at higher levels where students
must travel to the GP headquarter or beyond. Moreover, the classroom is a key arena in
which young people come to interact with other students and teachers from different
castes. Indeed, at lower levels, there is no evidence of a positive relationship between
education and claim-making; those with a primary education are not significantly more or
less inclined to engage in claim-making than those with no education at all. It is only as
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the level of education increases to the secondary level and higher that we observe a
significant increase in the incidence and repertoire of claim-making.
Caste categories
There is, of course, more to socioeconomic status than wealth, and in India caste is a
primary marker of social, economic, and political life. Banerjee (2004) demonstrates that
areas with a high proportion of traditionally marginalized caste groups (in particular
Scheduled Tribes) receive significantly lower levels of public goods provision. Caste is
also a primary political cleavage, taken advantage of by politicians who use shared ethnic
identity to secure votes (Chandra, 2004). Finally, caste refers to a set of government
classifications (Chatterjee, 2004) that shape a citizen's relationship to the state by
establishing categories of entitlement and political reservation (Corbridge et al., 2005).
We are therefore primed to think of caste as an all-important characteristic that shapes a
citizen's relationship both to the broader polity and the state. By extension, we might
predict that caste plays a primary role in shaping participation and claim-making
behavior. In particular, lower castes have a long history of economic and political
marginalization and so might be expected to make fewer claims. I find, however, that
there is no consistent pattern between one's position in the caste hierarchy and claim-
making. The raw data reveal very little difference in the incidence of claim-making
across caste category (Figure 2.3).
Multivariate analysis compares members of the SC, ST, and OBC to the "general"
(GC) groups that represent the upper castes (Table 2.13). In these controlled models,
caste category does not emerge as a significant predictor of the likelihood of engaging in
claim-making. Members of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, who are typically
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considered to be at the bottom of the social ladder, are no more or less likely to engage in
claim-making than those with the highest caste status. Both the ST and SC are, however,
less likely than the GC to make direct claims (results are borderline significant at p =
0.121 [ST] and p = 0.100 [SC]). The GC are more likely than the SC and ST to engage in
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Figure 2.3. Claim-making by caste category
The same caste bias does not, however, extend to contact with politicians; in fact, the SC
are significantly more likely to contact politicians and party members than the GC.37 And
so, while it does appear that there is an upper-caste bias in certain forms of direct
37 This likely reflects the fact that politicians in Rajasthan, out of political necessity, seek to form cross-
caste coalitions and therefore are more likely than other local officials to reach out to members of lower
castes).
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practice, caste hierarchy does not uniformly encourage or inhibit claim-making.
Table 2.13. Effects of caste identity on claim-making
Gender
Like caste, gender is another ascriptive characteristic that we expect to shape the
relationship between citizen and state. In Rajasthan, as in much of north India, gender
hierarchies are firmly entrenched, and many women (both Hindu and Women) continue
to live under the highly restrictive purdha (veil) system in which their engagement in the
public sphere is highly restricted. It follows that, under these conditions, we would expect
women's claim-making behavior to be curtailed, and this is indeed the case (Figure 2.4).
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Caste category (compared to GC)
Scheduled Tribe Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.171 0.257 0.506
DIRECT -0.127 0.085 0.121
MEDIATED 0.035 0.105 0.741
REPERTOIRE -0.154 0.302 0.612
Scheduled Caste Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE -0.099 0.218 0.649
DIRECT -0.097 0.061 0.1
MEDIATED 0.014 0.077 0.855
REPERTOIRE -0.115 0.229 0.618
OBC Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE -0.190 0.201 0.346
DIRECT -0.039 0.060 0.511
MEDIATED -0.037 0.074 0.613










Figure 2.4. Claim-making by gender
That women make fewer claims than men is undeniable.38 Women are 37 percent
less likely than men to engage in claim-making (p = 0.000) (Table 2.14), reflected in a 66
percent contraction of the claim-making repertoire (p = 0.000). It is worth examining,
however, the claim-making practices that are utilized by women (Table 2.15). The single
38 Interviews reveal that women, while less active in making both direct and mediated claims on the state,
develop other problem-solving strategies that are not adequately captured in the survey data. In large part,
these involve making complaints to or demands on male relatives, who in turn make state-targeted claims,
direct or mediated. This is, in effect, an additional step of mediation for women, and not one that was
considered in the survey questionnaire. The data therefore may under-report women's problem-solving
activities. That said, it could be misleading to include women's claims made through male family members
in the same category as other kinds of claim-making, since it does not involve engagement in the public
sphere. All other forms of claim-making, whether through direct contacting of officials or through the
mediation of associations or brokers, require public engagement outside of the home. It is precisely this
kind of engagement in multiple social and public spheres that is most restricted for women in rural
Rajasthan.
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most popular form of claim-making is to directly approach an elected member of the
Gram Panchayat, a practice reported by 44 percent of women in the sample. Women
engage in this direct form of claim-making far more than they turn to mediators of any
kind. Compared to other possible claim-making practices, the GP emerges as the channel
most accessible to women who otherwise have highly circumscribed claim-making
repertoires.









































Table 2.15. Women's claim-making practice
Women Effect StdErr p-value
INCIDENCE -0.280 0.066 0.000
DIRECT -0.301 0.064 0.000
MEDIATED -0.241 0.076 0.002
REPERTOIRE -1.361 0.213 0.000
All women of course are not the same. I therefore examine the interaction of
gender, class, and caste to see if differently-placed women engage in different claim-
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Figure 2.5. Claim-making by caste and gender
Multivariate analysis reveals that SC and ST women - at the very bottom of the caste
hierarchy - have broader claim-making repertoires than upper caste GC women (Table
2.16). SC women are 18 percent more likely to engage in direct practices than the GC (p
= 0.93), while ST women are 28 percent more likely to undertake mediated practices (p =
0.041). These findings run counter to the expectation that lower caste women, typically
considered the most marginalized of groups, will be the least engaged in local
government. Instead we find that lower caste women are - among women - the most
likely to engage in a diversity of claim-making practices.
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Table 2.16. Caste*gender effects (compared to GC women)
SC women Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.046 0.059 0.473
DIRECT 0.119 0.063 0.093
MEDIATED 0.031 0.085 0.719
REPERTOIRE 0.503 0.225 0.027
ST women Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.062 0.046 0.231
DIRECT 0.090 0.064 0.196
MEDIATED 0.152 0.069 0.041
REPERTOIRE 0.656 0.254 0.011
OBC women Effect Std. Err. p-value
INCIDENCE 0.020 0.051 0.704
DIRECT -0.023 0.066 0.723
MEDIATED 0.000 0.075 0.996
REPERTOIRE 0.181 0.190 0.341
As I will argue, these patterns are in large part a function of different women's mobility
and exposure. Faced with different economic pressures and cultural norms, ST and SC
women are more likely than upper caste women to work outside the home and, in so
doing, enter different social and public spheres than higher caste women with more
restricted mobility.
6. Conclusion
We have seen that many of the "usual suspects" commonly cited as the drivers of
political participation fail to adequately explain the variation in claim-making observed in
rural Rajasthan. Formal democratic institutions and administration are held constant
across the state and, at the sub-state level, within districts. Economic and demographic
features of the village, including level of development, population size, density, and
proximity to a town, have little significant effect on claim-making outcomes at the
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individual level. Village caste composition also tells us very little (with the exception of
areas with a high concentration of ST residents, where we observe a marked decline in
claim-making). The local governance environment - comprised of both formal and
formal institutions - however, does appear to shape the claim-making repertoire by
defining the opportunity structure in a given locality. And yet, we observe that different
people navigate the same environments differently.
Turning our attention to individual attributes, we find that socioeconomic status
(measured in terms of wealth and education), along with ascriptive characteristics such as
caste and gender offer at best only a partial explanation of claim-making behavior in rural
Rajasthan. It is simply not the case that the wealthiest people make the most claims. Nor
is it the case that those at the bottom of the local caste hierarchy are the least active
claimants. And while women consistently make fewer claims than men, we observe -
among women - that the lower castes are more active.
I do not wish to argue, however, that socioeconomic and ascriptive characteristics
do not play a role in shaping claim-making practice. Rather, I simply underscore the fact
that they do not predict claim-making in a consistent fashion. Moreover, patterns of
claim-making in rural Rajasthan appear to deviate from patterns elsewhere in the world,
particularly in the West, where socioeconomic status is closely linked to rates of
participation. As such, these findings complicate resource and identity-based theories of




Crossing boundaries: the theory of socio-spatial exposure
1. Introduction: claim-making in context
I myself am not an active claim-maker. I live in an affluent New England town; the roads
are regularly repaired, I have clean running water whenever I turn on the taps, my
garbage is - for the most part - picked up. On the few occasions that I have needed
something from my city government, I have turned to easily accessible sources of
information: the internet, the phone book, the help desk at town hall. To give one
example, I live in a college town, and students often leave behind large amounts of
garbage when they leave at the end of the term. On one occasion, my street was strewn
with garbage that went uncollected. After several days, I decided to complain. I turned to
the city's website where, under "frequently requested information" I found the contact
number for the Public Works Department where, with one phone call, I could report the
issue. On another occasion, I needed to have some documents notarized; a quick visit to
the town hall's help desk directed me to the office of the Town Clerk who, during regular
business hours, was available to assist me. My interactions with city government are
infrequent, but when I do have a complaint or a need, it does not take me long to sort out
who to talk to, and I proceed with a reasonable expectation that someone will, at the very
least, listen to me.
The rural Indian case is dramatically different. Services are often lacking and, at
best, are unevenly distributed and unpredictable. For example, access to clean drinking
water - something I take for granted - is a matter of continuous bureaucratic and political
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struggle for many residents. Poorer residents rely on communal taps and water tanks
where lines are long, water supply low, and where - if a tap falls into disrepair - weeks or
months may pass before a technician from the Public Health and Environment
Department (PHED) makes a visit. More affluent residents may have household
connections with running water, and yet these connections are dependent on a regular
supply of electricity. Residents regularly report that there are only a few hours in a day
where there is power for running water; women often speak of the need to get up at 3:00
or 4:00 in the morning because that is the only time they can capture enough water for the
day. Information about who to contact with these problems is not always readily
available. While some residents clearly understand that water delivery is the purview of
the PHED, other residents have a much less precise notion of where their water comes
from; as one man put it: "Who knows... all I know is that some Babu39 brings the
water."40 Even among those who are clear about which agency is responsible, there is no
clear expectation that contacting officials from the PHED will produce results. Residents
report making a continuous stream of complaints, inquiries, and petitions, turning directly
to officials, as well as to local panchayat representatives, and to a range of brokers. As a
Kota resident explained: "if you just say it [complain] once it doesn't happen. We have to
say it many times, to so many people. Everyone and anyone, we ask and tell them of the
problems." 4 1
Claim-making, as is clear from the contrast between my New England town and
the Rajasthani villages studied here, is context specific. First and foremost, there is the
39 Literally "Mister", referring here to a petty official.
40 Author interview, Sangod Block, Kota District, February 22, 2011
41 Author interview, Sangod Block, Kota District, January 31, 2011
95
question of need: is there something a person needs or wants that the state can provide? I
have little need to make demands, since most of the services I require are regularly
provided. In rural Rajasthan, where service delivery is far less regular, residents from
different economic strata all struggle to extract services from the state. Rich and poor
alike depend on the state for a wide range of services, though the precise nature of the
goods and services they seek may vary by economic class. The size and reach of India's
developmental state makes a growing range of public services available at the local level.
Simply put, there are significant resources to be had, even if access to those resources
remains elusive for many. Under these conditions, claim-making is an act driven by both
need and hope. As the pool of public resources expands (as described in chapter 1), and
as knowledge of these resources grows through encounters with others who have
successfully accessed them, people are increasingly likely to engage in claim-making out
of the hope that they too might benefit.
Second, there is the question of information: if one needs something from the
state, do you know how to proceed? Information on who to contact and how (phone
numbers, hours of operations, and so on) are readily available to me should I need
assistance. In rural India, where officials exercise a high degree of discretion in their
allocation of goods and services, residents require far more than procedural information.
Lines of accountability are much less clear; it is not obvious to the common citizen where
to turn or who to talk to. Even with these kinds of information, there is no assurance that
contacting the "correct" channels will produce the desired results. Rather, claim-making
emerges as a more involved and often circuitous process. In a "patronage-democracy"
where goods and services are seldom distributed in a rule-bound or programmatic
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manner, citizens require the skills to navigate a complex service delivery environment
that also functions according to informal rules and norms rather than formal procedure
alone.
Third, there are questions of access and efficacy: if you speak up, will someone
respond? When I needed something from my local officials, I acted directly - and on my
own - with the expectation that someone in city government would respond. I not only
know where to turn, but also feel entitled to services and believe that my officials should
be, and for the most part are, accountable to their local constituents. These expectations
of a responsive local government, as well as a sense of political efficacy, are much less
common in a rural Indian context where, as Anirudh Krishna reports in his study of
citizen access to services, many residents "expect that their voices will simply go unheard
by public officials, including those responsible for service delivery" (2011, p. 102). The
state for many rural Indians is both tantalizingly large (visible through a vast array of
programs, services, and infrastructure) and frustratingly remote and difficult to access.
Under these conditions, the questions emerge: who makes claims on the state, and
how? What obstacles do citizens face, and what conditions best foster this kind of citizen-
state engagement? This chapter seeks to answer these questions by examining the
obstacles and resources that inhibit or foster claim-making. I argue that citizens are
significantly more likely to make claims on the state, and will do so through a broader
array of practices, when exposed to information, ideas, and contacts that create
opportunities as well as political knowledge and skill for citizen-state engagement. This
exposure is, I will demonstrate, a product of networks that cut across both social and
spatial boundaries; through social and occupational ties that extend beyond the
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immediate community and locality, a person encounters broad sources of information and
an array of contacts that both motivate and enable claim-making.
The degree and manner in which I make claims for services is in large part a
function of where I live (an affluent town, where service delivery is regular) and my own
background (my level of education, my ability to navigate the local system). But, as we
have seen in chapter 2, differences in citizen claim-making in rural Rajasthan are not
adequately explained by the level of development in a locality or by individual
socioeconomic status, which at best offer only a partial explanation for the diversity of
practices observed. People in villages both rich and poor and, moreover, people living in
the same villages exhibit different sets of practice. So too do people of similar
backgrounds, who share features of class, caste, or gender.
Rather than being explained simply by people's village environment or
socioeconomic status, I suggest that exposure across these social and spatial cleavages
both drives and expands the claim-making repertoire. People secure the resources
required for claim-making (namely information about public services, notions of
entitlement and political efficacy, and linkages to the state) through exposure to people
and settings made possible by social and occupational networks that cut across social
cleavages and spatial divides. People embedded in "cosmopolitan" networks that extend
beyond their immediate community and locality are exposed to broader sources of
information and linkages to the state than those who are situated in more "parochial" or
locally circumscribed networks. In other words, socio-spatial exposure fosters more and
more diverse claim-making practice.
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This chapter has two aims. First, I present the theory of socio-spatial exposure,
drawing on insights both from rural Rajasthan and from social network theory. Second, I
use the Rajasthani case to illustrate this theory and its mechanisms in a particular setting.
I begin, in Section 2, by examining in further detail the obstacles to and resources for
claim-making, including information, ideas, and contacts that both enable and motivate
citizen action. Section 3 introduces the theory of socio-spatial exposure, which (in
section 4) builds on (and at the same time challenges) existing literature on social
networks. Section 5 develops the theory in the Rajasthani context, presenting two ideal
types of the "cosmopolitan" and the "parochial" villager who, by virtue of their different
social and occupational networks, are exposed to different resources for claim-making.
Section 6 turns to the question of mechanisms, using villagers' own accounts of their
claim-making experiences to demonstrate the ways in which socio-spatial exposure
shapes citizen-state engagement. The evidence presented in this chapter is qualitative in
nature, drawn from interviews and village case studies. In the next chapter, I return to the
citizen survey to offer quantitative evidence of the relationship between socio-spatial
exposure and patterns of citizen claim-making.
2. Obstacles to claim-making
What is it about exposure to information, ideas, and contacts that facilitates claim-
making? To begin to answer this question, it is necessary to take a step back to first ask,
what are the obstacles to claim-making? Why would a person, particularly someone
living in poor, rural areas where the state remains the primary service provider, not
demand essential public resources?
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As noted, a person must first have a need for state services. In rural India,
however, such needs are almost a given. Private services do, of course, exist and in some
cases provide an alternative to public services in the form of private schools, private
doctors, private water borings, and so on. The scale of these private services, however, is
dwarfed by the reach of the public sector, particularly in remote rural areas where private
service provision is less lucrative (Chandra, 2004; World Bank, 2000, 2011). The
majority of citizens require some kind of services from the state, even as interests vary
according to economic condition. Poor wage laborers may, for example, be most
concerned with issues such as securing a job on a government worksite, or basic
amenities such as drinking water. Large landowners may be more concerned with water
for irrigation or the quality of roads to transport their goods to market. The goods and
services a person seeks may vary in these ways, but rich and poor alike are engaged in
state-targeted claim-making.43 This is particularly true in an environment where the pool
of public resources is fast expanding due to a proliferation of state programs that increase
the incentives for claim-making.
Given these high levels of need, we might expect to see high levels of claim-
making and, indeed, roughly three-quarters of those surveyed report making claims on
the state. And yet a full quarter of the sample does not engage the state in regard to public
services. Given the primary role of the state in service delivery, This is not an
unsubstantial number. Why, then, do some people do not make claims on the state? A
person may simply lack basic information about public resources, the programs that exist,
43 Moreover, since the allocation of services is rarely a rule-bound affair, there are opportunities for
individuals to seek services beyond those to which they are legally entitled. For example, Below Poverty
Line (BPL) cards, which in turn give access to a range of rations and subsidies, are consistently allocated to
households above the poverty line (Besley et al., 2007a)-
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how to apply, who to talk to, what forms to file, and so on. Programs and schemes change
with each successive government, as do the rules of entitlement and application
procedures. In interviews, residents rarely knew the formal name of programs and were
often confused about whether or not they were entitled to apply. An exchange between
several SC women in Kota illustrates this dynamic by highlighting the confusion that
surrounds a subsidized housing program referred to as the Indira Avaz Yojna which is
intended to assist Scheduled Caste and Tribe households to secure "pucca" (proper, or
concrete) housing:
Interviewer: Is there some scheme here for housing?
Woman 1: Yes, the government will give you a pucca house. But only
if you are hath-walla ["hand people", referring to the
Congress party.]
Interviewer: Is the scheme meant for the SC/ST households?
Woman 2: No, it's not like that. See, houses just go to the mota aadmi
(big men); any rich person can take the application.
Interviewer: Take the application? How do you apply?
Woman 1: You have to ask the MLA [Member of Legislative
Assembly]
Woman 2: No, you have to go to the office in Gogunda [the block
seat]
Woman 3: The panchayat hands out the titles at the village meeting
[All three women start laughing]
Woman 1: See, who knows? These schemes come and go and nobody
knows what is up or down. They keep us running every
which way, and either way we will not get a house.
Interviewer: What is this scheme called?
Woman 1: Who knows! The sahibs [bureaucrats] say some "ABCs"
and call it a scheme. The common person can't know all
these things.44
Information about government programs and schemes is highly valued, if thin on the
ground. Indeed, in interviews people commonly described those who they believe to be
successful claim-makers and effective brokers as 'jankar" (knowledgeable) and 'jagruk"
44 Student interview, Sangod block, Kota district, February 24, 2011
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(aware) concerning government schemes. For example, when asked to describe who he
would turn to for assistance a SC man in Kota, rather than emphasize the need for
political connections, social standing, or wealth, simply replied:
Jankar, knowledge-walla log [people with knowledge]. Anyone with
information. This matters most. Without information, how can you know
what to do, or how to get anything done? 45
Procedural information about public services and how to apply, however, is a
necessary but insufficient condition for claim-making. Even if a person is well informed
about existing resources, he or she may not feel entitled to claim services from the state.
The housing scheme described above is specifically targeted to SC and ST households,
and yet the ST women conversing had no sense that it is intended for them. Indeed, sense
of entitlement emerged as one of the most variable themes among my interviews. Take
for example, these ST women in Udaipur who [separately] discussed the water shortages
in their village:
Interviewer: Have you contacted anyone about this [water] problem?
Woman 1: Why should I? I don't believe in the Panchayati Raj. I
believe I should do my own work. I should earn and then I
should eat. Going to all these [government] meetings does
not bring good. We don't want so much, just roti [bread]
two times a day. From our own fields we can provide." 46
Woman 2: If they [government officials] choose to give us something,
then it is OK. If not, then fine, it is God's will that it should
be this way. It is a matter of dharma [duty, good behavior],
of seva [service]. We are at their mercy. If it pleases God,
only then someone will help us.47
Woman 3: We have made the panchayat. They are there because of
our votes, and they are here to do our will. If they don't do
our work, where will the panchayat people go? Where can
45 Author interview, Sangod block, Kota district, February 16, 2011.
46 Author interview, Bargaon Block, Udaipur district, January 13, 2011
47 Student interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, February 24, 2010
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they hide? We have made the pradhan, we have made the
sarpanch, we have made the tehsildar [panchayat and
block officials]. We gave you our votes, now bring us
water! "948
These women, like many others I interviewed, express very different expectations
concerning what government should do. The first woman did not think the government
had a responsibility to solve the drinking water problem, but referred instead to the need
for self-reliance. The second woman was aware that officials might intervene to mitigate
the situation, but saw this as a matter of charity and left up to the whims of God and
government officials. The third woman, in contrast, viewed the delivery of water as an
entitlement that officials ought to provide, in particular because she had given them her
political support.
But even if a person feels entitled to a service, he or she may still refrain from
making claims if it seems like a costly or risky activity. Levels of inhibition are high,
particularly among the lower castes and women. Officials, even at the local village level,
sit in government buildings, painted a standard yellow and covered with slogans,
accounts, and announcements of government orders. Through the eyes of an illiterate
man or woman, these offices can seem quite intimidating, as can the long waits required
at government offices, and the paperwork required. As Corbridge et al. (2005) recount:
When a widow goes to the Block headquarters to collect her pension she
makes contact with the state in the form of a lower-level official and by
entering a designated building... For example, she might be required to
sign a particular piece of paper on an official's desk. But these encounters
are rarely conducted as the rulebook says they should be. The widow will
be kept waiting for hours in the sun or the rain, and she might have to call
on a relative or fixer.. .to get her business moving. Small payments might
also have to be made to the accountant and/or his peon, and sometimes the
payment she receives will be several rupees short (p. 19).
48 Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, January 30, 2011
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A tribal woman in Udaipur who had not received her pension described a very similar
situation, and explained why she was hesitant to make the journey to the block office to
file a complaint:
My son has no time to take me there [to the block office], and how will I
go alone? I am an uneducated old woman. How will I manage the
journey? .... Those [government] offices are no place for a lady. You stand
in long lines and say namaskar.49 But when they see you are alone they
treat you like nothing. Like dirt. They will cheat me. Maybe they will even
beat me.50
Her experiences of the local state are marked by a lack of dignity and a degree of shame
surrounding her inability to read and write, as well as an element of fear. Similarly, a
group of women in Jodhpur district discussed rumors about a local block official who
allegedly slapped a woman who had come to his office to make an application. Fear of
rough treatment, they explained, was a primary reason why they would not approach
officials (and why their husbands would not let them go). 51
Finally, perhaps the most common reason why a person refrains from claim-
making is the sense that it is not a worthwhile activity, particularly if a person does not
expect his or her voice to be heard. In other words, the person lacks a sense of political
efficacy. Villagers frequently expressed their pessimism over whether officials would
help them. In the words of one Udaipur man: "Why should we go [to the panchayat]? The
49 Namaskar is a form of formal greeting, in which a person touches the feet of a superior.
50 Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, February 9, 2011
51 This story, which was recounted by residents in a village in Mandor block, Jodhpur district, is
unconfirmed. However, whether it is true or not, the story had a chilling effect on the likelihood that these
women would attempt to approach the official in question. Fear of broader state violence, while not a
recurrent theme among those interviewed in these rural Rajasthani villages, is clearly part of the narrative
through which citizens see the state in many places in India including, but not limited to, those areas where
the state and residents are locked in pitched battles over land and resources, for example in the Narmada
Valley or in Jharkand where tribal communities are being evicted to make way for mining activities.
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sarpanch [GP president] just drinks, eats mutton, and sleeps." 52 A group of tribal men and
woman gave a particularly bleak assessment, echoes of which recurred in numerous
interviews:
Nobody listens to us. Even if we die, it doesn't matter... .They only come
at election time... .They say we will do this, we will do that. And in this
way they get the votes. They say you have to give your thumbprint here,
and then they get the job [win the election]. So they are happy, and it
doesn't matter if we just die here in the river.53
This bleak outlook, however, stands alongside high levels of claim-making. As
we have seen in chapter 2, a full three-quarters of the sample report directly or indirectly
contacting officials for issues related to service delivery. The disconnect between high
levels of pessimism regarding the state's role in service delivery and high levels of
citizen-state engagement, however, is less jarring if we consider the large pool of public
resources which is expanding under successive state and central government budgets.
People can see goods, services, and infrastructure all around them, even if they
themselves have not benefited. This, in turn, may spur a sense of grievance and
entitlement. Indeed, this emerged as a common theme in interviews, where residents
expressed knowledge of government resources and anger that they were not benefiting.
As an SC resident of Udaipur put it:
We make big budgets, but no one knows where the budget goes. The
National Rural Health Mission has such a big budget. And NREGA!
Crores and crores54 are being spent! You would think that with that much
money we would at least get something. I told the higher officials, "garib
aadmi to mar jayega " (the poor people are dying). We know the money is
there, so let us see some! 55
52 Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, February 6, 2011.
Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, February 9, 2011.
One "crore" is equivalent to 10 million rupees.
55 Conversation observed at a panchayat meeting, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, February 4, 2011
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A scheduled caste woman in Kota, while less aware of the budgetary process, expressed a
similar sentiment:
We see how in other villages people are getting things. Poor people like
us. That is how we have come to know about all the schemes that are
available....But only one man in this neighborhood got a house [under the
Indira Avaz Yojna]. He got it through his connections to the sarpanch [GP
council president].... Next time my son will go to the meeting and demand
that our name is on the list. If he is getting these things, why not us?5 6
Knowledge of and exposure to people and places that have successfully captured
resources from the state drive the hope that the state may in fact deliver on at least some
of its promises. In fact, as this chapter will attempt to demonstrate, it is precisely this kind
of exposure to different people and places that increases both the likelihood of claim-
making and the breadth of claim-making activities pursued.
Situated agency: access and know-how
So far we have examined a number of obstacles to claim-making at the level of the
individual: a lack of information, lack of a sense of entitlement, fear or inhibition, low
expectations, and lack of a sense of political efficacy. Taken together, these factors
inform both an individual's capabilities as well as motivation for claim-making, and help
to explain why in the same environments some people, but not others, seek to engage the
state.
And yet, even if a person is well informed and has a strong sense of entitlement
and efficacy, he or she may not have access to the channels (direct or mediated) that will
put him or her in contact with the appropriate officials. A young Scheduled Caste man in
Ajmer, for example, told a story of how he had repeatedly tried to secure a Below
Poverty Line (BPL) card - documentation necessary to access a range of welfare
56 Student interview, Sangod block, Kota district, February 24, 2011
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entitlements and subsidies. He was an educated man, who had worked as a school teacher
in a private school. He had also come into contact with a state-wide social movement, the
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS, Workers and Farmers Empowerment
Organization) which advocates for rural welfare and accountability in local government.
He was well informed and, through contact with MKSS, had been exposed to a discourse
of rights and entitlement. And yet his many efforts to secure a BPL card were
consistently stymied because, in his words, he lacked "a jack" [connection] in the
panchayat government. He explained:
I have seen and read the government orders. I know the rules of who is
BPL and who is APL [above the poverty line]. I am not an illiterate man
who can be fooled by fast talking.....Still the panchayat doors are closed
to me because I did not support the sarpanch in the election. Without a
57jack, there is no way in.
In other words, a person needs both contacts and know-how; linkages to the state and
exposure to information, ideas, and narratives about the state and its resources. It is not
enough to be motivated and know how to make a claim. A person also requires outward-
reaching bridges to the state through which to act upon information and ideas.
These bridges, or the "jacks" to which the school teacher referred, range from
connections to panchayat officials to links to higher-level bureaucrats or party politicians
to contact with individuals or organizations that mediate access to officials. The nature
and diversity of a person's contacts help to explain the breadth of a person's claim-
making repertoire. What channels of access does a given individual pursue? Are they
direct or mediated and, if mediated, by whom? Does a person depend on a single patron
57 Author interview, Masuda block, Ajmer district, March 24, 2010
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in order to access the state? Or does he or she purse multiple points of contact with
officials?
To begin to answer these questions it is first necessary to examine the local
opportunity structure in which claim-making occurs, understood here as the formal and
informal institutional environment in which citizens engage the state (Kitschelt, 1986;
Kriesi, 1995). As we have seen in chapter 2, a village's governance environment shapes
the claim-making repertoire by defining opportunities for contact with state actors and
agencies. Whether or not a person resides in the panchayat headquarter village, the caste
composition of the panchayat, and the range of mediating actors and organizations in a
locality shape the range of possible claim-making activity. Take, for example, the
statements of the following Scheduled Tribe individuals in a single block in Udaipur
seeking to address water shortages in their neighborhoods. Holding constant the
administrative block (Bargaon), caste (Scheduled Tribe), and sector (water), we observe
that different individuals seek assistance through different channels. First, in a village
where the seat of sarpanch (GP council president) was reserved for a ST member, a
resident stated that the panchayat, and only the panchayat, could assist with the water
issue:
This is a sarkari (government) issue and so it falls to the panchayat only.
There is a chain of command. We tell the ward panch, and he tells the
quorum (panchayat meeting), and the applications are made and sent to the
panchayat samiti (block) and then the zila parishid (district) 58
In another village where ST members were not so strongly represented in the GP,
many residents referenced the role of "Nanalal", an elder and tribal leader. For
example:
58 Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 14, 2010
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If anybody has any work all of them contact Nanalal ji and he helps us.
The Gram Panchayat does not help us in any way, and if the Gram
Panchayat does not listen to our problems we will go to Nanalal ji only. 59
Others referenced traditional institutions in the village, such as a caste panchayat, which
does not have any formal jurisdiction over public goods delivery but which often
provides a "backdoor" channel of access to the Gram Panchayat. As one resident
explained:
People turn to samahjic (community) panchayat, which exists as a power
besides the sarkari (government) panchayat.... This is a very old system,
from the olden days. The samahjic panchayat takes up social and
community issues. But sometimes they also take up public works, things
like water, and they pressurize the GP to get things done. 60
Still others stated that they would approach a diversity of actors for assistance. In one
example, a man detailed his many efforts to have a new water hand pump installed,
including contact with the Gram Panchayat, with caste leaders, and with higher-level
politicians:
Who haven't I asked [for help]? Some people just sit at home and
complain. But if you want to benefit, you need to speak up. But it won't
get done in one sitting [at once]. See, I have gone so many times to the
panchayat. But that is not enough.... Alone they won't hear you, and so I
have gone in the company ofprabhavshali [influential] people from the
[caste] community.... And when any [higher-level] official comes to visit,
again we tell them of our troubles. Kiran Mayeshwari [former Member of
Parliament] came here once to visit the temple. When she came, word
spread and people gathered. Everyone was talking and asking her what can
be done about the water.61
Such differences in claim-making repertoire in part reflect the local opportunity
structure, or range of actors and institutions in a given locality. We have also seen,
however, that - within the same panchayats and villages - different people navigate the
59Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, January 31, 2011
60 Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 14, 2010
61 Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, January 11, 2011
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same environments in different ways. I therefore argue that claim-making practices can
be best understood as a matter of situated agency, where "situatedness" refers to the
institutional context in which an individual conceives of, articulates, and pursues his or
her interests, and where "agency" refers to the capability of an individual to navigate a
given situation, that is: the "ability to set and pursue one's own goals and interests" (Sen,
1985). I build on the work of Narayan and Petesch (2007) who suggest that opportunity
structures, which consist of "the dominant institutional climate and social structures in
which disadvantaged actors must work to advance their interests," interact with the
"capabilities" of individuals and groups to "take purposeful actions, that is, to exercise
agency" (2007, p. 12). Such capabilities, they suggest, include access to information,
ability to hold leaders accountable, and the capacity to articulate and advance one's
interests.62 Interests and the strategies through which one pursues them are not, however,
given or autonomously derived, but are deeply embedded in local social context (Peter,
2003). Moreover, capabilities are not evenly distributed, and some individuals are better
- or differently - equipped than others to make claims on the state.
3. The theory of socio-spatial exposure
Why are some people better equipped than others to engage in claim-making? A large
scholarship, primarily developed in the West, has examined the resources necessary for
political participation. In their exploration of civic life in the U.S., for example, Verba et
62 This frameworks draws on Amartya Sen's (1999) "capabilities framework," in which capabilities refer to
what a person can or cannot do, including both negative freedoms, such asfreedomfrom hunger and
persecution, and positivefreedoms to participate in communal and political life. Importantly, capabilities
are not simply measured - nor are they adequately predicted - by income or economic status; rather they
are a product of the rights and opportunities available to an individual. Sen recognizes a wide heterogeneity
of capabilities - driven by a multiplicity of factors - within societies and within social classes.
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al. (1995) explore the role of time, money, and civic skills in creating the conditions for
participation. Building on these insights, I find in the Indian context that the resources
required for claim-making are not so much time or money, but who you know and what
you know, that is: contacts, information, and ideas. In other words, claim-making is a
product of access and know-how which, I argue, are developed through exposure to
different people and settings. In what follows, I develop this argument to present the
theory of socio-spatial exposure, demonstrating that claim-making is a product of diffuse
ties that cut across established social cleavages and spatial boundaries.
First, a person must be exposed to information and narratives about the state, its
resources, and claim-making practices. In other words, a person must be aware of
programs and services, and - either through personal experience or others' accounts -
have ideas about how best to pursue those services. Exposure to people and sources of
information beyond one's immediate community and locality enable the flow of new
ideas and practices. Second, a person also requires access to state officials and agencies;
access may be direct (through personal contact with officials) or mediated (through local
associations and brokers). The more a person comes into contact with different people
and settings, the greater the number of potential linkages to the state he or she will
encounter.
Claim-making practice, then, is a product of a person's socio-spatial exposure,
understood here in terms of ties that extend beyond a person's immediate community and
locality, and the flow of resources (information, ideas, and contacts) that those ties
enable. I argue that individuals with a greater degree of exposure are both more likely to
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make claims on the state, and will do so through a broader array of practices than those
with more limited exposure.
Know-how
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Figure 3.1. Socio-spatial exposure and claim-making
The diagram above presents the causal mechanisms at work. First, people are
embedded in different kinds of social and occupational networks. 63 "Parochial" networks
are closed in nature, bound by kinship, ethnicity, and locality. "Cosmopolitan" networks,
in contrast, are more open, extending across common cleavages of class and ethnicity as
well as across spatial and administrative boundaries of neighborhood and village.
Individuals embedded in cosmopolitan networks are exposed to diffuse and diverse
contacts that extend beyond the immediate community and locality. In other words, they
are exposed to more and different people and settings. This socio-spatial exposure, in
turn, impacts claim-making in two, related ways. First, people are exposed to greater
flows of information about the state and public resources, as well as to narratives of
entitlement and political efficacy. Second, they are exposed to a greater number and
diversity of potential linkages to the state. In these ways, socio-spatial exposure fosters
63 The origin of differences in network structure is discussed in chapter 5.
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political knowledge and skill, as well as the opportunities, for citizen-state engagement.
This, in turn, increases both the likelihood that a person will make claims on the state
(reflected in the incidence of claim-making) and the breadth of practices employed (the
claim-making repertoire).
By focusing on the role of network ties that extend beyond a person's immediate
community and locality, the theory of socio-spatial exposure helps to explain the lack of
a consistent relationship between socioeconomic status and claim-making activity. This is
not to suggest, however, that socioeconomic features and ascriptive characteristics such
as caste or gender are unimportant. Caste, class, and gender certainly do play a role in
shaping the opportunities and resources an individual brings to bear in making claims on
the state. And yet, as we have seen, this does not occur in a uniform fashion, and we
observe significant unexplained variation in claim-making within socioeconomic
groupings. This variation, I argue, can in large part be explained by differences in
network structure. Some people are more isolated than others, engaging in a limited
social and spatial sphere, while others are exposed to broader contexts and contacts.
Class, caste, and gender shape, but do not determine, a person's social and occupational
networks, and some people are more constrained by these features than others. As such,
differences in the degree to which networks cut across or reinforce social and spatial
cleavages account for much of the observed local variation in claim-making practice.
Networks are highly variable and "penetrate irregularly and in different degrees"
(Granovetter, 1985, p. 491). As such, "some individuals are better placed than other" and
"some groups are more isolated than others" even in the same local contexts (Smith-
Doerr & Powell, 2005, p. 379)
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4. Social ties and network structure
By placing social ties at the center of analysis, the theory of socio-spatial exposure builds
on, and at the same time departs from, a large existing literature on social networks and,
in particular, social capital. In its most basic terms social capital can be understood as the
benefits secured through membership in networks or other social structures (Portes,
1998). In this sense social capital is a resource, like financial or human capital, that can
be put to work towards various goals and ends. The resources for claim-making -
information, ideas, and contacts - are produced and circulated in social networks. At the
same time, however, a study of socio-spatial exposure diverges from the prevailing
literature on social capital, which emphasizes the need for norms of trust and reciprocity,
by highlighting a different set of dynamics and mechanisms.
While scholars differ in their conceptions of social capital, most common theories
maintain that where people are located in the same social networks they develop a sense
of mutual obligation that fosters trust and cooperation and, by extension, "civic"
behavior; where these norms are lacking, cooperation and civic participation are unlikely
(Almond & Verba, 1965; Banfield, 1967; Putnam, 1993). The most popular model of
social capital in this vein is developed by Putnam (1993, 2000), wherein members of a
"civic" community identify common problems and - through "habits of cooperation,
solidarity, and public spiritedness" (1993, p. 90) - demand effective and efficient
government.
And yet the notion of a civic community - defined in terms of "equal rights and
obligations for all" and by "horizontal relations" as opposed to "vertical relations of
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authority and dependency" (p. 88) - does not ring true in an Indian village. Indeed,
theories of social capital centered on horizontal social relations and participation in
voluntary associations are ill-suited for the rural Indian context given the persistence of
strong social hierarchies and class, caste, and gender inequality. 64 Socio-spatial
exposure, however, does not necessarily lead to the development of horizontal ties or
trust. One may, for example, encounter people from different class or caste backgrounds
without forging deep or sustained bonds of friendship or trust and without developing a
sense of mutual obligation. Rather than strong ties based on shared norms of mutual
obligation, socio-spatial exposure fosters primarily weak ties, often of a vertical nature, as
well as outward-reaching linkages to the state. As such, the theory of socio-spatial
exposure demonstrates how information and resources flow within social networks even
in the absence of horizontal ties and trust.
Claim-making is also not necessarily, or even primarily, a collective endeavor.
While some claim-making activity certainly can and does involve collective action,
particularly when centered on collective goods, much of it takes place at the level of the
individual, the household, or small groups. And so a different set of mechanisms are at
play; cross-cutting social ties facilitate claim-making not so much through the promotion
of cooperation, but through exposure to diverse contexts and people.
Much of the scholarship on social capital emphasizes the need for group "closure"
(cf. Coleman 1988) and, as such, is primarily concerned with the internal relationships
64
Some scholars have questioned whether models of civil society and social capital developed in the West
fit the Indian context, where levels of voluntary organizational membership are low (Chhibber, 1999; P.
Singh, 2011). Others find evidence of rich associational life in India, albeit one that does not necessarily fit
western notions of horizontal, voluntary organizations. Rudolph (2003), for example, argues that a narrow
examination of voluntary organizations overlooks other forms of association, in particular caste
organizations, that play an integral role in India's civil society and politics. These are ascriptive,
hierarchical organizations that clearly do not fit within the classic notions of a civic community.
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within a group or community. These studies tell us little about how local communities
access actors and resources external to the community. Some have noted, for example,
that social capital may create insular tendencies and "enclaves" (Loury, 2000; Portes,
1998). In contrast, my study of socio-spatial exposure emphasizes the need for outward-
reaching contacts and, in particular, linkages to the state. Rather than simply examine
stocks of social capital within a community, the emphasis is on the bridges an individual
is able to build beyond his or her locality and community.
The theory of socio-spatial exposure and its effects on claim-making behavior,
then, is distinct from prevailing theories of social capital while at the same time
acknowledging the important role that social networks play in creating the resources for
participation. My argument is informed by and builds on scholarship that examines the
ways in which different kinds of networks produce different kinds of social, economic,
and political relations (Cohen & Rogers, 1992; Locke, 1995; Putnam, 2000). This body
of work moves beyond accounts of network density focused on the number of ties to
examine instead "their qualitative features and patterns of interaction" (Locke, 1995, p.
24).
I draw in particular on three strands of literature. First, I build on work that
examines the strength of ties and the importance of "weak" ties in facilitating the flow of
information (Granovetter, 1973, 1995). Second, I draw on a literature in ethnic politics
that studies the degree to which ties cut across or reinforce social cleavages (Gittell &
Vidal, 1998; Narayan, 1999; Varshney, 2001) and the role of such cleavages in defining
the parameters of political action (Heller, 1996; Lieberman, 2009; Posner, 2005). Third, I
draw on work that investigates the role of network structure in determining the bridges
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that connect individuals and groups to other people, groups, and resources that would
otherwise be inaccessible (Burt, 1992, 2001). As a state-targeted activity, claim-making
particularly requires outward-reaching bridges to the state and its resources (Krishna,
2002; Pizzomo, 1971).
Weak ties and exposure to information
I define exposure in terms of the degree to which an individual engages other people
across established social and spatial divides; that is, contact or movement beyond one's
primary social groups and immediate locality. Spatial divides demarcate one locality
from another and may be geographical and/or administrative. The precise nature of the
social divisions in question - whether based on class, ethnicity, caste, tribe, religion,
gender, or other identity-based characteristics - vary from context to context. In all cases,
however, cross-cutting exposure provides people with the opportunities to engage with
different people and settings and, by extension, to encounter new and broader sources of
information.
A number of scholars have argued for the importance of cross-cutting ties that
extend beyond tightly-knit, insular groups as a vehicle for access to external resources
and, in particular, information. Most notably, Mark Granovetter, in his study of job
seekers in U.S. cities, finds that people are more likely to gain access to employment
networks from acquaintances than from those to whom they have strong ties. Through
this work Granovetter documents the "strength of weak ties" (1973), where a multiplicity
of "weak" ties that reach beyond more limited "strong" ties facilitate access to a greater
quantity and quality of information. Weak ties are conduits for the spread of knowledge
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and ideas by connecting people to others beyond small, primary groups centered on the
family, kinship, or other localized identities (1973, 1995).
Studies of ethnic minority communities in the United States have demonstrated
the ways in which groups with ties to the broader community and economy have access
to broader information and opportunities compared to those who live in insulated
"enclaves" or are otherwise insulated from the mainstream society and economy (Loury,
1977, 2000; Portes, 1998; Small, 2009). Studies in Africa similarly note how engagement
beyond narrow ties of kinship and ethnicity facilitate access to information and insertion
into far-reaching networks and markets (cf. Fafchamps, 2001).
Weak ties that extend beyond a community and locality also have the ability to
inform whether and how individuals engage in politics. In his study of urban poverty in
the U.S., for example, Small (2004; 2009) demonstrates how individuals - living in the
same urban neighborhoods - develop different social networks, some of which extend
beyond the neighborhood and others of which are isolated from mainstream society. As a
result, residents are exposed to different information and practices, developing different
propensities for civic participation as well as relationships to city government. US-based
studies have also found that exposure to diversity through diffuse and cross-cutting ties
may foster participation, since individuals increase their political knowledge through
interaction with diverse groups (Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Scheufele et al., 2004).65
Other scholars, however, have emphasized the role of strong ties in spurring
citizen action. In studies of contentious politics, scholars have found that strong, personal
ties play a critical role in social movement recruitment and activism (McAdam &
65 Others, however, suggest that diversity impedes participation by reducing the incentives for collective
action (A. Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000).
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Paulsen, 1993; Oliver, 1984). The bulk of the social movement literature, however, is
centered on examples of high-risk instances of activism and is concerned primarily with
the conditions that promote collective action. Making claims for services, which is a
more day-to-day, lower-risk, and often more individual set of activities, is a different
enterprise that rests more on the diffusion of information than on the conditions that
foster cooperation. Certain forms of claim-making, however, such as those that are
protest-based and so more contentious than other forms, will require a combination of
both weak and strong ties. Indeed, McAdam and Paulsen (1993) are quick to highlight the
need for both strong and weak ties, as movements cannot spread without the presence of
networks of weak bridging ties that foster the spread of information.66
Weak ties, then, are essential to claim-making as conduits of information. As
noted, however, individuals require much more than procedural information in order to
engage in claim-making. A person not only needs to know about existing services, but
must also be exposed to certain ideas and narratives about the state's role in service
delivery that motivate claim-making by fostering a sense of entitlement and of political
efficacy. In this way, ideas - in addition to information - help to shape the claim-making
repertoire by expanding (or narrowing) a person's sense of what is possible. Whether or
not an individual is capable of acting on this increased exposure depends on acquired
habits of thought and behavior: that is, whether or not an individual conceives of a
particular action as being a possible part of his or her "repertoire" of action.
Repertoires are not held by individuals in isolation, but are the product of the
narratives that circulate; lived experience and collective history combine to shape an
66However, claim-making through social movements and protest is a relatively rare occurrence in the
villages studied; 17 percent of respondents report taking part in a protest and just eight percent report that
they have been involved with a broader social movement.
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individual's understanding of the state and his or her own relationship to it. Through
broad networks of weak ties individuals are exposed to the information and ideas that
both enable and motivate claim-making; in other words, repertoires consist of the realm
of both (cognitively) conceivable and (structurally) possible actions.
Bridging ties and exposure to difference
Weak ties also have the ability to connect individuals otherwise separated by social
cleavages of ethnicity, class, caste, or other social boundaries. "Bridging" ties of this
nature are a variant of weak ties, all the more powerful because they link disparate groups
that, because of differences in social and political standing, have fundamentally different
experiences and views of the state. Such exposure to difference can be a critical resource
for information exchange, innovation, and the diffusion of new social - as well as
political - practices (cf. Page, 2007).
Here I build on a growing literature on "boundary politics," or the ways in which
people and communities define "who and what is properly included and who and what
stands outside" (Isaac, 2011, p. 779). Scholars of identity and ethnic politics have long
recognized that social boundaries and cleavages are not static. Their strength and salience
shift under changing social and institutional arrangements, with different consequences
for politics (Heller, 1996; Lieberman, 2009; Posner, 2005; P. Singh, 2011). Posner
(2005), for example, highlights how formal institutions such as party structure mobilize
different kinds of social cleavages in African states, from highly fragmented tribal
identities to broader linguistic groupings. Heller (1996) demonstrates how state-led social
mobilization in Kerala, India, fostered broad, class-based identification that cut across
narrower divisions of caste and religion. Singh (2011) similarly demonstrates how in
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some regions of India sub-national identities were able to traverse caste, religious, and
other communal divides, thereby enabling higher levels of public investment and
encompassing social policy.
At a more micro level, scholars of social capital have demonstrated how social
ties can both reinforce as well as cut across the boundaries the define the parameters of
social interaction. "Bonding" ties foster insular forms of engagement within a group
(reinforcing local social cleavages), while "bridging" ties foster engagement that extends
beyond a narrow locality or community, thereby making boundaries more porous (Gittell
& Vidal, 1998; Narayan, 1999; Putnam, 2000). Numerous studies have documented the
"dark side" of social capital, where strong bonding ties may create the conditions for
political and social exclusion and a range of social "ills" ranging from corruption to
ethnic violence (Berman, 1997; Levi, 1996; Putzel, 1997; Rubio, 1997). Narayan (1999)
highlights the Indian caste system as a primary example of a system in which localized
(bonded) groups lack inter-connections, leading to exclusion, polarization, and - in some
instances - violence (p. 15). In a study of Hindu-Muslim violence in Indian cities,
Varshney (2001; 2003) similarly highlights how the presence of inter- or intra-ethnic
social ties (drawn along religious lines) contributes to different patterns of communal
relations.
Much of the work on bridging social capital emphasizes the development of
shared norms as a precondition for inter-group cooperation. As noted, however, social
ties need not engender norms of trust or reciprocity, nor do they necessarily lead to
collective action. Rather, under conditions marked by social hierarchies and ethnic
divides, "bridging" ties are very often both shallow (as opposed to strong) and unequal
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(as opposed to horizontal). As such, the presence of weak bridging ties between groups is
consistent with the persistence of entrenched inequalities between class and ethnic
groups. And, as demonstrated by Granovetter and others, such ties are critical conduits
for information, ideas, and other resources.
Bridges to the state
As noted, exposure to information and ideas is a necessary but insufficient condition.
People also need channels of access through which to act upon this knowledge. Simply
knowing how to make a claim does not amount to anything unless a person has access
(direct or mediated) to the appropriate officials. It is therefore necessary to look beyond
the ideas and information that circulate within group and communities, to examine the
outward-reaching contacts and linkages through which people put these ideas and
information into action. Linkages to the state are a function of network structure. Greater
socio-spatial exposure increases both the number and diversity of a person's contacts and,
by extension, potential bridges to the state and its resources.
I build here on prior work by scholars who have examined the role of outward-
reaching contacts and linkages. In particular, Ronald Burt's (1992; 2001) discussion of
network structure provides a useful framework through which to consider the ways in
which differently-situated individuals access the state. Like Granovetter, and in contrast
to other scholars who emphasize closure, Burt emphasizes the need for bridges that
extend beyond local groups. Whereas Granovetter emphasizes the nature of social ties
(weak or strong) that link actors within a network, Burt highlights the nodal points within
a network that link otherwise disparate groups: third parties that are able to connect
others. His focus, in particular, is on the "gatekeepers" who, given their position in a
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network, are able to bridge "structural holes" that would otherwise inhibit access to
certain individuals, organizations, or resources. Gatekeepers enable the combination and
exchange of information and other resources among groups. In this way, networks
facilitate access, efficiency (faster access than those without connections), and referrals
(that is, access through personal connections rather than impersonal, informal channels).
As a state-targeted activity, claim-making not only requires external linkages but
also demands bridges to the state. A number of scholars have emphasized the importance
of such bridges in determining whether and how local communities secure public
resources. I draw in particular on insights developed in Pizzorno's rebuttal of Banfield's
work on "amoral familism" in rural Italy. Banfield (1967) argued that southern Italian
peasants acted in a self-defeating manner by failing to develop civic ties beyond the
immediate family. Pizzorno (1971) responded that a lack of civic ties was fully rational
when viewed in the context of relations between the center and the periphery, because
where resources flowed from the center people were naturally more inclined to engage in
external networks rather than village-level networks. In other words, the capacity to
bridge to the outside world and, in particular, to the central state, mattered more than
internal stocks of social capital. This same insight is powerfully underscored in the rural
Indian context by Krishna (2001; 2002), who finds that latent stocks of social capital in
rural villages are not activated unless agents are able to build links to external networks
and, in particular, the state. Krishna examines a range of development outcomes across a
range of villages, including access to a range of services and poverty reduction schemes,
and finds greater success in those communities with active brokers with external
connections to political parties and the bureaucracy.
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There is of course an extensive literature on political connections, particularly in
the context of less developed democracies where patronage - the "exchange of a citizen's
vote in return for direct payment or continuing access to employment, goods, and
services" (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 2) - is considered a central feature of political
organization. Scholars of Indian politics, however, have long noted that parties have
weak roots in rural India and, while well equipped to mobilize voters, they are not
effective bottom-up channels for citizen demands. As we have seen in chapter 2, parties
and local bureaucratic structures are not common targets of direct citizen claim-making.
Rather, local political connections are typically mediated, either by (ostensibly non-
partisan) members of the Gram Panchayat who in turn establish links to parties and the
administration, or by a wide range of non-governmental brokers. These dynamics are not
unique to India. Studies from around the world have documented the role of political
fixers (Boone, 2003; Michelson, 2007), of traditional governance institutions (Brick,
2008; MacLean, 2011; Ray & Reddy, 2003; Tsai, 2007b), and of local associations and
NGOs (Houtzager & Acharya, 2010; Lee, 1998) as vehicles for citizen interest
representation. Indeed, some scholars have argued that informal and non-state institutions
are, in fact, replacing political parties in their importance as representative institutions
(cf. Houtzager et al., 2002).
A person's political connections, his or her access to officials, and contact with
different mediators and brokers are shaped, first, by the local governance environment;
that is, the range of formal and informal institutions in a given locality. The same local
environment does not, however, look the same to all people. The channels a person
pursues in seeking services from the state are therefore also contingent on the range of
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actors and institutions to which that individual is exposed. Importantly, mediating actors
and institutions can either reinforce or cut across established cleavages; in other words,
they can foster both bonding and bridging ties. Elders and caste or tribal leaders, for
example, serve particular ethnic communities. However, as Krishna (2002) documents in
rural India, a new class of social and political entrepreneur (naya netas, or "new leaders")
is emerging that works across caste lines; educated and unemployed members of the
lower-castes are becoming active as brokers, building cross-caste networks. Local
associations and NGOs can also either reinforce or straddle social boundaries; highly
localized neighborhood groups, for example, tend to represent a homogenous caste or
ethnic communities, while village-wide associations incorporate members from multiple
communities. Similarly NGOs may target single-caste communities, or may establish
multi-caste or multi-class coalitions. In these ways, different mediating structures
contribute to different patterns of citizen-state relations, where channels of state access
emerge either by traversing or on the basis of social identities.
5. Village "cosmopolitans": socio-spatial exposure in the rural Indian context
The theory of socio-spatial exposure predicts that those individuals with weak and
bridging ties will be more likely to engage in claim-making than those embedded in
narrower, more circumscribed networks. What do these weak and bridging ties look like
in the rural Indian context?
Villagers are constrained first by social boundaries of class, caste, and gender, and
second, by administrative and geographical boundaries at the level of the neighborhood,
the village, Gram Panchayat, and beyond. In Rajasthani villages, as in many other rural
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regions of India, neighborhoods are very often carved along caste lines with different
communities occupying distinct neighborhoods (Krishna, 2002; S. B. Singh, 2009). As
such, neighborhood boundaries simultaneously represent social, economic, and spatial
divides within a village (Beteille, 1969; Cohn, 1987; Srinivas, 1987a). In the villages
studied, pucca ("proper" or concrete) homes are typically concentrated in the center of
the village (referred to as the "main" village, or mukhiya gaon) where upper caste
households typically reside. Poorer, lower caste (SC and ST) homes are located on the
outskirts of the mukhiya gaon or, as is often the case among tribal communities, in
separate hamlets at a distance of up to one or two kilometers from the center. Homes in
the SC and ST neighborhoods are typically of much poorer quality, made out of kaccha
(rough, makeshift) materials. Villages are thus simultaneously divided along caste and
class lines. The village itself imposes a set of both geographical and administrative
boundaries, nested within the broader Gram Panchayat, block, and district.
Patterns of exposure in rural India are therefore both social and spatial. In spatial
terms, people who move in and out of neighborhoods and within and across village
boundaries come into contact with a greater array of potential access points through
which to seek public officials and resources. A person who does not move far beyond his
or her immediate locality will encounter a more limited number of organizations and
people through which to build links to the state. The social dimension of exposure,
defined primarily along caste and class lines, often maps onto the spatial - particularly in
geographically divided localities where neighborhood is a proxy for both class and caste.
Other social divisions, such as gender, persist within localities. People who are situated in
networks that extend beyond their caste community or income group, or women whose
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networks extend into the public sphere, encounter both more as well as more diverse
people; in other words, they come into contact with sources of difference (people who are
not like them in terms of their social and economic standing). The degree to which an
individual moves about both within and beyond his or her village provides a strong
indication of the extent to which he or she comes into contact with people across caste,
class, gender, and other social lines.
To illustrate the concept of socio-spatial exposure, it is useful to consider two
ideal types that capture distinct sets of dynamics. At one end of the spectrum is the
parochial villager. By parochialism I refer to the organization of social and political life
around local ethnic and caste identities (Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2008). Parochialism
implies narrow rather than encompassing solidarities (Gidwani & Sivaramakrishnan,
2003). To give an extreme - but common - example, a woman who lives under the
purdah (veil) system and who rarely leaves her home or immediate neighborhood lives
within a circumscribed geographical and social sphere. Her knowledge of the state, its
programs and resources, and of potential strategies for claim-making is influenced by the
limited number of people with whom she interacts, consisting mostly of women from the
same neighborhood and male relatives. A less extreme but still common example is a
man who works as an agricultural laborer on land within his village. He may also be
illiterate or poorly educated; if he has attended school he did so only at the primary level
at the school located within the village. He interacts mostly with other laborers from his
own caste and village, and he does not often venture outside of the village.
At the other end of the spectrum is the village cosmopolitan; he (and sometimes
she) regularly engages across communities and spaces in the village and beyond. In so
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doing, he rubs shoulders with a diverse array of people, cutting across established caste
and/or class lines. As a result, he is exposed to a greater array of information and ideas
about the state and how best to access its resources, as well as to a diversity of brokers
and potential channels of access. He might be a man who migrates seasonally in search of
work, or a day-laborer who travels to a nearby town or city. Through such movement
beyond the village he encounters people from different backgrounds, and hears stories
about state service delivery. He may also come into contact with public officials,
including politicians and bureaucrats with offices in the city (but who are sparse on the
ground in the village). The village cosmopolitan might also be a woman who works
outside of the home, perhaps on a government worksite, who in so doing enters mixed
social spaces and encounters local officials. She may also be a Gram Panchayat member,
elected to a seat reserved for women, who through her elected office enters a public
sphere traditionally restricted to men. The cosmopolitan may also be a person who has
worked with a local NGO and has perhaps attended trainings, field trips, or exchange
programs in the district headquarter or state capital. Finally, he or she is likely to be
formally educated; education not only imparts crucial skills such as literacy and critical
thinking, but also - at higher levels - requires youth to move outside of their
neighborhood to attend schools in the GP headquarter or beyond.
In introducing the notion of a village cosmopolitan, I draw on Gidwani and
Sivaramakrishnan's (2003) notion of "rural cosmopolitanism," which they define as
"participation in multiple cultural worlds" (p. 345). For Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan,
rural cosmopolitans are those who move through space (from rural to urban settings, or
from one rural sphere to another) and transmit ideas and practices. In so doing, they
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challenge the notion of cosmopolitanism as a purely transnational (or even national)
phenomenon; they argue instead that cosmopolitanism operates at multiple scales. 67
While migration is central to Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan's notion, I examine the
potential for cosmopolitanism in an even more local sense, centered on exposure to
different people and setting both within and beyond a village or panchayat. The village
cosmopolitan may or may not migrate, but he or she moves fluidly across village,
neighborhood, caste, and class boundaries. Others have noted the very local nature of
these cosmopolitan dynamics. In his study of West African villages, for example, Piot
(1999) argues that cosmopolitanism can be found in rural places and local communities.
He writes: "a group bearing all the markings of the most traditional of anthropological
communities is nevertheless as cosmopolitan as the metropole, if by cosmopolitanism we
mean that people partake in a social life characterized byflux, uncertainty, encounters
with difference, and the experience and process of transculturation" (p. 22-23, emphasis
added).
Cosmopolitan networks, then, exist both within and beyond the village, and are
comprised of both weak and bridging ties that traverse caste, class, or gender lines.
People embedded in such networks are exposed to critical resources - information, ideas,
and contacts - that inform whether and how they engage the state. Greater socio-spatial
exposure through cosmopolitan networks, I argue, drives both the incidence as well as the
diversity of claim-making practice. Parochial networks, in contrast, are marked by
closure; they are tightly-knit, locally-bound and, as such, foster strong ties and the limited
circulation of information and narratives. In such networks, the capabilities and
67 Unlike the neo-Kantian usage of the term cosmopolitanism, which connotes the moral ideal of a
universal human community, rural cosmopolitanism describes a much more local set of dynamics in which
people come into contact with others and share ideas across multiple cultural spheres.
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motivation that citizens require to make claims on the state are restricted, leading to more
limited claim-making practice.
6. Mechanisms: putting information, ideas, & contacts to work
We have seen that there are a number of obstacles to citizen claim-making, including lack
of information about government programs, lack of procedural information on how to
avail of services, fear or inhibition, lack of sense of entitlement and political efficacy, and
a lack of access to state actors and agencies. The theory suggests that weak and bridging
ties foster exposure to the information, ideas, and contacts required to overcome these
obstacles. But how does this work? What is it about cosmopolitan networks, and the
diffuse, cross-cutting ties of which they are comprised, that fosters claim-making?
The remainder of this chapter explores the pathways through which socio-spatial
exposure shapes claim-making practice. The objectives are twofold: to demonstrate how
network structures shape the flow of information, ideas, and contacts, and to demonstrate
how these resources are put to use in making claims. I draw on interviews with villagers
to illustrate the mechanisms through which exposure drives claim-making, and develop a
series of village case study comparisons that offer qualitative evidence in support of the
theory.
How do people obtain information about government programs and services? I
have argued that weak and bridging ties facilitate access to both more and different
information about the state, its resources, and about how best to voice demands. And yet
there are many sources of information, and not all are social in nature. Literacy,
educational attainment, and access to the media are all contributing factors that do not
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necessarily require participation in broader social networks. A person might, for example,
learn about government programs or hear about citizen claim-making when reading the
newspaper without ever interacting with other people. Indeed, as one would expect (and
as we will observe in chapter 4), media exposure is positively correlated with claim-
making. In Udaipur, for example, I met a man who kept a large binder of newspaper
clippings about government corruption. In his discussion of local corruption (concerning
a policeman who was known to take bribes from drivers on the local highway), he
referenced high profile cases of corruption at the national level - knowledge of which he
had secured through exposure to media.
And yet social networks play a critical role in the diffusion of information above
and beyond what is learned in the newspaper or through other non-social sources. As
demonstrated by Granovetter (1973, p. 1372), people are more likely to act upon
information obtained through personal contacts, where information can ultimately be
traced to its source, as opposed to information obtained through more impersonal sources.
Another man in Udaipur, for example, lives in a house adjacent to a large government
billboard covered in slogans about the Right to Information (RTI) act, under which
citizens can legally request information from government agencies. He spent a long time
telling me about his effort to settle a land dispute, and complained repeatedly that he had
not received a response from the Land Registry. When I asked if he had thought of filing
a petition under the RTI act, he looked blank. At first he said he didn't know what RTI
was. When I pointed out the government billboard, he shrugged and said, "They are
forever painting slogans, but I don't know what these things are. I don't know anyone
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who has ever done such things."68 As is clear from this example, the simple presence of
information in an impersonal format does nothing to guarantee its consumption.
Impersonal sources of information are, however, reinforced through social
networks. A recent school graduate in a village in Udaipur, for example, described the
process through which he came to organize a protest over teacher absenteeism in his
school:
I read in the newspaper about some blockades. It was in Jaipur, I think. I
read how the people there had blocked the roads and how they were
throwing stones because the wells were dry and no leader would hear
them. I thought, here we have wells. But our school is broken. No one
hears us, but let us try.... My cousin-brother has also worked in
Ahmedabad and Mumbai, and he tells how people there do such things,
blocking up the traffic when there is some issue to resolve. So I thought,
let us try this here.69
This example underscores the fact that multiple sources of information may be at play.
First, the student learned about protest practices through reading the newspaper. Second,
this information was reinforced by personal knowledge of someone who had witnessed
protest activity in cities far removed from the village.
And yet the information and ideas about claim-making that circulate are not
uniformly positive and may have a motivating or chilling effect, thereby either expanding
or contracting an individual's claim-making repertoire. For example, a woman who hears
a story of someone who was treated roughly upon approaching a block official may
herself be less likely to approach an official. A man who hears about someone who
successfully lodged a complaint after being denied a benefit may himself consider this
option.
68 Author interview, Bargaon district, Udaipur block, April 16, 2009
69 Author interview, Gogunda, Udaipur, February 22, 2010.
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If the stories that circulate are both positive and negative, why then should access
to broader information and narratives have a positive effect on citizen-claim-making?
The answer lies in not only the quantity but also the quality of information to which a
person is exposed. Weak ties, as Granovetter has argued, expand the sources of
information, and by extension the diversity of ideas, that circulate. This in turn shapes not
only the amount but also the content of the information to which a person is exposed. A
preponderance of strong ties in the absence of bridging ties means that information is
produced and circulated in a highly localized fashion, reinforcing the same narratives and
messages. As Smith-Doerr and Powell (2005) note: "spatial concentration tends to
reinforce the status quo.. .as knowledge sharing leads to conformity." In other words, the
"ties that bind can also be the ties that blind" (p. 390). Portes, for example, demonstrates
how "downward-leveling norms" that circulate within ethnic enclaves may inhibit rather
than foster action by creating fatalistic attitudes and reinforcing low expectations (1998).
Similarly, if a person interacts solely with people with a low level of access to public
resources, this may reinforce low expectations of service delivery, while exposure to
stories about successful claim-making may inspire a sense of entitlement.
In numerous interviews across the sample, villagers reported learning about the
availability of different government programs and schemes through cross-cutting contact
with people in other communities across neighborhood or caste lines within a village and
beyond. A heated exchange in an Udaipur village between two men in a chai (tea) stall
serves to illustrate. The first man is an elderly member of an upper caste community and
resides in the mukhiya gaon or "main village." The second man is a member of a tribal
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community in a hamlet on the outskirts of the village who comes to the main village each
day to catch the bus in order to commute to work in a nearby factory:
Man 1: This village has everything. Roads, drinking water, schools.
There is so much development!
Man 2: Those facilities are just for rich people. Even if you have to
go to the doctor you have to wait!
Man 1: Just compare this village to other places and you will
understand how much you have here.
Man 2: I do compare! That's how I know how many facilities there
are, and how little we [in the tribal hamlet] have. You
might live your whole life in some far off basti [hamlet]
and never know what all schemes you mukhiya (main)
people are getting here. 70
A SC man in the same village similarly explained how his observations of levels of
service in the predominantly upper caste main village increased his awareness, as well as
his demands, for services in his own neighborhood:
You would have to be blind not to see! There are so many schemes. Over
there [in the main village] they have CC [paved] roads, and the panchayat
brought water connections to every house. Where is our road? Where is
our water?71
In another example, an OBC woman described how demands for water points had
spread throughout her village:
Today we have five working handpumps in the village. The government
made them. It happened slowly, one by one they were made. People would
see the handpumps in other places and started to demand their own, and so
would say it to the sarpanch. First one was made out of the MLA funds.
Then people started saying it in the quorum [panchayat] meetings. Now
each mohalla [neighborhood] has one.72
Of course knowledge of services is not, in and of itself, enough to drive claim-
making. And yet, the broader the network the greater the chances a person will encounter
70 Conversation observed during author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 15, 2010.
71 Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 15, 2010.
72 Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, January 29, 2011
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examples of successful claim-making that inspire action. The school graduate quoted
above, for example, conceived of organizing a protest over teacher absenteeism because
of his exposure to protest narratives through a relative working in the city. Similarly, a
member of a youth group in another village narrated how they had begun to take up
issues related to village sanitation with the panchayat:
Interviewer: How did you start working on these issues as a youth
group?
Youth leader: Most of us go to study in Udaipur, and we heard of such
things and so thought we should make our own group here
to improve the work of the panchayat....If the GP won't get
our work done, we will make an andolan [movement]. We
will lock down the panchayat, lock the door and say, "when
you do the work we will open it."
Interviewer: Have you actually done this?
Youth leader: No, but we have heard of it. A group of women here in the
village threatened to do this. There had been almost five
days without water. The women went together to the
panchayat and said, "fix this problem or we will lock you
out." And the problem got resolved! We learned from
them. If the ladies of this village can do this... [he trails off,
implying "if women can do this, so can we"]. 73
I also spoke to one of the women involved in the event referenced by this youth leader. I
asked her where the idea for this kind of protest originated. She explained that a group of
women who met regularly at the angandwadi (government daycare center) began
discussing the water issues. One of the women ("Gita") used to be a panchayat member
and so, at her urging, they organized themselves to complain about the lack of water.
They drew, she explained, on Gita's past experience in the panchayat and her exposure to
different political practices (including NGO training) beyond the village:
We demanded water from the officials.... At first you might feel shy.
People were thinking, what's the use? Why should we ladies attend these
meetings? But Gita-ji has experience in the panchayat. She has traveled
Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 20, 2010.
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and attended trainings, and she knows how the administration works. She
told us, "We have elected those people. We have votes, just as the men!"74
In this series of examples, ideas about claim-making spread within a village through
exposure to narratives which, themselves, are informed by exposure and experiences
beyond the village. Gita, in this case, forms a "bridge" that links the group of women to
broader claim-making narratives that inform their practice within the village. The
experiences of these women, in turn, shaped the narratives employed by the youth group.
Socio-spatial exposure also generates the outward-reaching contacts and linkages
to the state through which to act upon information and ideas. The broader the network,
the more likely a person is to encounter actors and organizations that provide channels of
access to the state. When asked about their claim-making experiences in an interview, a
common response was to start to delineate a "chain" of contacts and events. The length of
these "chains" and the actors and institutions that comprise them vary considerably, both
across and within localities. These differences, I have argued, are the product, first, of the
local opportunity structure or range of mediating actors and institutions in a locality and,
second, of an individual's social and occupational networks and the contacts that he or
she develops through these networks.
To illustrate how this works in greater detail, I turn to three cases drawn from my
interviews. The first two compare claim-making activity in tribal hamlets of two villages
in Udaipur. While roughly the same size and home to people from the same Bheel
community, one hamlet is isolated and disconnected from the broader village, while the
other is strongly linked both to the main village and to broader networks beyond the
village. The different networks in place within these two hamlets, I suggest, enable very
74 Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 16, 2010.
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different patterns of claim-making among their residents. The third case employs an even
more micro level of analysis to explore unexpected variation in claim-making activity
among upper caste women within a single village and single caste community.
Empty promises and dry wells: the case of Village K's Bheelwada75
Village K is a mixed caste village (and panchayat headquarter) home to roughly 550
households. It is a relatively affluent village, with a tar-coal access road, paved interior
roads, a bus stop, and a busy cluster of small shops. Houses are mostly "pucca"
(concrete), and there are two primary schools, one secondary school, a health center, and
an ayurvedic hospital - all of which were open and functioning at the time of our village
visits. A number of the houses have running water connections, while the rest use
neighborhood handpumps - the majority of which were in working order. The Panchayat
Bhavan, in contrast to most villages where the panchayat offices remain locked most of
the time, was open for regular business hours, and was freshly painted with neat lists of
government programs and their beneficiaries listed on its wall.
The picture is very different in Village K's smaller tribal hamlets, home to about
200 Bheel households, which are scattered on the outskirts of the village. The largest of
these hamlets, referred to as the "Bheelwada," consists of about 50 households, or about
300 people. The Bheelwada lies about 2 km from the main village, but is a world apart.
The approach road is unpaved, and it takes about 45 minutes on foot to walk to the main
village. There are no interior roads within the hamlet -just rough footpaths. There is no
running water, no electricity, and no school. There is one well in the hamlet, but it dries
up in the summer season. Residents are forced to walk about 30 minutes to the closest
75 Gogunda block, Udaipur district. Author field visits (February 4 - 10, 2011) and focus group discussion
(February 22, 2010).
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hand pump on the outskirts of the main village, or walk through the fields to a private
well in another panchayat. In the words of one man: "Water here is a crisis. It is a crisis
every day."
When asked what they had done to try to resolve the water issue, however, I was
met first with silence, and then with another string of complaints: "We tried to deepen the
well ourselves, but the earth is dry. There is no water here!" Another stated: "We have
been without water for the past six years!" I asked whether they had approached anyone
for assistance with this issue. The answer was a resounding no. Several men recounted
how officials had visited the hamlet in the last panchayat election, and that they had
promised to bring water: "The mota aadmi (fat men) all came to visit at that time, and
made big and empty promises....Once or twice they sent a tanker of water, but there is no
real solution." Since the election time, they reported, they "had not had the chance to
meet any big people, not party-walle [from political parties], not panchayat-walle. No
one comes here." I asked if they themselves could go to the panchayat or to the block or
district to complain about this? The response was that:
There are no setting-log [connected people, who can make arrangements]
here. In the main village, every house has its leader, every house is aware.
But here there are no such leaders.
I asked if anyone from the hamlet attended panchayat meetings. They told me a few
people had gone, "but they don't say anything, they just listen. When they come home,
they don't say anything to other people here about what happens there."
There is, in sum, a profound sense of being disconnected in the Bheelwada, both
from the rest of the village and from government. This lack of connection is also found in
the limited social and occupational networks of the hamlet's residents. The men in the
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village work small, individual plots of land at a subsistence level. Some of the women
work on government worksites under NREGA; these worksites, however, are located on
the outskirts of the village and so do not offer an opportunity for engagement in the main
village. No resident that I spoke to had a personal connection to either the panchayat or to
a political party. There are no active social movements or NGOs working in the hamlet.
This is not to say, however, that there is a lack of social organization in the
hamlet. Rather, residents proudly boast of their local temple organization, where they
meet weekly and carry out collections to build and improve the temple. In fact, they had
recently collected money to have a small water tank delivered for use in religious
purposes. The social capital required to organize water for the temple, however, did not
extend to state-targeted claim-making or efforts to resolve the issue of public drinking
water. The social ties at work in the temple organization are strong ties - based on
kinship and ethnicity - that do not extend beyond the hamlet. In this sense, residents of
the Bheelwada are embedded in highly "parochial" or locally-bound networks.
A light in every house: the case of Village B's Bheelwada7 6
Village B is a similarly-sized and similarly-developed village to Village K, home to about
500 mixed caste households and located in the same block. Like Village K, Village B is
also the panchayat headquarter. The main village is "pucca"; roads are paved, every
house has an electricity connection, and some houses have running water connections.
There is a primary school, secondary school, primary health clinic, and ayurvedic
hospital.
76 Gogunda block, Udaipur district. Author field visits (January 27 - February 2, 2011) and focus group
discussion (February 24, 2010).
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Village B is home to about 120 Bheel households who, as in Village K, live in
distinct neighborhoods. In contrast to Village K, the largest of these Bheel
neighborhoods, home to about 80 households, is located in the main village. A smaller
hamlet, or Bheelwada, is home to about 40 households which, as in Village K, is located
at a distance (about 1.5 km) from the main village.
Village B's Bheelwada, however, is nothing like Village K's. The access road is
dirt, but is well maintained. There is a public water tank, as well as two handpumps in
working order. The houses are made from kaccha (makeshift) materials such as mud and
bricks. And yet each home has an electricity connection and a latrine, both of which were
provided under a government scheme targeting SC and ST households. There is a
primary school and a daycare center located in the hamlet. The school regularly serves a
midday meal to the students, and a new classroom was added the year before with
funding from the central government's Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (Education for All
Campaign). At the time of my visit, new latrines were being constructed at the school.
The seat of sarpanch was reserved for a member of the ST and was filled by an
influential elder who lives in the Bheelwada. He is something of a career panchayat
member, having previously served as ward panch and before that as a member of the
block level Panchayat Samiti (each time filling a reserved seat). The sarpanch has played
a critical role in linking the hamlet to the rest of the village, in accessing a wide range of
government schemes. In his words: "I wanted there to be a light in every house in the
Bheelwada."
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And yet service delivery in this hamlet is not simply a matter of supply directed
by the sarpanch. Residents play an active role in voicing demands for services. As one
explained:
The sarpanch learned of the scheme to bring the bhijli [electricity]. But
ordinary people made demands for the connections. Not everyone got
them at once. People had to approach the ward panch to make the
application. You had to be included under BPL (Below Poverty Line
designation), and so people had to make sure their names were included.
You had to travel to Gogunda and fill up forms. Not just once, but again
and again. Each household had to do this work.
In another example of active claim-making, residents recounted having organized local
protests, first (a number of years ago) over teacher absenteeism in the hamlet and, more
recently, about under-payment on a NREGA worksite. This started, I was told:
... with 2-3 women from this hamlet who were working in NREGA and
became aware that they were not getting the full amount, and so they
organized a group of about 20 women who went to the panchayat to
demand to see the muster rolls [payroll accounts].... The Bheelwada
women took the lead in this.
The Bheelwada in village B reflects a sense of being both connected and well-
served, and its residents appear to be well-informed about government programs and
active claim-makers. This stems, I suggest, from a confluence of factors which, together,
link the hamlet both to the main village and, beyond the GP, to a wider network of other
villages and towns in the region.
First, the hamlet is linked to the panchayat, and by extension to the main village,
through (randomly assigned) caste reservations and the role that bridging the sarpanch
plays as both a tribal elder and panchayat member. And yet, even if the sarpanch did not
play this role, hamlet residents would remain connected to the village through family
members who reside in the Bheel neighborhood located in the main village. While these
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family ties are strong, they are also bridging as they link residents of the Bheelwada to
the wider village. Once a resident begins to spend time in the main village, he or she
develops broader (and weaker) ties through day-to-day contact with other villagers from
different neighborhoods and castes. This was particularly clear when visiting the local
chai stall, where we could observe men from different backgrounds (including residents
of the Bheelwada) drinking tea side-by-side.
Residents of the Bheelwada also participate in networks that extend beyond the
village and the panchayat. Many of the men in the hamlet regularly travel to Gogunda
(the block seat) or to Udaipur (the district capital) to work as manual laborers on
construction sites. Residents explained that they have a long tradition of working in
masonry, and so find it easy to find employment in construction. Women in the hamlet
also work on NREGA sites. However, unlike Village K where the worksites are isolated
from the main village, the women were engaged on projects in and around the main
village and in other parts of the panchayat. As one woman explained, the NREGA sites
emerge as places where they encounter government officials:
Everyone comes there when we are working. There is the mate, the
technician, the supervisor. The higher-ups from Gogunda also come and
check on the progress. Sometimes politicians also come to show their
faces. NGO-walle also come, to inform us of how this should be, how that
should be.
Finally, the hamlet's residents are also exposed to a development NGO that works
in a number of villages in the area. Through the NGO, which organizes working
committees comprised of village representatives, hamlet residents come into contact with
people from other villages. As one resident and NGO member explained:
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Each time the meeting is in a different place, and so we move around and
meet people from other villages in this way. You see all the programs and
schemes, the work being done in other places.
In these ways and others, through ties to the main village, the panchayat, the city, and the
NGO, residents of the hamlet have developed "cosmopolitan" networks that extend
beyond the Bheelwada and which, in so doing, inform their claim-making practice.
Veiled claims: women's demands for water in Village C77
Village C is a far cry from the Bheelwada in either Village K or Village B. It is a highly
developed village and panchayat headquarter, home to about 300 households primarily
from the higher caste OBC and GC communities. The village, which is located in close
proximity to Udaipur city, is - compared to others in the sample - a wealthy place with
"pucca " houses, paved access roads, and running water in the majority of homes. And
yet residents within Village C exhibit different patterns of claim-making, ranging from
some of the most active that I encountered in my study to other cases of extreme
passivity.
Differences in claim-making activity are most striking among the upper caste
(primarily Brahmin) women of the village. Among women, higher caste women have
some of the most restricted mobility in this region of India. Most are housewives who,
under the purdah system, wear the veil and do not travel far from their homes
unaccompanied by a male relative. Given these restrictions and their circumscribed social
sphere, upper caste women are among those who we would least expect to engage in
claim-making. Indeed, as we saw in chapter 2, they are less likely to make claims on the
state than lower caste women from the Scheduled Castes or Tribes (many of whom, out
77 Bargaon block, Udaipur district. Author field visits (December 13-21, 201) and focus group discussion
(December 17, 2010).
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of economic necessity, work outside of their homes). And yet in Village C I encountered
dramatic variation in claim-making practices among upper caste women. These
differences can be attributed, I argue, to the fact that women have developed different
kinds of social ties and networks - even within the same village environment.
Some women, as we would expect, move in very small circles, socializing
primarily with family members and with neighbors in their own locality and caste
community. They represent, in many ways, the archetypal "parochial" villager.
Interviews with such women were a frustrating - but also revealing - affair. It was
incredibly difficult to strike up a conversation. Many women refused to talk altogether if
a male relative was present, or spoke in whispers from behind her veil. Some women, in
response to questions about service delivery in the village, would list a series of
complaints: water supply (while piped to each home) is irregular, the secondary school
goes only to 8 th grade and should be upgraded, the roads are in need of repair. And yet
when I asked whether they had done anything or contacted anyone to address these
issues, the answer was almost uniformly no. In the words of one woman, echoed by many
others:
I spend most of the time doing household work and therefore do not get
time for such tasks....We [women] do not go anywhere, and we also don't
have much information.... My husband and the men of the family, they
only do all these tasks.
Another group of women in the village, however, were much more engaged in the
affairs of the village, and in claim-making. In fact, this group of about ten women were
routinely referred to by others as the "active" women of the village. While members of
the same upper caste communities (also seen wearing the veil in public), they stand out
from other women because they have developed social and occupational ties that extend
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across neighborhood lines and beyond the village. First, most are associated with the
local anganwadi (government daycare center), either as staff members or informal
helpers. The anganwadi, which draws together women from different neighborhoods,
provides links both to the panchayat as well as to the block level administration. A
number of women travel regularly to the Bargaon block offices to attend trainings
organized by the Department for Women's and Children's Development. The training, in
the words of one participant:
... opens your eyes to government procedure. They teach us there about
government schemes, how to talk, and how to educate people in the village. They
tell us that it is important that ladies participate, that the panchayat is there for us.
Their attachment to the anganwadi also makes these women a focal point for
other women in the village. As one woman explained: "They [other women] come to me
here in the anganwadi. They have confidence in me, and they know that I will speak for
them." Other women, such as "Gita" (the former panchayat member, introduced above),
also have links to the local administration. Finally, most of the women in this group have
completed a secondary level of education, which required attending school outside of the
village.
Building on ties and experiences that extend beyond their local neighborhoods,
these women became vocal advocates for drinking water in the village. As one explained:
"Women feel the need for water the most. These are women's issues, so we only have to
bring them up.... The household connections were made because of us." Another woman
explained how exposure beyond the village spurred their demand for household water
connections:
Most of us have relatives in Udaipur. It is so close by, so we can see the
services there. Tap connections, water every day! Don't we have the same
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needs here? Even Kailashpuri [a similar village, located close by] has
running water connections. We said, "[Village C] should be developed
like that!"
In making demands for water, the women drew on a wide repertoire of claim-
making strategies, contacting actors in the panchayat as well as higher-level politicians
while engaging both in formal channels as well as in acts of protest. As narrated by one
of the women:
There used to be such long lines at the public taps. It was a big problem
because people were fighting over the water, and so we started to demand
household connections. This was because of us ladies that it happened.
Men don't collect the water, and so at first they weren't so concerned. But
we raised this issue with the panchayat. We went many times as a group to
the panchayat. We raised the issue in the quorum meetings, and made
applications. Gita-ji was up-sarpanch [vice-president] at that time. We
walked there with empty water pitchers on our heads, and said [to the
men], "if you don't help us, what will you drink?" .... When the
politicians [candidates for state Legislative Assembly and national
Member of Parliament] came, we also raised the issue. We told the
candidates "you are not getting our votes unless you give us water." And
then that politician said, "ladies, I will take those pitchers from your
heads" [I will bring water so you don't have to carry it.] That is how
finally these connections got sanctioned.
This example is all the more striking given that it was carried out by upper caste women
in a village where most women are notably absent from the public sphere. On the one
hand, their actions were made possible by the ties of friendship among the group. And yet
their activism would not have been possible without outward-reaching ties, facilitated
through their relationship to the Angandwadi and exposure beyond the village.
7. Conclusion
The cases drawn from villages K, B, and C illustrate local variation in claim-making
practice, both across and within localities controlling for socioeconomic features and
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ascriptive characteristics such as caste and gender. Such variation in citizen-state
relations, I have demonstrated, can in large part be explained by differences in social and
occupational networks and the information, ideas, and contacts to which differently
situated people are exposed. The residents of village K's Bheelwada are isolated; their
social and occupational ties do not extend far beyond the hamlet or beyond their tribal
community. Their claim-making activity is, accordingly, circumscribed as they are
exposed to limited sources of information and have few contacts through which to pursue
services. The residents of the Bheelwada in village B have developed outward-reaching
ties that extend beyond the hamlet to the main village and beyond. These ties cross
established social cleavages of caste and class, as well as geographic and spatial
boundaries of neighborhood and village. Because they are connected in these ways, the
residents of village B's Bheelwada are exposed information about the array of public
services that are available, and have developed a strong sense of entitlement reflected in a
high level of claim-making activity. A similar set of contrasting dynamics are observed
within Village C, where most women live under conditions of limited exposure but where
a group of "active" women, by virtue of their outward reaching ties and connections to
the panchayat and local administration, have emerged as village activists.
These examples drawn from rural Rajasthan help to illustrate the theory of socio-
spatial exposure and the causal mechanisms involved. Networks that reach beyond the
neighborhood, that traverse caste or class lines, or that extend beyond the village
facilitate the flow of information and ideas about public service delivery and claim-
making practice. The same networks also expose individuals to different sets of actors
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and institutions that provide outward-reaching bridges to the state through which to
channel demands.
As noted, exposure does not require either strong or horizontal interpersonal ties.
As such, the theory of socio-spatial exposure is distinct from theories of social capital
centered on shared norms of trust and reciprocity. Rather, exposure is the product of
weak ties, the presence of which are consistent with the persistence of caste and class
inequalities in rural India, while at the same time enabling contact across socioeconomic
lines. Such weak ties are critical conduits for information and other resources, and
provide essential, outward-reaching bridges to the state.
At the same time, however, it is important to note that the presence of weak ties
does not preclude strong ties that develop within communities and localities. Strong ties,
as the social capital literature effectively documents, are essential in creating the
conditions for local cooperation. They play an essential role in creating local support
systems based on family, kinship, and shared ethnicity. This local support is a critical
form of insurance, put to use in developing coping strategies - very often in the absence
of public services. In this sense, strong and bonding ties are critical to survival and
wellbeing in under-served communities. These ties are not, however, platforms for
outward-reaching or state-targeted action. This is particularly true for marginalized
groups who traditionally lack strong connections to the state and its resources. In other
words, as Narayan (1999) observes: "When the networks of those excluded or
disempowered, consist primarily of "people like themselves", and are not linked to
outside groups, information, power, and resources, the networks serve an important
insurance and solidarity function. However, they do not become agents for
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transformation..." through which citizens engage the state (p. 35). The residents of
Village K's Bheelwada, as we have seen, were able to organize internally to bring water
to their temple, but did not act collectively to demand drinking water for their hamlet.
The "active" women of Village C, in contrast, built on ties of friendship when organizing
to demand household water connections. Their collective demands would not, however,
have come to fruition in the absence of weak and bridging ties that extended beyond their
tightly-knit group to the broader panchayat and beyond.
Weak and bridging ties, in sum, provide both the access and know-how necessary
for claim-making. The next chapter explores these dynamics in further depth, turning to
the citizen survey data to empirically examine the effects of exposure along a range of




Cross-neighborhood, cross-caste, and extra-village exposure
1. Introduction
The theory of socio-spatial exposure predicts that those people embedded in networks
comprised of weak and bridging ties will be more likely to engage in claim-making, and
will do so through a greater diversity of practices, than those situated in more parochial,
locally-bound networks. As we have seen from villagers' own accounts, social and
occupational ties that extend beyond the immediate community and locality expose
individuals to information and ideas about, as well as linkages to, the state. These
resources inform both whether and how a person makes claims on the state.
This chapter turns to data from the citizen survey to test this theory, examining
the effects of socio-spatial exposure on claim-making. Section 2 introduces a number of
measures of exposure in the rural Indian context, including cross-neighborhood, cross-
caste, and extra-village exposure, each of which captures the presence ties across
different social and spatial dimensions. Section 3 describes the data and empirical model
through which the data are assessed, while section 4 presents the main results, examining
two sets of outcomes: the incidence of claim-making and the claim-making repertoire.
Section 5 probes the relationship between exposure and claim-making in greater depth by
examining a range of alternative explanations and causal pathways. These include
exposure to other (non-networked) sources of information, stocks of social capital, and
local political connections. The main effects of socio-spatial exposure are, I find, robust
to the inclusion of controls for these and other alternative explanations. Section 6
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considers the effects of exposure on claim-making across different sectors, examining
different categories of goods and services and, in particular, whether different dynamics
might apply to goods of a collective or selective nature.
2. Capturing exposure: explanatory variables
Using data from the citizen survey, I assess socio-spatial exposure along several
dimensions, namely exposure across caste, class, neighborhood, and village lines.
Together, these represent the primary set of boundaries that constrain social and
economic life in rural India. First, cross-neighborhood exposure is a proxy for contact
across both caste and class lines, since villages tend to be spatially segregated by caste
and since caste divisions also often overlap with class distinctions. Second, the workplace
is another common site for cross-caste exposure, both within the village and beyond.
Third, extra-village exposure develops as a result of movement beyond the village -
typically in search of employment.
If the theory of socio-spatial exposure is correct, we should expect to see both
more as well as more diverse claim-making among those individuals with greater
exposure across neighborhood, caste, and village lines. The more a person comes into
contact with people and settings across these various dimensions, the more
"cosmopolitan" his or her network, and the greater the sources of information and
diversity of contacts to which he or she is exposed.
Cross-neighborhood exposure: engagement across caste and class lines
At the most local level, I assess the degree to which individuals traverse neighborhood
boundaries to socialize with people in other parts of the village, thereby moving across
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caste and class lines. As noted, the majority of villages in the sample are divided along
caste and, to a large degree, class lines; wealthier, upper caste homes are typically located
in the center of the main village, while distinct lower caste and class neighborhoods are
located on the outskirts or in hamlets of the village. Within the main village,
neighborhoods often have a distinctive caste character, and it is very common to hear
people refer to their neighborhood by caste name (for example, the "Brahmin basti," the
"Jain mohalla," the "Bheelwada," and so on). Even if these boundaries are not
immediately visible to an outsider's eyes, they are clear to residents who, in participatory
mapping exercises, could clearly demarcate neighborhoods by caste.
I measure cross-neighborhood exposure by examining the frequency with which
survey respondents report "regularly meeting or sitting with people from different
neighborhoods" using a four-point scale ranging from those who almost never interact
across neighborhood boundaries (0), to those who do so very often (3) (Table 4.1).
"Sitting with" others might take place in defined settings such as a women's group, youth
group, or cultural group, or may occur in more informal contexts over a cup of tea or
game of cards, or in other kinds of social gatherings. 78 If the theory is correct, we would
expect people with greater degree of cross-neighborhood exposure to be more likely to
engage in claim-making through a greater diversity ofpractices than those who socialize
primarily within the confines of their own neighborhood.
78 To anchor the responses, surveyors provided respondents with a series of prompts including examples of
behavior that constitutes "meeting or sitting with" people, ranging from visiting friends, engaging in
conversation (batchit), playing cards, playing kirtan (collective worship), or gathering for puja (religious
ceremony). This remains, however, a subjective measure of exposure since individuals were left to decide
for themselves both what constitutes social engagement and what constitutes a neighborhood. This degree
of subjectivity, however, provides critical insight into the mental maps and categories at play within a
village and the degree to which residents, according to their own assessments, move across such divides.
152
Table 4.1. Cross-neighborhood exposure
Socialize across neighborhood boundaries
Frequency Freq. Percent
almost never 708 32
occasionally 1,408 64
regularly 70 3
very often 10 0
Total 2,196 100
How does cross-neighborhood exposure contribute to claim-making? Social
interaction across neighborhood, and by extension caste and/or class lines, is a critical
source of information exchange. In a village in Kota, for example, I encountered a mixed-
caste group of men including both upper caste and Scheduled Caste members sitting near
a temple on the outskirts of the village. They were returning from nearby fields, and had
stopped to chat with one another. One of the men described how men from different
neighborhoods in his village regularly gather outside the temple:
You come, smoke a beedi [cigarette] and hear the news. What's what,
who's where, how is the harvest, what are the government schemes.
People sit and talk, and this is how we become jagruk [aware].79
This kind of social interaction and exchange of information, however, is not necessarily
marked by equity or by horizontal social ties. The same men, for example, made it clear
that - despite their sociality - barriers of caste and class were still at play; a SC man,
while engaged in the conversation, sat at a short distance and did not partake of the
tobacco that the other higher-caste men were sharing. Later, speaking individually with
an upper caste man who had been part of the group, I asked whether he would talk in the
same way with the SC man in his home. He replied frankly:
No, we don't meet in that way. Each [caste] community has its own ways,
and you have to respect that. We'll meet one another in the fields, or out
79 Author interview, Sangod, Kota District, February 20, 2011.
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and about, or at a gathering like the wedding feast. But we are neighbors,
not brothers.80
Social interaction across caste and class lines can, in fact, be rather shallow. One
may encounter people from different class or caste backgrounds in the marketplace, at a
chai stall, or at a temple without forging deep or sustained bonds and without developing
a sense of mutual obligation. In other words, cross-neighborhood ties are primarily weak
rather than strong, and - to the extent that they cut across caste and class divides - are
also bridging. Weak and bridging social ties enable exposure to sources of difference: to
information, ideas, and contacts beyond the tightly-bound groups of kin and caste that are
found at the neighborhood level. The measure of cross-neighborhood exposure captures
the frequency with which a person ventures beyond these neighborhood constraints to
engage others from different caste and class backgrounds.
There are, however, concerns that this cross-neighborhood measure of exposure
might be endogenous to the claim-making process. In other words, it is unclear whether
exposure is a cause or an effect of claim-making activity. A person might, for example,
come into contact with new and different people through acts of claim-making; one
might, for instance, strike up a friendship with people encountered at a government office
or on a picket line. People might also gather around collective issues of claim-making,
and this in turn might create a new social space for interaction across caste or class lines.
In these ways, claim-making might serve to alter a person's social sphere by encouraging
interaction across neighborhood lines, rather than the other way around.
The kinds of cross-neighborhood engagement that I measure, however, are
specifically social acts and, as such, are antecedent to - if not fully independent from -
80 Author interview, Sangod, Kota District, February 20, 2011.
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state-targeted acts of claim-making. The forms of cross-neighborhood contact captured in
the survey entail social rather than explicitly political modes of interaction: sitting
together, gathering for religious and cultural purposes, and so on. As such, the impetus to
engage across neighborhood lines develops prior to - and independently from - acts of
claim-making. A ST man in Udaipur, for example, explains how people meet at the
temple to worship, and how this then extends to discussion of village public goods:
We sit at the Hanumanji temple. We worship there, and also discuss
issues. We'll talk about what will happen to our children and how they
will earn a living. We talk about how a school must be made for our
children.8'
A woman in the same village described other social spaces in which people from
different neighborhoods and caste backgrounds meet:
We sit together when there is a death or wedding. For example, at the
funeral yesterday.82 When we sit together, maybe we will talk about the
village. What is there, what is lacking in this or that mohalla
[neighborhood]. We talk about if we should go to the sarpanch, or to
Gogunda, or to the Zila [district seat]. We discuss what should be done. 83
Scholars elsewhere have observed the ways in which "nonpolitical" institutions
such as the workplace or religious bodies create spaces that foster civic and political
participation (Burns, Schlozman, & Verba, 2001). In studying the effect of church
attendance on participation in the U.S., Verba et al. (1995) have observed that, while one
may become politicized at church, one is unlikely to attend church for political reasons.
As such, the "institutional involvements out of which citizens acquire resources [for
participation] are.. .antecedent to political activity" (Verba et al., 1995: p. 227). Decisions
81 Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, January 30, 2011.
82 Here she is referring to a funeral for a ST man in her neighborhood. While primarily a ST function,
people from other parts of the village also paid respects.
8 Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, January 31, 2011.
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about whether and with whom to socialize are made "apart from and in advance of
choices to take part politically." Similarly, when I asked the group of men gathered
outside of the Kota temple whether they met with the objective of discussing the village's
development, one man replied:
No, that is the work of government. Here we are simple people. If
someone has an issue, he can raise it if he wants to. But mostly we just
come to sit and talk.84
In other words, social spaces in the village may become platforms for claim-making but
they are not - first or foremost - political spaces.
Cross-caste workplace exposure
A second measure of socio-spatial exposure examines cross-caste engagement in the
workplace. Occupations are traditionally caste bound in rural India (Dirks, 2001;
Dumont, 1970; Srinivas, 1987b). And yet caste-based restrictions are becoming less rigid
over time as changes in the rural economy (discussed in greater detail in chapter 5) propel
people to seek economic opportunities in new sectors (Kapur, Prasad, Pritchett, & Babu,
2010; Krishna, 2002, 2003). As a result, increasing numbers of people find themselves
interacting in the workplace with people from other castes, whether through local
employment in agriculture, non-farm labor, or the service sector, or in settings beyond the
village.
To capture exposure along these lines, I examine whether or not a person works in
a multi-caste environment (Table 4.2). Survey respondents were asked: "Do you work
mostly with people from your ownjati [caste community], or with people from other
jatis?" From this, I created a measure of cross-caste workplace exposure where
84 Author interview, Sangod, Kota District, February 20, 2011.
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respondents either work primarily with their own caste (0), or with people from different
castes (1). The expectation here is that individuals who regularly work with people from
other caste communities will be more likely to make claims through a wider repertoire of
practices than those who primarily work side-by-side their own co-ethnics.






The workplace represents a primary arena in which people from different caste
communities come into contact with one another and, as such, a person's participation in
a multi-caste workplace is an indicator of bridging ties. A woman at a government
worksite, to give one example, reflected on the multi-caste nature of the job: "Here we
meet and greet and everybody. We all work side-by-side. There is no discrimination
(untouchability) here."8 5 Another woman, an agricultural laborer, reported:
I move about and meet people. I talk to people on the way, and in the
fields, and in this way come to learn about who is good, who will help
you. Someone will say, so-and-so, he isjagruk [aware], he can get thins
done. And so when the water pump was broken, I knew where to turn.
Again, however, it is important to note that workplace interaction does not require strong
ties of friendship or trust. Relationships in the workplace may remain unequal (for
example, between landowner and laborer), but are still conduits for information
exchange.
85 Author interview, Gogunda, Udaipur, January 27, 2011.
86 Author interview, Bargaon, Udaipur, December 16, 2010.
157
Unlike the primarily social (and subjective) measures of cross-neighborhood
exposure, concerns over endogeneity are less pronounced for occupation-based measures
of exposure. It is unlikely that decisions about where and with whom to work are shaped
by the ways in which individuals do or do not make claims on the state. Rather, these
decisions are driven by a range of exogenous factors such as the availability of cultivable
land, the productivity of agriculture in a given locality and season, employment
opportunities beyond the village, and so on. Together these factors shape the economic
incentives that drive decisions about occupation. A clear exception, of course, is if the
state is your employer, as is the case for public sector employees or for villagers who
work as laborers under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS).
Public sector employment of this kind might confound the analysis since these jobs are,
themselves, the targets of claim-making. NREGS, in particular, is a specifically demand-
driven program in which households must request employment on a government
worksite. To address this, I examine whether people are employed under NREGS or are
"salaried employees" who typically hold public sector jobs (for example, as school
teachers, nurses, daycare workers, and the like).
Even with these controls, however, I am not able to rule out the possibility that
claim-making, in its different forms, will shape the degree to which a person traverses
social and spatial boundaries. In order to address this problem of potential endogeneity,
an additional measure is required, one that is clearly independent from the claim-making
process. The village land-to-labor ratio is one such variable.
158
Extra-village exposure and the land-to-labor ratio
Calculated as the total cultivable land over the total village workforce, 87 the land-
to-labor ratio reflects the likelihood that a person will find agricultural
employment within a village (Table 4.3). Where cultivable land is scarce,
opportunities for village-based agricultural employment are reduced and
individuals are more likely to venture outside of the village, either to towns or
cities or to areas with a higher concentration of farmland. As such, the land-to-
labor ratio reflects the conditions that underlie the decision to travel outside of the
village in pursuit of employment. We therefore expect to see a negative
relationship between the land-to-labor ratio and claim-making activity;
individuals living in villages where farmland is scarce will be more likely to make
claims through a broader claim-making repertoire than those who live in villages
with ample land.
Table 4.3. Village land-to-labor ratio (extra-village exposure)
Land-to-labor ratio
Cultivable land (hectares) / Total Village Workforce
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
2210 1.52 1.21 0.08 10.12
The land-to-labor ratio serves as a proxy variable through which to assess extra-
village exposure both of a local and of a longer-distance variety.88 While circular rural-
87 Village cultivable land (both irrigated and non-irrigated land suitable for farming, measured in terms of
hectares) and village workforce are both reported in the Government of India's 2001 Census Primary
Abstract and Village Directory.
88 The land-to-labor ratio serves as an exogenous proxy variable for the potentially endogenous socio-
spatial exposure variables. In the empirical models described below I present the reduced form estimates of
the effect of the land-to-labor ratio on claim-making. I do not, however, apply an "instrumental variable"
approach, since this would require certainty that the land-to-labor ratio affects claim-making only through
socio-spatial exposure and not through any other channel. This requirement, referred to as the "exclusion
restriction," is a result of the demand that the variable being used as an instrument is correlated with the
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urban migration is on the rise across India (cf. Kapur et al., 2010), less than a quarter (22
percent) of the sample reports having a family member who migrates. Rates are highest
in Udaipur (the poorest, most remote district) at 25 percent and lowest in Kota (the most
developed district) at 16 percent. The number of people who leave the village for work,
however, is much higher if we consider those who do not migrate for long periods of
time, but rather commute on a daily basis to nearby towns and cities. A majority of
households interviewed stated that they have at least one family member who works
outside of the village in this fashion. The predominantly local nature of extra-village
employment in part reflects advances in rural-urban connectivity made possible through
improvements to Rajasthan's major roads and highways as well as to transportation
services. Better roads and transportation mean that more and more people (in particular
men) are going "outside" in search of jobs, participating in what many villagers referred
to in interviews as the daily "up-down." In Udaipur district, for example, substantial
numbers of men (very often from the ST and SC communities) travel on a regular basis to
Udaipur city where they are employed on construction sites, or in nearby marble factories
or other industry. Among higher class and caste residents, it is also common to commute
to the city for work, for example in office jobs, or for education.
As a function of village geography and demography the land-to-labor ratio is
exogenous to the claim-making process. 9 That is, the land-to-labor ratio is (negatively)
endogenous explanatory variable, but is uncorrelated with the error term of the equation (thereby ruling out
that the instrument has an effect through any other means). Since I cannot satisfy the exclusion restriction
for the land-to-labor ratio (which could plausibly effect claim-making through demand for certain services
such as agricultural extension), I do not attempt to use this variable as an "instrument." Instead, I simply
present the direct results with the land-to-labor ratio as an independent measure of one of the key drivers of
socio-spatial exposure, leaving the reader to decide how well it works as a proxy. See Angrist and Pischke,
Mostly Harmless Econometrics, (2009).
89 Analysis includes controls for population density, ruling out the possibility that the land-to-labor ratio is
simply picking up levels of crowding within a village.
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correlated with socio-spatial exposure but is itself independent from individual claim-
making practice; whether or how a person makes claims is unlikely to alter the
underlying geographic, demographic, and economic conditions in a village that determine
the land-to-labor ratio. 90 Using the land-to-labor ratio as a measure of exposure thereby
helps to address concerns related to possible endogeneity surrounding other measures of
socio-spatial exposure.
Extra-village ties and, in particular, rural-urban ties, make the boundaries between
village and city more porous. As people move across rural-urban borders, there is reason
to believe that new norms and practices may be introduced with the potential to alter
social and political practices within the village. An elderly man in Udaipur summed up
these dynamics:
There used to be much land and such good quality land. Each man had his
own. Now, the population is growing and with each generation the land is
divided into smaller and smaller pieces. Now there is so much crowding,
so little space. More and more the younger generations are going outside
in search of work. It is changing the face of the village, bringing in new
ways. Now everyone who leaves the village comes back and thinks he is
Shah Rukh Khan.91
Another man in Kota reflected on the high numbers of people who "go outside"
for work, noting that they are "changing the village mentality":
People come back and they talk about what's going on the cities. Village
people are generally less educated and have limited information. But
people who go outside have state-level information. Everybody has their
90 A possible exception is if village residents effectively demand employment on government NREGS
worksites which, by providing local opportunities, reduce the incentives for people to seek employment
outside of the village. There is, however, little evidence that this is the case. NREGS provides only 100
days of work per household per year at minimum wage (Rs. 100/day), and workers are consistently under-
paid. While NREGS may supplement a household's income, it is not enough to deter people from seeking
other sources of employment. Moreover, there is a pronounced gender division of labor, wherein primarily
women work on NREGS sites while men pursue other opportunities. I do, however, include controls for
employment on NREGS sites in the analysis that follows.
91 Author interview, Gogunda, Udaipur, February 25, 2010. Shah Rukh Kahn is a famous Bollywood actor.
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own point of view. My thoughts might be limited. Their city thinking is
wider, they have foresight. 92
The land-to-labor ratio is also associated with cross-cutting exposure within a
village. Specifically, the land-to-labor ratio is significantly and negatively correlated with
cross-neighborhood exposure: where land is scarce, people socialize across neighborhood
(and caste and class) lines with greater frequency. 93 This suggests, albeit tentatively, a
second set of dynamics within the village. The same lack of agricultural land that
motivates people to seek external employment may also drive people to seek employment
in new, non-traditional sectors within a village. This in turn may foster increased levels of
interaction across caste and class lines. A young Scheduled Caste man in Kota, for
example, works as a school teacher - an occupation that would have been unthinkable for
the older generation. He explains:
I spent my childhood right here in this village. I grew up next to the Mali
and the Rajput [higher caste communities]. But most would not give the
time of day to an Erwhal (SC) boy. But then I left to study, and I came
back with a degree and earned their respect. Now they send their own
children to me. I meet and greet all the parents, pass the time of day with
them.94
This man's statement is consistent with other studies in rural India that have noted
a diversification in employment sources among the lower castes who are increasingly
engaged in non-traditional occupations (Kapur et al., 2010; Krishna, 2002, 2003). As I
will discuss in chapter 5, a loosening of caste-bound strictures on occupation, in turn,
allows for greater contact among broad segments of the village population.
92 Author interview, Sangod block, Udaipur district, February 20, 2011.
93 These dynamics are discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.
94 Author interview, Sangod block, Kota district, February 22, 2011.
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Migration: a mixed picture
If extra-village ties are an important source of socio-spatial exposure, we might also
expect to find a positive relationship between migration and claim-making, particularly
where circular patterns of migration allows for the rural-urban flow of information and
ideas. To measure migration, I asked respondents whether they (or a member of their
household) reside outside of the village for more than thirty days in the year (Table 4.4).
Because the respondents were located in their home village at the time of the survey, the
data primarily capture the effects of circular migration involving periods of travel with
return to the village.






A priori expectations concerning the effects of migration on claim-making are
unclear. On the one hand, migration beyond the village might facilitate exposure to
different people and contexts. As such, it might foster a broader (and more
"cosmopolitan") worldview that contributes to the political knowledge and skill required
for claim-making upon return to the village. In their work on migration and rural
cosmopolitanism, for example, Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan argue that movement that
"disrupts conventional spatial divisions" creates "newly salient spaces of work,
... habitation and politics" (2003, p. 339, emphasis added). People who migrate may be
exposed to new and different repertoires of political practice, as well as to ideas
concerning service delivery, entitlement, and political efficacy. For example, a man in
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Udaipur who spends part of the year as a cook in cities in other states accompanied
several friends and neighbors to a panchayat meeting to help them with their application
for an electrical connection. He commented:
Because I move outside I see things, how the world works. And when I
come home I know that the panchayat should be doing such-and-such
things, that the sarkar should provide all these things. People turn to me
because of my knowledge. 95
Indeed, "exit" from the village might increase voice upon one's return. 96 Kapur et
al. (2010), for example, document how rural-urban migration is contributing to changing
social and economic caste relations in rural India, where "tightening labour supply in the
villages, and financial flows to households from migrant members, [enhance] the
bargaining power of dalit [lower-caste] households within the village economy...
weakening traditional clientelist political structures" (p. 47).
On the other hand, the literature on immigration suggests that certain patterns of
migration may have an insulating effect. In particular, temporary labor migration, which
is seasonal and circular in nature, may do little to expose people to new practices since
migratory networks may in fact be quite closed. 97 People in these networks may be
physically mobile but are reliant on people from their home communities for information,
resources, and support; as such, they are not socially mobile and develop very few ties to
their new locality. Rather, their ties to and dependency on their home communities are
95 Author interview, Bargaon, Udaipur, December 16, 2010.
96 This is particularly true among "settled" migrants who take up residency in new communities, as
opposed to labor migrants who move in a circular (temporary and often seasonal) fashion. For settled
migrants, political engagement with their home communities may be a way to increase their social status
which is tied to the place of origin, rather than the new location. See, for example, Jones-Correa (1998).
Albert Hirschman also examines dynamics where exit can lead to voice, using the East German case to
illustrate (Hirschman, 1993).
97 Thanks to Erica Dobbs for insight into these dynamics concerning different types of migration.
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reinforced (Massey et al., 1993; Piore, 1979).98 Jha et al. (2007), for example, have
shown how rural institutions are transplanted in ethnically homogenous slum
communities of Delhi. Under such conditions, we would not expect migration to be a
source of exposure to new information or ideas. Nor would migration of this variety lead
to a proliferation of new contacts or linkages to the state.
Given these different possible patterns, the expected effects of migration on
claim-making are ambiguous; it is not clear whether households with members who
migrate will be more or less exposed, or more or less inclined to engage in claim-making
in their home village. However, given the largely circular nature of migratory patterns
between rural and urban India, we might suspect that migrants and their households may
in fact be more insulated from, rather than exposed to, new ideas and practices.
3. Survey data and analysis
Analysis of data drawn from 2210 households across 105 Rajasthani villages confirms
the hypothesis that greater socio-spatial exposure is associated with both more and more
diverse claim-making. Those individuals who socialize across neighborhood lines and
work with people from other castes, as well as those who are likely to venture beyond the
village in search of employment, are, all else equal, more likely to make claims on the
state, and do so through a greater range of practices, than those who are less exposed.
98 Massey et al. (1993), for example, find that labor migration of Mexicans to the Unites States is structured
by social networks developed in and with reference to home communities; migrants live with other
migrants from the same towns and find jobs, housing, and other resources through these networks.
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Variables
I examine three sets of dependent variables as discussed in chapter 2: the incidence of
claim-making, assessed in binary terms, the claim-making repertoire, assessed as an
index of the number of practices engaged (0 - 9); and the particular claim-making
practices - or channels - engaged.
The explanatory variables consist of the range of measures of socio-spatial
exposure described above including cross-neighborhood exposure (socializing across
neighborhood lines within a village), cross-caste workplace exposure (working with
people from other castes), and extra-village exposure (assessed using the village land-to-
labor ratio as an independent proxy). Migration, the anticipated effects of which are
unclear, is included as a secondary measure of extra-village exposure.
To isolate the effects of socio-spatial exposure on claim-making, I introduce a
range of control variables at the individual, household, village, and panchayat levels.
Individual and household controls include the socioeconomic status of the respondent
(assessed in terms of land and asset-ownership, occupation, level of education, and
occupation), ascriptive characteristics including age, gender, and caste category (SC, ST,
OBC, or GC), and an interaction term to assess the relationship between caste and gender
jointly. I also include controls to assess a person's exposure to information through the
media (newspaper readership, and radio or TV usage), as well as knowledge of
government institutions (constitutionally mandated village meetings known as the Gram
Sabha, and the Right to Information Act). Other individual-level variables include
controls for social capital, measured in terms of participation in cultural groups and
willingness to contribute to communal village works, and measures of a person's local
political connections including ties to local officials and party membership. Finally, a set
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of household controls include family size and the number of children and elderly family
members in a household.
Village andpanchayat controls include variables that capture the level of
economic development in a locality, including average rate of landownership, average
asset ownership, and village literacy rates (provided in the 2001 government census data).
Other variables control for village demographics, including population size and
dispersion, proximity to a town, and the caste composition of a village (including caste
fractionalization and, separately, the percentage of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes in a village). Controls for village partisanship capture whether or not a majority of
villagers state support for one party over another. I also include a range of village
institutional controls, including whether there is an active NGO or village, neighborhood,
or caste associations. Panchayat level controls are introduced, using data from the
Rajasthani Election Commission, to capture the effects of caste and gender reservations
for the seat of sarpanch (panchayat president), as well as the panchayat's population and
the number of villages in the panchayat. Another set of variables examine the village in
relation to the broader panchayat, namely whether or not the village is the GP's
administrative headquarter or the sarpanch's home village, as well as controls for
whether the village's numerically dominant caste is also dominant in the broader
panchayat. A final set of variables assess the relationship between the individual and the




I use multivariate regression analysis to estimate the effects of socio-spatial exposure on
claim-making activity, according to the following basic empirical framework:
Y = a + p(exposure) + y(individual)+ (household) + O(village) + Q(GP fixed effects)+ 
where Y is an outcome related to claim-making, including its overall incidence, the types
of practice involved, and the number of practices in an individual's claim-making
repertoire. For dichotomous variables that measure whether or not a person engages in a
given practice, I employ maximum likelihood estimation using probit models to calculate
the (marginal) effects of exposure on claim-making incidence and practice. I use OLS
models to examine the effects of exposure on an index of practices representing the
claim-making repertoire.
P estimates the effects on claim-making associated with different measures of
socio-spatial exposure. In a first set of models, presented below, I examine the effects of
each indicator: cross-neighborhood exposure, cross-caste workplace exposure, the land-
to-labor ratio, and migration. Because measures of exposure are likely to co-vary, each
indicator is assessed in a separate model. An additional set of models, presented in the
appendix (Tables A4.4-A4.6), examines the joint effects of these indicators when
included together in the same regressions.
I include controls as described above, where y represents individual characteristics
and where X represents controls for household size and composition. In a first set of
models (presented in the text below), I include Gram Panchayat fixed effects (Q), which
control for all features of the panchayat and higher-level administration, along with
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village-level controls (0). A second set of models (not reported here, but presented in the
Appendix, Table A4.3) applies village fixed effects (dropping both village controls and
GP fixed effects) to isolate the variation that occurs at the household and individual levels
within villages. A third set of models (also reported in the Appendix, Table A4.2)
examines variation both across and within panchayats. In these models, block fixed
effects are introduced to control for all features of the local administration at the level of
the block and above, alongside village and GP controls. In all models, standard errors are
clustered at the village level.
4. Results: claim-making incidence and repertoire
The analysis presented below presents the findings from the primary models, described
above, which separately examine the effects of each indicator of socio-spatial exposure
while employing GP fixed effects along with village and individual controls. The data
confirm that that socio-spatial exposure is associated with an increase in the incidence of
claim-making. These results are strongly significant for the three primary measures of
socio-spatial exposure: social ties that extend across neighborhood lines, workplace ties
that extend across caste lines, and the land-to-labor ratio, which serves as a proxy for
extra-village exposure (Figure 4.1). Social interaction across neighborhood lines and
engagement in a multi-caste workplace are both correlated with an increase in the
likelihood that a person will engage in claim-making, holding all else constant. The land-
to-labor ratio, in contrast, is associated with a drop in the likelihood of claim-making,
suggesting that individuals who live under conditions of land scarcity (and so who
venture beyond the village in search of employment) are more likely to make claims than
169
those who live in villages with an ample supply of farmland. All of these results are
significant at a 99 percent confidence level (p-value < 0.001). The effects of migration on


















Figure 4.1. Effects of exposure on the incidence of claim-making 99
Socio-spatial exposure is also correlated with an expansion of the claim-making
repertoire (Figure 4.2). Cross-neighborhood and cross-caste workplace exposure are both
associated with a significant increase in the number of claim-making practices engaged,
while the land-to-labor ratio is correlated with a contraction of the claim-making
repertoire (all results significant at a level of 99 percent confidence, p-value 5 0.001).
99 Notes for Figures 1 and 2: Percent change in claim-making associated with a one unit increase in cross-
neighborhood exposure (XNH), cross-caste exposure (XC), the land-to-labor ratio (LL), and migration
(MIG), shown with 95% confidence intervals. Each indicator of exposure is assessed separately. Models




These results broadly confirm the theory that those individuals who are situated in more
"cosmopolitan" networks - assessed across neighborhood, caste, and village lines - will
be more active claim makers who pursue a diversity of channels of access to the state,
compared to those individuals embedded in more parochial networks who are less likely








Figure 4.2. Effects of exposure on the claim-making repertoire
Similar results are observed in models applying different sets of controls. Full
results are found in the Appendix (Tables A4.1 -A4.3), including models with block and
village fixed effects. In an additional set of models, the explanatory variables are jointly
assessed, taking into account potential collinearity among the measures of socio-spatial
exposure (Tables A4.4-A4.6, Appendix). The main patterns observed when examining
single indicators of exposure persist in these more conservative models.
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Cross-neighborhood exposure
Socializing across neighborhood lines is the most consistently strong and significant
predictor of claim-making practice. Those who report frequently "sitting with" people
from other neighborhoods for a variety of social purposes are more likely to engage in
both direct and mediated claim-making, through channels that are administrative,
partisan, associational, and brokered.
Table 4.5. Effects of cross-neighborhood exposure on claim-making100
Outcome Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
INCIDENCE 0.111 0.019 0.000 15%
REPERTOIRE 0.550 0.079 0.000 27%
DIRECT 0.165 0.022 0.000 25%
MEDIATED 0.096 0.027 0.000 18%
ADMINISTRATIVE 0.168 0.025 0.000 27%
Gram Panchayat 0.165 0.023 0.000 27%
Bureaucrat 0.067 0.019 0.000 32%
PARTISAN 0.052 0.017 0.004 24%
ASSOCIATIONAL 0.173 0.026 0.000 49%
NH Assoc. 0.079 0.019 0.000 37%
Vill Assoc. 0.090 0.015 0.000 59%
Civil Society Org. 0.007 0.011 0.515 7%
BROKERED 0.054 0.029 0.063 13%
Caste leader 0.058 0.020 0.003 25%
Inter-caste leader 0.064 0.012 0.000 47%
Fixer 0.006 0.019 0.769 3%
Table 4.5 examines the data in greater detail. We find that a one unit increase in
frequency of cross-neighborhood engagement (assessed on a four point scale from almost
never [0] to very often [3]) is associated with a 15 percent increase in the overall
100 Notes: For binary variables where maximum likelihood estimation is applied, the "effect" shown is the
marginal effect (dF/dx). Models include GP fixed effects with individual, household, and village controls.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Full results are shown in the Appendix. The same notes
apply to all regression result tables in this section.
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likelihood of making claims, regardless of the kind of practice involved (p-value <
0.001). The same increase in the frequency of cross-neighborhood contact is also
associated with a 27 percent expansion of the claim-making repertoire, reflected in a
significant increase in the likelihood of engaging in all kinds of claim-making practice,
with the exception of contacting civil society organizations and fixers (for which there is
no significant relationship). In sum, exposure to people across neighborhood, and by
extension caste and class, lines within a village drives both an increase in claim-making
activity and an expansion of the number of claim-making practices employed.
Cross-caste workplace exposure
Cross-caste interaction in the workplace is also a positive and significant predictor of the
overall incidence of claim-making, including both direct and indirect practices (Table
4.6). Those who report working primarily with people from other castes are 18 percent
more likely to engage in claim-making, and do so through a greater diversity of practices
(a 17 percent expansion of repertoire), than those who work mostly with people from
their own caste community. This is reflected in significant increases in both direct (22
percent) and mediated (18 percent) practices (all results significant at a 99 percent
confidence level; p-value < 0.001).
Cross-caste exposure is also significantly associated with particular kinds of
claim-making practice, including a 23 percent increase in administrative practices (driven
primarily by contact with the GP), an 11 percent increase in contacting party politicians
(who under conditions of increasing electoral competition are increasingly likely to reach
out to multi-caste constituencies),101 and a 15 percent increase in contacting brokers.
101 See, for example, Krishna 2002, 2003, and Wilkinson 2007.
173
Table 4.6. Effects of cross-caste workplace exposure on claim-making
Outcome Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
INCIDENCE 0.139 0.033 0.000 18%
REPERTOIRE 0.351 0.106 0.001 17%
DIRECT 0.155 0.035 0.000 24%
MEDIATED 0.114 0.035 0.001 21%
ADMINISTRATIVE 0.159 0.036 0.000 25%
Gram Panchayat 0.152 0.037 0.000 24%
Bureaucrat 0.038 0.024 0.134 18%
PARTISAN 0.062 0.026 0.030 29%
ASSOCIATIONAL 0.031 0.037 0.402 9%
NH Assoc. 0.028 0.030 0.368 13%
Vill Assoc. 0.011 0.022 0.641 7%
Civil Society Org. -0.013 0.017 0.403 -12%
BROKERED 0.086 0.034 0.014 21%
Caste leader 0.003 0.031 0.922 1%
Inter-caste leader 0.048 0.016 0.009 35%
Fixer 0.078 0.018 0.000 46%
These brokers are primarily individual fixers (who, as noted in chapter 2, very
often work across caste lines) as well as leaders of inter-caste bodies. There is, however,
no significant change in contact with leaders who serve a single caste community, or in
associational practices (which are often also defined along communal, caste lines). Taken
together, the data suggest that working alongside people from different caste communities
facilitates claim-making, but that particular kinds ofpractice - through local
administrative channels and through politicians and brokers who are not bound by caste
- are more likely than others.
Extra-village exposure: the land-to-labor ratio & migration
The land-to-labor ratio, which as we have seen is a proxy for engagement outside of the
village, is negatively correlated with the overall incidence of claim-making (Table 4.7). A
one unit increase in the land-to-labor ratio (which entails moving from the 30th percentile
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to the 75th percentile in the land-to-labor distribution) is associated with an eight percent
drop in likelihood of engaging in claim-making (p-value = 0.005), as well as an eight
percent contraction of the claim-making repertoire (p-value - 0.001). In other words,
where land is scarce relative to labor, and where people therefore have incentives to
spend periods of time outside the village, people in that locality are more likely to engage
in claim-making and do so through more diverse practices. Where land is in ample
supply, the reverse is true.
Table 4.7. Effects of village land-to-labor ratio on claim-making
Outcome Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
INCIDENCE -0.061 0.022 0.005 -8%
REPERTOIRE -0.164 0.050 0.001 -8%
DIRECT 
-0.049 0.026 0.063 -7%
MEDIATED -0.075 0.019 0.000 -14%
ADMINISTRATIVE -0.055 0.026 0.037 -9%
Gram Panchayat -0.064 0.025 0.010 -10%
Bureaucrat -0.004 0.011 0.740 -2%
PARTISAN 0.005 0.015 0.764 2%
ASSOCIATIONAL -0.033 0.013 0.008 -9%
NH Assoc. -0.045 0.013 0.001 -21%
Vill Assoc. -0.011 0.014 0.427 -7%
Civil Society Org. 0.010 0.008 0.239 9%
BROKERED -0.074 0.020 0.000 -18%
Caste leader -0.117 0.036 0.002 -50%
Inter-caste leader 0.011 0.009 0.226 8%
Fixer -0.025 0.012 0.035 -15%
Not all forms of extra-village movement, however, appear to have the same
effect. The majority of travel beyond the village is local in nature, as people who remain
resident in the village seek employment in nearby towns and cities. The relationship
between longer-term migration and claim-making, however, is muddier (Table 4.8).
There is no significant effect (positive or negative) of migration on either the overall
175
incidence of claim-making or the size of the claim-making repertoire.10 2 Whether or not a
household member leaves the village for an extended period each year does not appear to
influence whether members of that household make claims, or the range ofpractices they
engage.
Table 4.8. Effects of migration on claim-making
Outcome Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
INCIDENCE 0.007 0.024 0.760 1%
REPERTOIRE 0.057 0.107 0.592 3%
DIRECT 0.007 0.028 0.797 1%
MEDIATED 0.006 0.034 0.863 1%
ADMINISTRATIVE -0.003 0.030 0.918 0%
Gram Panchayat 0.007 0.029 0.806 1%
Bureaucrat -0.030 0.022 0.195 -14%
PARTISAN 0.037 0.026 0.133 17%
ASSOCIATIONAL 0.039 0.032 0.210 11%
NH Assoc. 0.067 0.030 0.018 31%
Vill Assoc. 0.007 0.018 0.688 5%
Civil Society Org. 0.010 0.013 0.448 9%
BROKERED 0.007 0.034 0.835 2%
Caste leader -0.049 0.024 0.059 -21%
Inter-caste leader 0.003 0.017 0.851 2%
Fixer 0.041 0.021 0.039 24%
These null effects, however, must be understood in context given the nature of
rural-urban migration in this region of India, most of which involves temporary labor that
builds on pre-existing caste and ethnic networks. Extra-village movement of this kind, as
noted, may in fact have an insulating effect. If this is the case, we would not expect to see
an increase in claim-making activity or expansion of the claim-making repertoire. Indeed,
102 These null effects may in part be attributed to the nature of the survey sample. Variation in rates of
migration is most often observed across (rather than within) localities, as new migrants build upon existing
ethnic and social networks that stem from their home villages. As a result, models that apply many controls
or fixed effects at either the village or GP level will fail to separately capture the effect of migration.
Second, the relatively small village and panchayat sample size (of 105 villages in 40 panchayats) limits the
statistical power of the models to predict the effects of migration.
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it is extra-village exposure to new information, idea, and contacts - and not just physical
movement beyond a village's borders - that enables and motivates claim-making
practice.103
There is, however, some (albeit tentative) reason to believe that the migratory
experience shapes the kinds of practices engaged, if not the overall incidence of claim-
making. A person who migrates (or who has a family member who does so) appears to be
more dependent on certain kinds of local mediating institutions than others. He or she is
31 percent more likely to contact neighborhood associations (p-value = 0.018) and is 24
percent more likely to seek assistance from individual fixers (p-value = 0.039), but is 21
percent less likely to turn to village caste leaders (p-value = 0.059). These patterns of
mediated claim-making are consistent with the suggestion that temporary labor migration
strengthens a person's ties to local networks and brokers. Local associations and fixers
play a critical role in assisting new migrants, who depend on contacts from his or her
home community while navigating environments far removed from the village. The
relationships a person builds through these experiences may shape the opportunity
structure through which a person (or his or her family members) makes claims upon their
return to the village. At the same time, however, highly parochial village institutions -
such as local caste associations and their leaders - may prove less helpful in navigating
migratory networks beyond the village (cf. Kapur et al. 2001). It follows that household
members with an experience with migration may be less inclined to turn to such bodies
for assistance.
103 Moreover, the effects of the land-to-labor ratio on exposure persist controlling for migration.
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To summarize, analysis of data drawn from the citizen survey reveals that those
individuals with greater levels of exposure across social and spatial boundaries are, all
else equal, more active claim-makers. These effects are observed through social ties that
extend across neighborhood lines within a village (which themselves delineate local caste
and class boundaries), across caste lines in the workplace, and across village boundaries
where residents are driven beyond the village in search of employment. Long-distance
temporary migration built upon local ethnic networks, however, has a potentially
insulating effect and, for this reason, does not significantly increase the likelihood of
claim-making.
Exposure and socioeconomic status
The effects of socio-spatial exposure persist controlling for socioeconomic status and
ascriptive characteristics including caste category, land and asset-ownership, and gender.
For each separate indicator of exposure, the same patterns are observed: caste category
(SC, ST, or OBC, compared to GC) is not a significant predictor of either incidence or
the claim-making repertoire. Land- and asset-ownership are, by and large, also not
significant.104 Gender, however, continues to be significantly and negatively correlated
with claim-making.105
But could there be an effect of socioeconomic status that works through
exposure? In other words, might claim-making be the product of the interaction of a
person's social and economic standing and his or her exposure? It is possible, for
example, that exposure would matter more for those individuals (such as members of the
104 The one exception is found among those in the fourth quintile of landownership, suggesting - as
observed in chapter 2 - a non-linear relationship where those who are neither very poor nor very rich are
marginally more likely to make claims.
105 Full results are found in Table A4.5 in the Appendix. In these regressions, the indicators of exposure are
jointly assessed.
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SC, ST, or women) who are, a priori, more disadvantaged in political, economic, and
social terms. In other words, socio-spatial exposure might have a differential effect on
different groups, thereby masking the effect of socioeconomic status. To investigate this
possibility, I introduce interaction terms for each indicator of socio-spatial exposure and
caste and gender.' 06 I find, however, that these interaction terms are largely not
significant. 107 Moreover, the addition of interaction terms does not change the
independent effect of caste (which remains insignificant) or of gender (which remains
negative and significant). It is not the case that the effects of socioeconomic status are
simply masked by their interaction with exposure. Once again, we observe that claim-
making cannot be adequately explained by a person's social or economic standing.
The claim-making environment
Nor is it the case that claim-making can be explained by the level of development in a
village, or by demographic features of a village's population. Controls for village wealth,
including average rates of landownership and literacy rates, are not significant in
successive models examining different indicators of socio-spatial exposure. 10 Neither are
a village's population size or population dispersion significant predictors of claim-
making. Distance to a town is significant and negative, but the size of these effects is
small (where a one km increase in distance is associated with a less than one percent
106 The models employed are essentially identical to the primary model utilized above, including individual,
household, and village controls along with GP fixed effects, with the addition of interaction terms for
exposure * caste category (where the SC, ST, and OBC are each compared to the GC) and exposure *
gender. Each indicator of exposure is independently assessed. The results are presented in the Appendix,
Table A4.7.
107 The vast majority of the interaction terms are not significant. In certain instances (for example, for
cross-neighborhood exposure and gender, or cross-caste exposure and ST) there is a significant negative
effect associated with the interaction term. These findings, however, are not consistent across the different
indicators of exposure. Given this lack of consistency, we cannot assign much explanatory weight to these
findings (which are estimated at a 95 percent level of confidence, leaving open the possibility that they are
simply coincidental).
108 See Table A4.8, Appendix.
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decline in the likelihood of making claims).109
A village's caste fractionalization also fails to significantly predict claim-making
activity among its residents. While exposure across caste lines appears to be a crucial
resource for claim-making, it does not appear that diversity per se is either an obstacle to
nor a resource for citizen-state engagement. Rather, it is exposure to diversity, and not
diversity itself, that facilitates the access and know-how required for claim-making.
Individuals may live in diverse (fractionalized) environments that remain highly divided.
In the absence of cross-cutting ties within or beyond such a locality, individuals may
remain insulated from one another.
In sum, a village's development, demography, and diversity are not enough to
explain the claim-making activity of its residents. Indeed, individual-level measures of
socio-spatial exposure are found to have an effect controllingfor all features of the
village environment through the inclusion of village fixed effects. And yet, with the
inclusion of village-level controls and fixed effects, it is plausible that we overlook
important claim-making patterns that emerge at the level of the village. Village fixed
effects, in particular, blind us to the possibility of village-level dynamics that might foster
or inhibit claim-making. I therefore introduce an additional set of models to examine
claim-making at the village level, where the variables of interest are the share of people
in a village who make claims and the average size of the claim-making repertoire in a
village.10
109 While the size of the effect is small, it is in fact consistent with exposure-based explanations of claim-
making, where those people who live at a greater distance from an urban center are less likely to venture
outside the village and are therefore less prone to extra-village sources of exposure.
110 Full results in the Appendix, Table A4.9. The outcome is the share of people in a village who engage in
claim-making. Socio-spatial exposure is assessed at the village level as the share of the village sample who
report exposure across each dimension. Each indicator of socio-spatial exposure is independently assessed.
The models include block fixed effects, along with controls for village population (size, density, caste
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Table 4.9. Effects of socio-spatial exposure on village-level claim-making
Measure of exposure Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
% X-NH exposure 0.357 0.115 0.003 47%
% X-Caste exposure 0.346 0.152 0.025 46%
% Migration -0.008 0.164 0.961 -1%
Village land-to-labor -0.042 0.016 0.008 -6%
I find that those villages in which a higher proportion of residents engage in
claim-making are also those villages in which a greater proportion of residents socialize
across neighborhood lines and work with people from different castes (Table 4.9). These
effects are strong and significant; a one unit increase in average rates of cross-
neighborhood and cross-caste exposure is associated with a 47 percent and 46 percent
increase in the share of villagers engaged in claim-making, respectively (results
significant at 95 percent level of confidence or higher). The same is also true for villages
with lower land-to-labor ratios; a one unit decline in the land-to-labor ratio accompanies
a 6 percent increase in village-level claim-making (significant at a 99 percent level).
These village-level findings broadly confirm the expectations and predictions generated
by the theory of socio-spatial exposure.
5. Alternative explanations
But why does socio-spatial exposure lead to more and more diverse claim-making
practice? In Chapter 3, I argued that exposure both enables and motivates claim-making
by providing both the knowledge (information and ideas) and access (linkages to the
state) necessary for citizen-state engagement. Villagers' own accounts provide qualitative
composition, fractionalization), village development (average land and asset-ownership, literacy rates),
village institutions (NGO, village, neighborhood, and caste associations), and whether the village is the GP
headquarter or sarpanch's home village.
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evidence to support the theory. But could socio-spatial exposure affect claim-making
through other means? Might there be other variables captured in the measures of
"exposure" that also drive variation in claim-making activity? In other words, how are we
to know that this is in fact a process driven by exposure, and not by something else?
First, perhaps there is something unique about active claim-makers (or about
those who don't make claims) that I have not captured in the empirical theory. Perhaps
those people who by disposition are more likely to interact across caste, class, or village
lines are also more likely to make claims, just as those who are more reticent might be
less likely to seek contact with officials and brokers. In other words, both socio-spatial
exposure and claim-making could be attributed to immeasurable differences in
personality that shape both the propensity for social interaction as well as for political
action.
It would be impossible to argue that personality does not play a role; indeed,
many forms of political participation from voting to claim-making can in part be
attributed to personal affect. It is, however, unlikely that differences in claim-making can
be reduced simply to a matter of inherent optimism versus a naturally gloomy outlook.
Such differences in individual personality cannot account for the broad patterns we
observe across the citizen survey. Rather, there is something about a person's lived
experience that shapes his or her disposition, including questions of optimism, political
affect, and sense of efficacy. We must therefore seek more structural explanations to
account for variation in local citizen-state relations. It is with this goal in mind that I
introduce a range of controls related to a person's background and social standing.1 1 '
" Unless otherwise noted, the analysis that follows employs a model that jointly evaluates the effects of
the various measures of socio-spatial exposure alongside individual-level controls (as described above in
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Education, media, and the role of information
Lack of information, as we have seen, is a common obstacle to claim-making. It follows
that knowledge of government programs and procedure are positively correlated with
both a greater likelihood of claim-making and a greater diversity of claim-making
practice." 2 I asked respondents if they were aware of two, constitutionally mandated
institutions designed to facilitate citizen claims: the Gram Sabha (a bi-annual
participatory planning meeting at the level of the panchayat), and the Right to
Information Act (which allows citizens to file information requests against government
agencies). Respondents who had heard of and could correctly define these institutions
were more likely to make claims through a broader repertoire of practices than those who
did not.1 1 3 These findings broadly confirm the central thesis that information is essential
to the claim-making process.
But are social networks necessarily central to these dynamics, or might people
gain information through exposure to other, non-network related sources? We saw in
chapter 2 that individuals with higher levels of education (at a secondary level or above)
are more likely to engage in claim-making. As I suggested in chapter 2, however, some of
the primary model) with village fixed effects. Explanatory variables in this model include cross-
neighborhood exposure, cross-caste workplace exposure, and migration. The land-to-labor ratio, as a
village-level variable, is excluded from the analysis. Because of potential collinearity among measures of
exposure, this joint model is more conservative than other models in which each indicator is separately
assessed. Full results are presented in the Appendix (Tables A4.5-A4.6).
112 It is impossible to know in a static model whether this knowledge of government procedure is a driver or
a product of claim-making; in qualitative terms, it becomes clear that prior experience with and knowledge
of government procedure is both an outcome of claim-making as well a factor that influences future claims.
113 Eighty percent of the sample was aware of the Gram Sabha, making this an indicator of common levels
of knowledge about government procedure. In contrast, just ten percent were aware of RTI, making this a
marker of deeper knowledge of government systems. For the incidence of claim-making, knowledge of the
Gram Sabha is a positive and significant predictor (at a 99 percent level of confidence; p-value = 0.009)
while knowledge of RTI is positive but not significant (p-value = 0.290). For claim-making repertoire,
knowledge of Gram Sabha is borderline significant (p-value = 0.135), while knowledge of RTI is
significant at the 99 percent level (p-value =0.009).
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the effect of education on claim-making might work through increased socio-spatial
exposure as students travel beyond the neighborhood to attend school in a mixed-caste
environment. Indeed, when examining education alongside indicators of socio-spatial
exposure, the effects of education disappear; controlling for exposure, there is no
significant change in claim-making incidence or repertoire associated with level of
educational attainment.11 4
Media exposure, however, is a significant predictor of claim-making practice;
greater frequency of newspaper readership and TV and radio usage are associated with a
greater likelihood of claim-making, and with a larger claim-making repertoire." 5 The
independent effects of socio-spatial exposure, however, are robust and persist controlling
for media exposure.116 This indicates that there is an effect of socio-spatial exposure as a
conduit for information above and beyond that secured through the media. As is
suggested in chapter 3, people are more likely to act upon knowledge gained through
personal contacts as opposed to impersonal sources. Social networks are therefore critical
to both the flow and uptake of information.
Social capital and civic engagement
Theories of social capital tell us that where residents participate in the same social
networks they develop norms of trust and reciprocity that facilitate civic participation.
Perhaps, then, claim-making is a product of civic engagement fostered through horizontal
ties. People embedded in cross-cutting networks might have an enlarged sense of
114 Estimates of the effects of dummy variables for primary education (p-value = 0.764), secondary
education (p-value = 0.940), and tertiary education (p-value = 0.953) are not statically significant.
1" Newspaper readership is positively correlated with the incidence of claim-making (p-value = 0.007), as
is TV and radio usage (p-value = 0.115). Newspaper readership is also significantly associated with an
expansion of the claim-making repertoire (p-value = 0.000).
116 The effects of cross-neighborhood and cross-caste exposure are both positive and significant, controlling
for access to the media. The effects of migration are positive but not significant. (Table A4.4)
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community, moving from particularistic interests to concerns of a more encompassing
nature. In this sense, claim-making might be more the product of an enlarged sense of
"civic duty" than it is a matter of exposure.
Following an established metric of social capital (cf. Putnam et al., 1993), I
examine whether a person reports participating in cultural groups. In keeping with the
predictions of the literature, I do find that participation in such groups is positively
associated with an increased likelihood of engaging in claim-making, as well as with an
expansion of the claim-making repertoire.' 1 7 However, the mechanisms that underlie this
relationship are unclear. As a measure of civic engagement, a person's participation in a
"cultural group" tells us little about the qualitative features of his or her social ties. We
cannot know whether they are "bonding" or "bridging," whether they reinforce or cut
across local social cleavages. Moreover, as noted in chapter 3, notions of a "civic
community" built on horizontal ties are often ill-suited to a rural Indian environment
marked by the persistence of caste and class hierarchies. Socio-spatial exposure,
however, neither requires nor does it necessarily produce horizontal ties. Rather,
exposure may take place under, and is therefore consistent with, conditions marked by
high levels of hierarchy and inequality. It is not at all clear, then, that claim-making is
necessarily - or even primarily - a product of shared norms of trust and reciprocity.
Local political connections
While theories of social capital focus on the horizontal ties between citizens, others have
examined vertical ties between citizens, politicians, and officials. Such vertical ties are
the subject of substantial scholarship, particularly in the context of less developed
117 Participation in a cultural group is positively correlated with a greater likelihood of making claims (p-
value = 0.000) and with a broader claim-making repertoire (p-value = 0.000).
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democracies where patronage is considered a central feature of political organization.
Under these conditions, one would expect people with ties to politicians to engage in
significantly more claim-making than those without such ties.
The evidence from rural Rajasthan, however, reveals a mixed picture with regard
to political connections. As one might expect, those with ties to the Gram Panchayat
(who are either a GP member themselves or who have family or close friends who are
members) are significantly more likely to engage in both direct and mediated claim-
making. These dynamics, however, do not appear to extend to higher-level politicians
who run on party platforms. People who report that they are a member of a political party
are no more or less likely to engage in claim-making than those who remain non-
partisan. 118 Vertical ties and political connections only partially account for an
individual's propensity to make claims, and ties to the local GP appear to matter more
than partisan ties.119 Moreover, controlling for such ties, exposure continues to have an
independent effect on claim-making.
6. Collective and selective benefits
Claim-making happens in reference to particular kinds of goods. Services are funded and
produced by different agencies and delivered according to different rules and procedures.
Goods and services are also consumed in different manners at the local level; some, like
employment on a government worksite or a pension, benefit individuals and households,
while others, like a school, a road, or a health clinic, benefit wider collectives. As
118 Local official ties are positively associated with the incidence of claim-making (p-value = 0.020), while
partisan ties are not found to have a significant effect (p-value = 0.383). (Table A4.6)
119 As noted, GP members very often have strong (if informal) ties to political parties. It is therefore
possible that partisan ties play out through the panchayat, but not directly through contact with parties.
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Kramon and Posner (2011) demonstrate in the African context, the nature of the goods
that one studies plays a large role in shaping the conclusions we draw about who benefits
from distributive politics. Different kinds of goods, they suggest, are more open to
political manipulation by officials and politicians, creating stronger conditions for
patronage in some sectors as opposed to others. In the rural Indian context, Besley,
Pande, and Rao (2004) similarly find that the provision of public goods varies according
to the kind of good in question. "High spillover" goods, such as an access road or water
tank, benefit an entire locality, while "low spillover" goods are targeted towards specific
groups. Low spillover goods, they find, are more likely to be the subjects of ethnic
favoritism, while high spillover goods are distributed on the basis of residential proximity
to elected officials.
As these studies demonstrate, the politics of public goods provision is in large part
shaped by the goods in question and, in particular, by how easily divisible those goods
are. Politicians and officials consider these factors when making decisions about how to
allocate goods, for example whether to favor their co-ethnics, core political supporters, or
swing voters, or whether to distribute goods in a more encompassing manner. Might
similar dynamics supply to the politics of citizen demand? In other words, might the
nature of the goods and services in question influence whether and how citizens make
claims on the state? I examine whether there are differences associated with claim-
making with regard to collective goods of a high spillover nature compared to claims
regarding goods of a low spillover or selective nature. 12 0 We might expect, for example,
to find that collective goods are pursued through "collective" channels, for example
120 Survey respondents were asked to report on their claim-making practice with regard to 1) village public
works (collective benefits) and 2) individual government schemes (selective benefits).
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through local associations, while citizens pursue selective goods through individual
contact with elected officials.
Table 4.10 offers summary statistics on the incidence of different kinds of claim-
making practice related to collective and selective benefits. I find that a higher proportion
of respondents (72 percent) report making claims for collective village goods compared
to those who make claims for selective government services (64 percent). Across the
different channels, rates of claim-making are consistently slightly higher for collective as
opposed to selective goods. This tells us, in basic terms, that levels of demand are
somewhat higher for village public goods than for individual and household-level
benefits.
Table 4.10. Incidence of claim-making practice for collective vs. selective goods
Collective Services Selective Services
Claim-making Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
INCIDENCE 0.72 0.45 0.64 0.48
Gram Panchayat 0.57 0.50 0.53 0.50
Bureaucrat 0.20 0.40 0.14 0.34
Party politician 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.36
Village Assoc. 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.32
NH Assoc. 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.36
Civil Society Org. 0.10 0.31 0.04 0.19
Caste leader 0.22 0.42 0.17 0.37
Inter-caste leader 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30
Fixer 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32
The data also reveal, however, that there is considerable variation in claim-making
practice within categories; people pursue a mix of strategies when seeking both collective
and selective goods. In fact, if we examine the likelihood of claim-making through a
given channel, we see a notable lack of difference across collective and selective goods.
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The distribution of claim-making practices is, in fact, quite similar for both categories.
The nature of the goods in question - whether they are high or low spillover - does not
seem to fundamentally alter the mix of strategies pursued.
Finally, could different dimensions of socio-spatial exposure have a differential
effect for different kinds of goods and services? One might imagine, for example, that
relationships within a village could motivate claim-making with regard to local public
goods of a collective nature. Extra-village ties, in contrast, might motivate claim-making
surrounding goods of a more selective nature as people are exposed to the range of
services available to people in other localities. Might we, then, observe that different
kinds of socio-spatial exposure matter more for different kinds of goods? Tables 4.11
and 4.12 present the results of analysis examining the effects of exposure on the
incidence of claim-making disaggregated by the category of goods.12 1 Once again, we
observe a striking lack of difference across categories. The direction and size of the
effects associated with the different metrics of socio-spatial exposure are almost identical
for both collective and selective goods.
Table 4.11. Effects of socio-spatial exposure on claim-making for collective goods
Measure of exposure Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-NH exposure 0.133 0.022 0.000 19%
X-Caste exposure 0.130 0.033 0.000 18%
Migration 0.001 0.026 0.974 0%
Village land-to-labor -0.055 0.020 0.007 -8%
121 The models employed are identical to the primary model introduced in section 4, and includes
individual, household, and village controls with GP fixed effects. Each indicator of socio-spatial exposure
is independently assessed. In each model, standard errors are clustered at the village level. Full results are
presented in the Appendix (Table A4. 10).
189
Table 4.12. Effects of socio-spatial exposure on claim-making for selective goods
Measure of exposure Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-NH exposure 0.132 0.024 0.000 21%
X-Caste exposure 0.129 0.035 0.000 20%
Migration -0.039 0.030 0.181 -6%
Village land-to-labor -0.057 0.023 0.012 -9%
What accounts for this lack of difference in claim-making behavior across goods
and services of a different nature? Here, once again, it is important to recall the character
of claim-making in rural India, where service delivery is marked by a profusion of
programs that are allocated by officials acting in a highly discretionary manner. Under
these conditions, the lines of accountability are far from clear. Residents are not always
aware of the different agencies involved. Even when they are aware, there is no guarantee
that contacting the "correct" channel will produce results. Claim-making therefore has
much less to do with questions of official jurisdiction than with a person's local
opportunity structure and his or her access to information.
In addition, the conceptual lines that scholars draw between "collective" and
"selective" goods appear to be less clear in the rural Indian context. A collective good
such as a water source may, in fact, be the subject of particularistic concerns where
access to water is drawn along caste lines. At the same time, selective benefits that target
individual households may be the subject of collective claim-making, where groups and
communities (again, often drawn around caste lines) act together to make claims. It is not
uncommon to find that groups, rather than individuals, are involved in making claims for
selective benefits such as employment on a government worksite, a pension, a ration
card, and so on. In sum, the lines between the public and private spheres are often quite
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fuzzy, making it difficult to discern which goods are truly "collective" and which are
"selective" in nature.
7. Conclusion
Taken together, the data from the citizen survey suggest that exposure across social and
spatial barriers increases the propensity for claim-making as well as the breadth of the
claim-making repertoire; people with social and occupational ties that extend beyond
their immediate community and locality are more likely to make claims on the state for
services, and do so through more diverse practices, than those with more limited
exposure. These patterns persist across a range of metrics, from cross-neighborhood
social ties (which themselves extend across barriers of caste and class), to cross-caste
workplace exposure, to extra-village exposure among people who travel beyond the
village in search of employment. The findings are robust to the inclusion of different sets
of controls, including models with village, panchayat, and block fixed effects.
The implications of these findings are far reaching. First, they suggest that
individuals who are exposed to a diversity of people and contexts are more active in their
engagement of the state. Second, exposure appears to broaden the channels - direct and
mediated, formal and informal - through which citizens pursue the state and its resources.
Third, from the perspective of distributive politics, a study of socio-spatial exposure helps
to answer the question of who successfully navigates the local environment to make
claims on public resources. We will return to these questions, and to a discussion of the
consequences of claim-making, in chapter 6. First, however, we are left wondering about
what drives exposure: why are different people, living under similar conditions,
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differently exposed? The next chapter turns to this question, examining the drivers of
socio-spatial exposure in the rural Indian context.
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CHAPTER 5
The drivers of socio-spatial exposure
1. Introduction
Differences in socio-spatial exposure, I have argued, account for significant amounts of
variation in claim-making and, by extension, in patterns of local citizen-state relations.
The previous chapter demonstrated that people who traverse social and spatial boundaries
of neighborhood, caste, and village are - all else equal - more likely to make claims on
the state, and do so through a broader repertoire of practices, than those who operate in a
more limited social and geographical sphere.
This chapter investigates the drivers of socio-spatial exposure and, in so doing,
sheds light on the causal relationship between exposure and claim-making. Are people
living in particular places, embedded in certain local economies, or constrained by
characteristics of class, caste, or gender, more or less exposed than others? If so, could
the underlying conditions that promote exposure, rather than exposure itself, drive claim-
making?
In what follows, I situate the study of socio-spatial exposure in the larger context
of rural India's political economy. A series of structural and institutional changes are -
through a slow and uneven process - creating the conditions for increased interaction
across caste, class, and village lines. A multiplicity of factors, ranging from changes to
the rural labor market and caste relations, to political reservations in local government, to
the intervention of NGOs, combine to shape a person's social and occupational networks
and, by extension, the resources for claim-making to which a person is exposed. These
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drivers of exposure are, however, unevenly experienced at the individual level; change
has not come to all people and all places in the same ways.
Socio-spatial exposure as a dependent variable
In the following analysis, I attempt to disentangle the various factors - structural,
institutional, and individual - that foster and inhibit socio-spatial exposure. Drawing on
data from the citizen survey, I employ a series of models 2 2 in which the outcomes of
interest are a sub-set of the indicators of exposure investigated in chapter 4: cross-
neighborhood exposure, cross-caste workplace exposure, and extra-village exposure
assessed in terms of migration. The land-to-labor ratio, which was introduced in chapter 4
as a proxy for extra-village exposure, is not included as an outcome, but rather is treated
as an explanatory factor.123
Section 2 examines the effects of village development, demography, and diversity
on socio-spatial exposure, investigating whether these features shape the likelihood and
degree to which that person crosses class, caste, or village boundaries. Section 3 turns to
the individual, examining a range of personal attributes, including socioeconomic status,
caste, and gender, that might influence the degree to which a person is exposed to sources
of difference beyond his or her immediate community and locality. I demonstrate that
122 The full model and list of controls are presented in the Appendix (A5), along with the results. Controls
are introduced at the individual, household, village, and GP levels along with block fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the village level. Unless otherwise noted, the same models are employed throughout
this chapter.
123 The land-to-labor ratio is a key factor underlying decisions to seek employment beyond the village and,
as such, is a driver of extra-village exposure. In chapter 4, where the analysis sought to determine the
effects of socio-spatial exposure on claim-making, the land-to-labor ratio was employed as an independent
variable as a proxy for exposure (but not as an instrument for exposure since it also may affect other factors
that influence claim-making). In this chapter, however, socio-spatial exposure is itself the dependent
variable. As an exogenous driver of individual-level exposure, it is inappropriate to treat the village land-to-
labor ratio as an outcome. Rather, it is re-employed as an explanatory factor.
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socio-spatial exposure is not solely, or even primarily, a function of these village-based
or individual characteristics.
Rather, differences in exposure are driven by forces set in motion at the state or
national level, experienced - albeit in an uneven manner - by individuals at the local
level. Section 4 examines structural changes in the rural economy, including a
diversification of occupation, population growth, and declining land-to-labor ratios, that
create the conditions for increased exposure across caste, class, and village lines. Section
5 examines a range of institutional interventions, including caste and gender reservations
in local government and the intervention of NGOs, designed to encourage the
participation of marginalized citizens. Section 6 examines the ways in which these
structural and institutional forces are mediated by local conditions and individual-level
circumstances.
2. Village characteristics
Does the level of village development influence the degree to which its residents interact
across different social and spatial boundaries? Do demographic features such as village
size, population density, or proximity to an urban center make a person any more or less
likely to engage across caste, class, or village lines? Does the diversity of the village and,
in particular, its caste composition create the conditions for more or less interaction
across social lines? If so, might these village-level characteristics, and not exposure per
se, drive differences in claim-making? Chapter 2 briefly addressed this question,
demonstrating a lack of strong links between village-level development, demography,
and an individual's claim-making activity. We saw that average levels of village wealth,
195
literacy rates, population size and density, and a village's proximity to an urban center all
failed to significantly predict the claim-making behavior of people in that village.
However, it is worth examining these relationships in greater detail to study whether such
village-level characteristics might foster or inhibit exposure and, as such, influence
claim-making practice.
I find that village development, demography, and diversity are unable to
consistently or adequately predict levels of socio-spatial exposure among village
residents. While a number of important village-level patterns emerge, I find that people
living in the same environments are differently exposed. First, levels of village
development tell us relatively little about the extent to which a person traverses
boundaries both within and beyond his or her village. Rather, patterns of exposure
diverge within the same village environments, both rich and poor. Village C (introduced
in chapter 3), for example, is a wealthy, predominantly upper caste village located in
close proximity to Udaipur. And yet residents of Village C exhibit very varied tendencies
in traversing neighborhood, caste, and village boundaries. Some routinely leave the
village to work in other districts and states, while others remain engaged in village-based
agriculture. Some residents interact socially and in the workplace across caste and
neighborhood lines, while others operate within more restricted social spheres. Village D,
a primarily tribal village also located in Udaipur, is a much poorer place; there too,
however, we observe internal variation in the degree to which different people venture
across social and spatial barriers. Some residents venture into Udaipur on a daily basis to
work on construction sites. Others migrate beyond the village for longer periods of time.
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Others still rarely leave the village, and are employed in local agriculture or on
government worksites.
Analysis of the survey and census data confirms the lack of a consistent
relationship between economic development in a locality and individual exposure
assessed along three dimensions: cross-neighborhood exposure, cross-caste workplace
exposure, and migration beyond the village. Two measures of village wealth - average
rates of landownership and asset-ownership - reveal divergent results (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1. Effects of village development on socio-spatial exposure
Village land Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.002 0.002 0.232 -0.33%
X-Caste 0.000 0.001 0.815 0.04%
Migration 0.000 0.001 0.817 -0.14%
Village assets Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.007 0.025 0.763 1.04%
X-Caste -0.006 0.015 0.704 -0.70%
Migration -0.056 0.015 0.000 -25.62%
Village literacy Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.253 0.155 0.107 35.17%
X-Caste 0.023 0.113 0.841 2.80%
Migration 
-0.124 0.126 0.327 -56.27%
Average rates of landownership do not significantly predict a person's socio-spatial
exposure across any of the three dimensions. Rising levels of asset-ownership in a
village, however, are associated with a significant drop in the likelihood that residents
will migrate. Village literacy rates, employed as a proxy for the level of development,
reveal an inconclusive picture; people living in villages with higher literacy rates are no
more or less likely to work with people from other castes or to migrate, but are more
likely to socialize across neighborhood lines. While levels of development and affluence
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in a village clearly do appear to have some effect on levels of exposure among its
residents, the relationship is not clear or consistent.
One might expect that people living in bigger places or more densely populated
places will have more opportunity to encounter others across caste and class lines, or that
people living in close proximity to a town or city will be more likely to leave the village
in search of work. I find, however, that none of these demographic features of the village
have a significant effect on individual measures of exposure (although there is a small,
negative [borderline significant] effect of population density on migration) (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2. Effects of village demography on socio-spatial exposure
Village population Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.000 0.000 0.924 0.00%
X-Caste 0.000 0.000 0.298 0.00%
Migration 0.000 0.000 0.210 0.01%
Population density Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.014 0.012 0.256 1.88%
X-Caste -0.009 0.009 0.334 -1.08%
Migration -0.015 0.010 0.140 -6.68%
Dist. to urban cent Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.001 0.001 0.293 -0.19%
X-Caste 0.001 0.001 0.551 0.07%
Migration 0.000 0.001 0.772 0.08%
Perhaps, then, it is the village's diversity, and not its size or urbanicity, that drives
exposure; people in more "mixed" places may have greater opportunities to encounter
people from different caste and class backgrounds. To explore this possibility, I examine
the effects of village caste fractionalization 12 on exposure (Table 5.3).
124 The index of caste fractionalization, introduced in chapter 2, is equal to 1- Z (caste,)2 , where i is the
number of each caste in the village. For further discussion of this index, see Alesina, Baquir, & Easterly
(1999).
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Table 5.3. Effects of caste fractionalization on socio-spatial exposure
Caste fractionalization Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 
-0.222 0.086 0.011 -30.93%
X-Caste -0.023 0.053 0.665 -2.83%
Migration 0.061 0.050 0.227 27.61%
In fact, I find that people living in more diverse (caste fragmented) villages are less likely
to socialize across neighborhood lines. However, caste fractionalization has no significant
effect on the likelihood of cross-caste workplace exposure or migration. This is consistent
with the observation that diversity per se has little effect on claim-making practice;
diversity may contribute to fragmentation (and more insular ties within a community) or
(where weak and bridging ties are at play) may create the conditions for increased
exposure. Simply living in a diverse locality, however, does nothing to guarantee this
exposure.
3. Individual characteristics
It appears, then, that there is no consistent relationship between a village's development,
demography, or diversity, and the exposure of its residents. The lack of a consistent
picture at the village level prompts us to look for individual-level features that might
drive exposure. Could differences be traced to a person's affluence, or to other
characteristics related to economic and social standing such as caste, gender, or one's
level of educational attainment?
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Class, caste, gender, and exposure
Studies of participation in the West have found that "disparities in political
activity.. .parallel the fault lines of significant political and social division" (Verba et al.,
1995, p. 11), and that "those who are advantaged in socioeconomic terms are more likely
to be politically active" (p. 19). Could more affluent people with higher social standing
also have broader social and occupational networks, and so exhibit higher levels of socio-
spatial exposure? The data from the citizen survey offer little evidence to support this
view (Table 5.4).
Table 5.4. Effects of socioeconomic status on socio-spatial exposure
Landownership (quintiles, compared to most land)
Quintile 1 Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.023 0.054 0.678 3.14%
X-Caste 0.056 0.026 0.044 6.93%
Migration -0.021 0.037 0.575 -9.58%
Quintile 2 Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.022 0.055 0.691 -3.06%
X-Caste 0.036 0.030 0.258 4.42%
Migration -0.039 0.040 0.343 -17.94%
Quintile 3 Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.010 0.040 0.805 1.39%
X-Caste 0.044 0.026 0.103 5.40%
Migration 0.012 0.031 0.703 5.33%
Quintile 4 Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.015 0.041 0.711 -2.11%
X-Caste 0.047 0.024 0.076 5.80%
Migration 0.054 0.040 0.151 24.63%
Asset-ownership Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.024 0.022 0.292 3.31%
X-Caste 0.016 0.013 0.204 1.98%
Migration 0.009 0.016 0.591 3.97%
Assets-squared Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.003 0.003 0.309 -0.37%
X-Caste 0.000 0.002 0.838 0.04%
Migration 0.000 0.002 0.794 0.18%
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The relationship between a person's economic well-being and his or her socio-spatial
exposure is weak at best. Commonly-cited socioeconomic features, such as wealth and
caste status, do little to explain individual differences in cross-neighborhood, cross-caste,
or migration. Land and asset-ownership have no significant effect on the likelihood that a
person socializes across neighborhood lines, nor does it significantly affect the likelihood
of migration. There is, however, a significant, but small, effect of landownership on the
likelihood of working with people from other castes.125
One might expect in the Indian context that caste will play a particularly critical
role in determining norms of social interaction and, by extension, exposure: that is, in
shaping unwritten rules about who goes where, does what, and interacts with whom.
Traditionally, class, caste, and associated indicators of social standing such as educational
attainment have all moved in tandem - particularly in rural India where caste hierarchies
remain more pronounced than in urban settings (Dumont, 1970; Srinivas, 1987; Weiner,
2001). We might therefore expect the lower castes to be more constrained and less well
positioned to venture across caste, class or village lines.
And yet, the survey data reveal that caste category cannot adequately predict a
person's social or spatial exposure (Table 5.5). Members of the lower castes are not
significantly more or less likely to socialize across neighborhood lines or to work with
people from other caste communities than the upper castes. The Scheduled Castes and
Other Backward Classes are, however, significantly less likely than members of the upper
125 This relationship suggests that those with less land (at the 1st, 3 rd, and 4 quintiles) are more likely to
work alongside people from other castes compared to those with the most land (at the 5t quintile).
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castes to migrate. 126 The lack of a consistent relationship between an individual's class or
caste and his or her socio-spatial exposure helps to explain the lack of uniform
relationship between socioeconomic status and claim-making in the rural Indian context
where, as we have seen, the poor and lower castes are active participants and claimants in
local politics.
Table 5.5. Effects of caste category on socio-spatial exposure (compared to GC)
ST Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.011 0.083 0.894 -1.54%
X-Caste -0.019 0.074 0.793 -2.33%
Migration -0.060 0.058 0.333 -27.45%
SC Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.067 0.065 0.301 -9.36%
X-Caste 0.016 0.047 0.741 1.99%
Migration -0.084 0.039 0.053 -38.24%
OBC Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.053 0.063 0.407 -7.35%
X-Caste 0.035 0.051 0.507 4.27%
Migration -0.115 0.038 0.004 -52.29%
Again, my intent is not to argue that these socioeconomic and ascriptive
characteristics do not matter; caste and class certainly do play an important role in
shaping a person's social and occupational ties. The data reveal, however, that
individuals are less constrained by these features as one might expect, as people from
across the socioeconomic spectrum demonstrate similar propensities to engage across
social and spatial boundaries. It is critical to note, however, that cross-caste and cross-
class exposure do not imply horizontal social relations; individuals may encounter new
contacts and engage in new contexts under conditions marked by social hierarchy and
126 This relationship is, however, to be expected since - as noted - migratory patterns develop within
particular places and communities. The SC traditionally worked in village services (for example, as rag
pickers or in garbage disposal), and so do not have a long tradition of extra-village migration.
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economic inequality.
Other features such as gender clearly do shape the degree to which a person gains
exposure beyond his or her home and immediate neighborhood (Table 5.6). Women are
less likely to socialize across neighborhood lines, and are less likely to work with people
from different castes. Since migration is assessed at the household-level, it is impossible
to say whether women are more or less likely to migrate than men. Qualitatively,
however, we know that women are far less likely than their male relatives to leave the
village; seasonal and circular migration is almost entirely the purview of men seeking
employment in other localities.
Table 5.6. Effects of gender on socio-spatial exposure (women compared to men)
Women Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.323 0.085 0.000 -44.94%
X-Caste -0.148 0.051 0.002 -18.26%
Migration -0.039 0.045 0.394 -17.56%
These patterns are not, however, uniform for all women. Lower caste women
appear to be more likely than upper caste women to venture into the public sphere (Table
5.7). Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe women are significantly more likely than
General Caste women to socialize across neighborhood lines, while women from the
Other Backward Classes are more likely to work with people from different castes than
GC women. As discussed in Chapter 3, this reflects the fact that lower caste and class
women -faced with different economic realities and gender norms - leave the home with
greater frequency than upper caste women.
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on socio-spatial exposure (compared to GC women)
ST women Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.196 0.085 0.023 27.27%
X-Caste 0.052 0.048 0.346 6.39%
Migration -0.009 0.051 0.866 -4.01%
SC women Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.130 0.082 0.117 18.14%
X-Caste 0.066 0.039 0.162 8.09%
Migration 0.079 0.066 0.195 35.79%
OBC women Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.045 0.074 0.546 6.24%
X-Caste 0.061 0.035 0.124 7.52%
Migration -0.115 0.038 0.004 -52.29%
Beyond SES: education as a driver of socio-spatial exposure
We find, then, that key markers of socioeconomic status do not adequately predict
patterns of socio-spatial exposure at the individual level. A person's level of education,
however, does appear to influence the degree to which a person crosses social and spatial
boundaries. Education is often used as a proxy for socioeconomic status, as higher levels
of education have traditionally accompanied greater affluence and higher social standing.
In the rural Indian context, however, education is becoming less of a class- and caste-
bound affair. While upper castes have long dominated in terms of educational attainment,
this gap is beginning to close due to national and state-level efforts to increase the reach
of rural schooling, as well as a proliferation of private schools.127 At the same time,
however, the link between education and upward economic mobility is increasingly
127 According to the census, 61 percent of Rajasthanis were literate in 2001, compared to just 38.5 percent
in 1991. Gains have been particularly dramatic in rural areas and among the younger generations. In a 1999
survey of selected villages and districts in Rajasthan, Krishna (2003) finds that nearly 50 percent of those
between the ages of 25 and 35, and 70 percent of those 18 to 25, had five or more years of education.
Caste-based differences in educational attainment among this youngest group have almost equalized. The
SC have obtained nearly the same average level of education as the upper castes, and have even overtaken
some OBC and land-owning classes. The ST still lag behind the upper castes, but are on par with the
middle-caste OBC groups. There is still, however, a significant gender gap in terms of women's access to
education.
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Table 5.7. Caste*gender effects
tenuous. School enrollment may lead to greater literacy, but does not necessarily translate
into well-paying jobs as the number of people with school degrees grows faster than job
opportunities (Jeffrey, Jeffery, & Jeffery, 2004). As a result, the level of education is less
closely linked to employment and prosperity than it used to be.
Education does, however, provide a platform for contact across class, caste,
village, and (to a certain degree) gender lines and, as such, is associated with increased
socio-spatial exposure (Table 5.8) - even as it fails to predict upward economic mobility.
Table 5.8. Effects of education on socio-spatial (compared to zero years)
Education level
Primary Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.026 0.038 0.492 3.69%
X-Caste 0.017 0.027 0.541 2.13%
Migration 0.050 0.031 0.094 22.55%
Secondary Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.033 0.040 0.413 4.55%
X-Caste 0.043 0.023 0.076 5.29%
Migration 0.030 0.026 0.255 13.46%
Higher Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.094 0.058 0.112 13.05%
X-Caste 0.000 0.048 0.995 -0.04%
Migration 0.125 0.055 0.011 56.96%
Almost every village has its own primary school, and larger villages often have multiple
schools that serve distinct hamlets. Schools at this most local level are therefore typically
divided along caste lines, reflecting the spatial caste segregation within a village. At the
secondary level, however, there is typically just one school per Gram Panchayat (most
often located in the headquarter village), serving multiple villages, hamlets, and children
from distinct caste communities. Beyond secondary school, most students must travel to
towns and cities to continue their education. As a result they are forced to venture beyond
the village and GP, where they are exposed to new contexts and contacts.
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At a local level, the classroom brings together students from different caste
backgrounds within multi-caste villages and Gram Panchayats. A secondary school
teacher in Udaipur powerfully underscored this point by narrating a story in which
several higher caste boys objected to being served food by lower-caste classmates. The
teacher herself is ST, and recounted:
We are four teachers in this school: one ST, one SC, one OBC, one GC.
The students see us and learn by our example. When this happened and the
students would not eat the food, we called their parents and everyone was
made to sit and discuss how this school should be a space free of
discrimination. 128
It is important, however, not be overly sanguine about this kind of social interaction.
Classroom exposure across caste lines does not necessarily foster strong ties, nor does it
necessarily breed friendship or trust. It does, however, mean that students are exposed to
sources of difference - particularly when their teachers are also drawn from different
caste communities.
Education, then, appears to be a driver of socio-spatial exposure. The relationship
between education and exposure is, however, strongest at higher (secondary and tertiary)
levels, reflecting the spatial distribution of schools. A primary level of education does not
have a significant effect on cross-neighborhood or cross-caste workplace exposure.
People who have completed at least some years of secondary school, however, are more
likely to work with people from other castes compared to those with zero years of
schooling, while those who have gone on to a tertiary level are more likely to engage
socially across neighborhood lines, and are also more likely to migrate.
It remains difficult, however, to disentangle the precise mechanisms through
which education shapes exposure. The data suggest that engagement with students and
128 Author interview, with translation, Gogunda District, Udaipur district, January 28, 2011
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teachers in the classroom may persist into adulthood and spill over to social interactions
within the village. As noted, however, this is only true above the secondary level.
Education beyond secondary school almost always requires travel to towns and cities.
This tentatively suggests that there is something about the act of leaving the village to
attend school that may re-shape a person's attitudes about caste, perhaps leading to a
more "cosmopolitan" worldview that translates into more frequent interaction across
caste lines upon return to the village.12 9
Education may also contribute to exposure through occupation. Indeed, as
Krishna notes in his study of Rajasthan, expanding access to education has contributed to
a weakening of caste-bound strictures on occupation: "People are no longer bound to
follow the occupation of their caste. Barbers have become telephone operators, sweepers
have become patwaris [government record keepers], and skinners and tanners have
become tractor repairmen" (Krishna, 2002: p. 38).130 Those who have continued on to
secondary school are more likely to work in a multi-caste setting - very often in low-
level government jobs for which a secondary school degree or higher is required. The
leader of a local anganwadi (daycare center), for example, explained that she was given
the job because she was one of the few women who had completed a Bachelor's degree.
As a result, she occupies an official position in the village that puts her into contact with
the panchayat and district administration including staff and administrators from different
caste backgrounds (not to mention men).131
129 Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan (2003) similarly argue that rural-urban ties may foster the transmission
of new norms and practices from city to village.
130 Indeed, as Krishna notes, a new breed of social and political entrepreneur is emerging, hailing primarily
from among newly educated but underemployed members of the lower castes, who work primarily across
caste lines as brokers between citizen and the state (Krishna 2002, 2011).
131 Author interview, with translation, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 15, 2011.
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To summarize, patterns of socio-spatial exposure are not adequately explained by
commonly-cited features such as local development and demography, or by features
related to an individual's socioeconomic status (with the notable exceptions of
education). Holding these features constant, the question remains as to what propels some
people, but not others, across socio-spatial boundaries. The remainder of this chapter
expands the analysis to investigate a range of structural and institutional factors (beyond
the village and above the individual) that might drive exposure.
4. The changing rural economy and caste relations
Caste is front and center in most analyses of Indian political economy. Caste is regularly
portrayed as a defining feature of occupation, economic opportunity, educational
attainment, social standing, and political representation, and caste-based patron-client
structures are widely considered to be a central feature of Indian economic as well as
political organization (Bailey, 1960; Brass, 1994; Chandra, 2004; Dirks, 2001; L. I.
Rudolph & Rudolph, 1967; Weiner, 1989, 2001).
Recent scholarship, however, suggests that change is afoot in rural India. The
relationship between caste, class, education, and occupation may no longer be as strong
or as clearly defined as it used to be (Kapur et al., 2010; Krishna, 2002, 2003). Notably,
changes in the structure of the rural economy are have begun to create new opportunities
for interaction across caste, class, and village lines. Here I examine two related sets of
such changes and their effects of cross-caste exposure. First, while occupation has
traditionally been a caste bound affair, a majority of rural households today engage in a
mix of economic activities. This diversification of rural occupations has provided new
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opportunities for the lower castes to engage in non-traditional sectors and so to encounter
others across caste and class lines. Second, as we have seen, people increasingly travel
beyond the village in search of employment. Movement beyond the village is driven in
large part by population growth and an increasing scarcity of agricultural land, which, as
noted in chapter 3, is reflected in declining land-to-labor ratios. This, in turn, allows for
exposure to new contexts, people, and practices that pass from urban to rural spheres.
Changing caste occupations
Rajasthan, which prior to Independence consisted of a series of Princely States, has a
long feudal history wherein the lower castes for generations worked, often under
conditions of bondage, on the land of upper caste landowners. Upper caste groups such as
Rajputs and Brahmins traditionally owned the most land, while lower caste members
performed forced labor ("beggar") (Krishna 2002; Chaubisa 1988). Under this system,
caste and occupation were closely tied; "each person had a fixed place.. .that he or she
knew at birth" (Krishna, 2002: p. 36), and people were dependent on a patron-client
(jajmani) system built around caste.
These dynamics, however, are slowly changing as the relationship between caste,
occupation, and class becomes less closely bound. Bonded labor was formally outlawed
in 1976, and over time has become increasingly rare in rural India (Kapur et al. 2010).
Following land reform, many middle and lower-caste households that previously labored
on upper caste land now own their own plots of land which they cultivate at a subsistence
level.132 As a result, members of the lower castes and tribes are today much less likely to
132 Land reform in Rajasthan as in elsewhere in India has not resulted in an equalization of ownership. It
has meant, however, that those groups who traditionally cultivated the land belonging to the upper castes
are now land-owners - no matter how small their plots of land.
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work as wage laborers in the fields of upper caste landlords. Among those surveyed, 70
percent of members of the Scheduled Castes and 77 percent of Scheduled Tribe members
farm their own land, compared to just eight and six percent who work as laborers on
someone else's land (Table 5.9). Even where the lower castes continue to work in upper
caste fields, they are most likely to do so as sharecroppers who rent parcels of land. This
marks a dramatic shift in economic relations from one of serfdom and bonded labor to
one in which cash transactions prevail.
Table 5.9. Occupation
Farm (own) Farm labor Non-farm labor Entrepreneur Salaried
ST 0.77 0.06 0.63 0.01 0.02
SC 0.7 0.08 0.65 0.04 0.03
OBC 0.79 0.03 0.51 0.06 0.02
GC 0.66 0.03 0.31 0.1 0.06
All 0.75 0.05 0.52 0.06 0.03
At the same time, population growth and land degradation have generated
increased pressure on rural households to find sources of income beyond agriculture.
Consequently, the last twenty years have seen a diversification of occupations among the
lower castes and tribes. As an ST woman in Udaipur explained:
Everybody has land, and everyone does farming. But it is not enough to
live off of; if you have 5 family members and you don't do some other
labor, how will you live? People go to Gogunda [the block seat] and
Udaipur [the district capital]. They work in the factory in Gogunda, and as
laborers in Udaipur. They can also go to Surat and Bombay. They make
tea or work in hotels.13 3
In a recent study of caste dynamics in Uttar Pradesh (adjacent to Rajasthan),
Kapur et al. (2010) find that the Scheduled Castes increasingly supplement their incomes
from agriculture through engagement in other occupations, either through work outside of
133 Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, January 30, 2011.
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the village or in sectors traditionally dominated by the upper castes. The same is true in
Rajasthan, where I find that substantial numbers of those surveyed (65 percent of SC and
63 percent of ST) are engaged in non-farm labor, working on government worksites, as
day laborers in construction, mining, or in other industry.
My survey data are collected at a single point in time, and so cannot give us a
sense of how occupation has changed. It is clear, though, that the distribution of
occupations across castes marks a dramatic shift from the state's feudal and agricultural
past. These changes mark a slow - but important - alteration of caste relations, as the SC
and ST are become increasingly integrated into the wider rural economy. An elderly man
in Udaipur described these dynamics:
In the old times both Gamiti (ST) and Meghwal (SC) had their given place
in the village. The Gamiti were supposed to protect the village boundaries,
and so lived on the outskirts. The Meghwal worked for the service of the
village, in sanitation, in removing dead animals, and so were attached to
the village. Now though their occupations are changing. Now everyone
owns his own little piece of land, and people are active in farming. Not
just that, but they also go to Udaipur to work in the factories, and to work
as laborers. This is a big change since generations ago. It used to be the
SC and ST did not move around much, and they depended on the village
[on the GC community] for their well-being. Today, every man is more
independent and will make his own way.1
Such changes in occupation and related caste dynamics create new opportunities for
socio-spatial exposure. Small-scale SC or ST farmers, for example, may negotiate with
members of the upper castes for access to irrigation water, or may travels to nearby
markets, or may engages with government agricultural extension workers. In all of these
instances, commonly cited in my interviews, members of the lower castes insert
themselves into the local economy in new ways and, in so doing, come into contact with
134 Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 14, 2010.
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members of the upper castes.135 A tribal man in Udaipur, for example, reflected:
In my childhood, the Rajputs grew maize and we the Gamiti used to work
in the Rajput houses and land. Only the Rajputs had land. The "mota log"
[big people] didn't allow us to have lands. Slowly, slowly the Congress
government came, and they said: "they should be given land, let them also
harvest." That is when people started to become independent. People
started to venture outside, to the market, to the city. People got aware.' 36
Occupation, then, plays a role in shaping socio-spatial exposure. Those who farm
their own plots of land, as well as those employed as non-farm laborers, and small-scale
entrepreneurs are all significantly more likely to report engaging with people from other
caste communities in their workplace (Table 5.10).
Table 5.10. Effects of occupation on socio-spatial exposure
Farm (own) Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.140 0.039 0.001 19.44%
X-Caste 0.073 0.028 0.005 9.04%
Migration 0.029 0.024 0.246 13.23%
Farm labor Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.026 0.058 0.655 -3.61%
X-Caste 0.004 0.044 0.925 0.52%
Migration 0.039 0.056 0.462 17.81%
Non-farm labor Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.032 0.030 0.284 -4.49%
X-Caste 0.066 0.018 0.000 8.13%
Migration 0.026 0.023 0.254 11.74%
Entrepreneur Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.030 0.043 0.488 4.16%
X-Caste 0.067 0.028 0.059 8.24%
Migration -0.018 0.042 0.684 -7.97%
Salaried worker Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood 0.053 0.092 0.565 7.38%
X-Caste 0.067 0.035 0.138 8.32%
Migration 0.048 0.071 0.475 21.66%
13 Kapur et al. (2010) find a similar set of dynamics in their study where, following increased
mechanization of agriculture, SC farmers have begun to contract members of the upper caste to till their
land with tractors. The result, they write, is a "rapid shift out of traditional dalit [SC] economic
relationships into local occupations and professions, migration and changed agricultural practices" (48).
136 Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, January 30, 2011.
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Declining land-to-labor ratios
As discussed in chapter 3, exposure beyond the village and its immediate surroundings
provides a critical resource for claim-making. Such exposure is driven by demographic,
geographic, and economic factors. In particular, population growth and, related, the sub-
division and parceling of land has made it less viable for new generations to maintain
themselves through agriculture alone. Where land is scarce relative to labor, villagers
face increased incentives to look beyond the village for sources of employment. We
therefore should expect that a scarcity of farmland relative to labor will be linked to
increased extra-village exposure.
There is, indeed, a strong negative relationship between the land-to-labor ratio
and rates of migration. Using the same multivariate models as above, I find that where
land is scarce relative to labor, residents are significantly more likely to live in
households where one or more member migrates beyond the village in search of
employment (Table 5.11). In other words, village demography and geography - factors
exogenous to both exposure and claim-making practice - propel people beyond the
village.
Table 5.11. Effects of land the land-to-labor ratio on socio-spatial exposure
Land-to-labor Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.023 0.010 0.032 -3.14%
X-Caste -0.010 0.010 0.331 -1.24%
Migration -0.021 0.008 0.010 -9.64%
A possible confounding factor in this analysis is the introduction of the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), which following a constitutional
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mandate is designed to provide 100 days of work to any rural household that requests it.
Forty million households were employed under this scheme across India in 2011-12,
including 4 million households in Rajasthan. A full two-thirds of my sample drawn from
105 Rajasthani villages report having at least one household member employed under
NREGS. Policymakers have suggested that NREGS is helping to stem the tide of rural-
urban migration by providing local alternatives to urban employment. We might expect,
then, that NREGS would curtail certain kinds of exposure. I find, however, that the
program has very little effect on exposure; employment on a NREGS worksite has no
significant effect on the likelihood of migration, or of working with people from different
castes, or the frequency with which a person socializes across neighborhood lines.
NREGS does not provide an alternative to movement beyond the village; rather, it offers
a very basic safety net (at less than Rs.100 or U$2/day) for less than one-third of the year.
Moreover, the program is infamously corrupt, resulting in consistent under-payments.
NREGS is therefore at best a supplement to a household's income, mixed with other
kinds of employment.
A declining land-to-labor ratio is also associated with a small increase in cross-
neighborhood exposure; people in villages where land is scarce report socializing with
people across neighborhood (and by extension class and caste) lines with greater
frequency than those in villages with ample land. This tentatively suggests that, as land
scarcity drives people beyond the village, their exposure to new contexts and people may
carry over to affect their social relationships back in the village. Extra-village movement
of this kind plays a social as well as economic role by creating more porous boundaries
between rural and urban areas, exposing people to new contexts, information and ideas.
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Changing caste relations
Changes in caste-based occupation are accompanied by changing social practices.
In their study of Uttar Padesh, Kapur et al. find that SC households in Uttar Pradesh
increasingly consume "high status" foods as well as use products, such as toothpaste, that
were previously used exclusively by the higher castes. The last twenty years have also
witnessed changes in the frequency and kind of social interaction between castes. Non-
SC, for example, are today more likely to accept hospitality in a SC home, and to attend
social functions (such as weddings and feasts) alongside members of the higher castes.
Kapur et al. are quick to point out that changes they document do not represent a
newfound caste-equality, they mark important shifts in social relations over a relatively
short span of time.
My fieldwork in Rajasthan also suggests that social boundaries between castes
may be becoming more porous, in large part a function of occupation. For example,
residents in a number of the sample villages noted the declining practice of
untouchability ("chuachoot") as the lower castes become more integrated into the local
economy. In the words of one SC man:
In my father's time, everyone lived more apart, and everyone had their
place....You wouldn't dream of arriving at your wedding on a horse.137
You would be knocked down. Now, they have to show us respect. They
know that tomorrow they will be dependent on us since the development
and progress of the village depends on the SC.
A tribal woman offered another poignant illustration:
These silver ankle bangles that I am wearing now, I could not wear them
before since only the Rajputs and Gaayri had the right to wear them. They
137 The groom's arrival on horseback is a high status event, traditionally reserved for upper caste
households.
138 Author interview, with translation, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 17, 2010.
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used to say, how can you wear the same things as us? But now we wear
them. People have earned a little bit of money, and now we have more
respect. Long ago, we did not even have the right to make lapsi [a kind of
sweet, considered a luxury]. Once people made it and the Rajputs came
and poured dirt in it. They said: "how can you act as though you are equal
to us?" But now, everything is OK. Any caste can sit on ajajham 1
now. 140
This loosening of caste-based strictures, along with a diversification of economic
occupation across caste lines, contribute to the emergence of new social and economic
spheres in which people encounter others beyond their immediate community. In the
words of an Udaipur resident: "The uchro gharwalla (higher-up people) have started to
mix with the nichro gharwalla (lower people)." Another man declared:
Today people are less scared. There is no untouchability anymore.
Everyone will speak his mind. You even see this at the chai stall. An SC
man will drink his tea and share his thoughts there. 141
Again, however, it is important to stress that these spaces for cross-caste interaction are
not necessarily platforms for caste equality. Nor are the social interactions in question the
mark of deep or strong social ties. They do, however, create opportunities for information
exchange and exposure to ideas with the potential to inform claim-making practice.
5. Institutional interventions to promote exposure
Structural changes in the rural economy, as we have seen, are creating conditions that
foster increased economic and social engagement across caste, class, and village
boundaries. Other drivers of exposure are institutional in nature, involving interventions
by actors and organizations that seek to alter norms of social engagement. Here I
139 A carpet used to designate official space at a public meeting.
140 Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, January 30, 2011.
141 Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 14, 2010.
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investigate two sets of interventions with the potential to drive exposure across social and
spatial boundaries. First, political reservations of seats in the Gram Panchayat for women
and members of lower caste and tribal communities have created new spaces in which
traditionally marginalized groups participate in public spheres from which they were
previously excluded. Second, non-governmental and civil society organizations often
seek through a combination of targeting, training, and advocacy to foster interaction
across caste and gender, as well as village, lines.
Political reservations by caste and gender
Following the 1993 Constitutional Amendment that reserved seats in local
government for women and members of traditionally disadvantaged castes, a large
number of new actors have entered local politics. In just the first round of elections in
1994, close to a million women were elected as panchayat members, as were large
numbers of Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Jayal, 2006b). Since then, the numbers of
women, SC, and ST with electoral and administrative experience have grown
exponentially with each election every five years. Almost twenty years later, however,
the effects of political reservations are still contested. As discussed in chapter 2, some
have argue that where reservations are in effect the distribution of public goods better
reflects the interests of marginalized groups (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004a), and that
members of these groups are better positioned to access benefits (Besley et al., 2004).
Other studies focus on issues of representation, arguing that the presence of marginalized
groups in politics is boosted by reservations (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004a; Duflo,
2005), and that these effects persist even when the reservations are subsequently
withdrawn (Bhavnani, 2009). Others, though, maintain that local political reservations are
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simply captured by elite factions (Krishnan, 2007) and higher-up officials (Dunning &
Nilekani, 2009), with little distributional effect (Chauchard, 2010).
Still others argue that there are important non-material impacts of reservations
reflected in changing social relations. In a study of reservations in rural Rajasthan,
Chauchard (2010) argues that political reservations generate increased contact and
interaction across caste lines that corresponds with a decline in hostile or discriminatory
behavior. This, he argues, is less a function of profound changes in personal beliefs or
attitudes about caste, but rather is due to changing perceptions about lower caste social
status and the acceptability of interaction across caste lines, as well as new understanding
of the legal rights of lower caste and tribal groups. In other words, "when access to
political power is redistributed towards members of groups that used to be strictly
excluded from it, day-to-day social interactions based on traditional structures of
domination also change" (Chauchard, 2010, p. 35).
Given these very different views regarding the impact of political reservations, it
is unsurprising to find that the effects of reservations on both lower-caste and women's
exposure are also mixed. As we saw in chapter 2, political reservations have no
significant effect on the claim-making behavior of women or members of the Scheduled
Tribes living in GPs where they share either the gender or caste of the sarpanch.
However, members of the Scheduled Castes living in SC-reserved villages are
significantly more likely to engage in both direct and mediated claim-making practice.
The relationship between reservations and local political participation therefore requires
further investigation, particularly with regard to the question of both social and spatial
exposure. Could reservations, which have created constitutionally mandated spaces for
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inter-class, inter-caste, and cross-gender interaction, drive some of the differences in
exposure we observe?
On the one hand, there are many reasons to doubt that reservations would have
any profound effect on exposure since they are so often captured or manipulated by the
local elite. In village after village I consistently observed higher caste groups attempting
to influence lower caste panchayat members. In a village in Udaipur, for example, I
attended a GP meeting where I observed an upper caste (Brahmin) leader literally
whispering in the ear of the Scheduled Tribe sarpanch in order to guide him through the
meeting. In another village in Kota where the sarpanch's seat was reserved for a
Scheduled Caste woman, election violence broke out between two upper caste (Jat and
Rajput) communities, each of which "ran" its own female SC candidate, contesting the
election by proxy through these women. In a dramatic turn of events, a Jat man was killed
by a Rajput in the run-up to the election. This violence signals the high stakes of local
elections, even where the seat in question was reserved and therefore formally beyond the
reach of either the Jat or Rajput communities. 142
Reserved seats for women are also subject to behind-the-scenes (or often more
overt) manipulation; husbands, fathers, and brothers wield considerable control over the
action of their female relatives in reserved seats. In villages where the panchayat
president was a woman, I was consistently referred to their husbands (the "sarpanch-
pati" or president's husband) or another male relative who was treated as a defacto
office-bearer. In fact, in no panchayat did I ever meet with a female GP president
1 As more and more public resources are pumped to the local level - for example through the
administration of programs like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme - panchayat elections
are becoming a high stakes affair. This means the local elites are increasingly invested in controlling
panchayat administration, even as reservations attempt to create space for non-elite groups.
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unaccompanied by a male. In the words of one such pati, when asked where his wife was,
he replied:
She's at home. See, how can a woman effectively take care of the
panchayat business? What does she know of this work? How can a woman
sit behind this veil and conduct this business?1 43
And yet there is evidence to suggest that the experience of filling a reserved seat
does in fact alter the social position of women and members of the lower castes. An
examination of the survey data reveals that those who hold (or have held) village-level
public office are significantly more mobile than those who have not held local office
(Table 5.12). Elected panchayat members are significantly more likely to engage across
caste lines - an intuitive finding if we consider that part of their job description is to
attend village-wide, multi-caste meetings. Upper and middle caste villagers are forced to
interact with lower caste panchayat members in new ways, for example by visiting their
homes to ask for political favors and engaging them in public meetings.
Table 5.12. Effects of holding panchayat office on socio-spatial exposure
GP office Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.041 0.037 0.266 -5.70%
X-Caste 0.042 0.020 0.060 5.13%
Migration 0.053 0.027 0.040 23.98%
Panchayat members are also more likely to venture beyond the village, and are
significantly more likely to live in households where at least one family member
migrates. 144 Office-bearers also regularly cross village lines in order to attend public
43 Author interview, with translation, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, February 22, 2010.
144 The direction of this relationship, however, is unclear; while it might be that local office-bearers develop
more "worldly" or "cosmopolitan" views that foster migration, it is perhaps more likely that the experience
of migration - and exposure to different contexts and political practices - makes it more likely for members
of these households to run for office, all else equal.
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meetings and training sessions in the GP headquarter, the block, district or - in some
instances - the state capital. A tribal woman in Udaipur, for example, described her
experiences after being elected to the panchayat:
Before I never ventured out. My life was here only, and to the fields and back
again. After my election, I went every which way, to Gogunda [the block seat], to
Udaipur. It was my business to go. The NGO-walle and party people, they even
organized buses to take us to Jaipur so we could learn the business of the
panchayat.145
The same increase in exposure is not observed, however, across neighborhood
lines within a village, for which holding GP office has no significant effect. This suggests
that while women or members of the lower castes enter new public settings through the
panchayat, these interactions do not necessarily carry over into their social lives. This is
consistent with Chauchard's (2010) finding (also in Rajasthan) that inter-caste contact
increases as a result of reservations even as casteist attitudes (including negative
stereotypes about the lower castes) persist. While reservations have profoundly altered
the local political environment and require a new set of interactions across caste, class,
and gender lines, changes in the social sphere are much slower to develop and take hold.
Might the effects of reservations carry over beyond the office-bearer him or
herself to his or her co-ethnics or to other women? Here the survey reveals that people are
no more or less exposed in settings where they share caste or gender characteristics with
the panchayat leadership (Table 5.13). This is largely unsurprising, since there is no clear
reason to expect that village elected leadership should alter where or with whom a person
works, or whether he or she (or a family member) decides to migrate. One might, though,
expect political reservations to contribute to increased social interaction across class or
145 Author observation of NGO training sessions of elected panchayat women, with translation by NGO
staff, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, April 14, 2009.
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caste lines within the village. Again, however, increased contact in the public sphere of
the panchayat does not appear - at least in the survey data captured at one point in time -
to spillover into regular sites of social, as opposed to political, interaction.
Table 5.13. Effects of sarpanch identity match on socio-spatial exposure
Female match Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.005 0.059 0.938 -0.65%
X-Caste -0.016 0.030 0.585 -2.01%
Migration -0.003 0.037 0.943 -1.20%
ST match Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.023 0.091 0.803 -3.17%
X-Caste -0.030 0.077 0.680 -3.74%
Migration -0.077 0.055 0.222 -35.03%
SC match Effect Std. Err. p-value % change
X-Neighborhood -0.053 0.099 0.595 -7.33%
X-Caste 0.001 0.085 0.990 0.13%
Migration -0.022 0.065 0.743 -10.09%
There are, however, other more subtle ways in which reservations might
contribute to exposure that are not adequately captured by the survey. The relationships
forged in the panchayat may not be deep social relationships, but as villagers are forced
to interact across caste, class, and gender lines in the affairs of the panchayat they are
exposed to important sources of difference, including new sources of information and
potential linkages to the state. Over time, a new set of social as well as political
relationships may take hold. Rao and Sanyal (2010), for example, argue that panchayat
meetings (Gram Sabha) are important "discursive" spaces in which poor and
disadvantaged groups acquire civic and political skills. These skills, they suggest, are put
to use in seeking both material and non-material benefits, including increased social
standing within the village. This process of change is necessarily slow and hard to
document. And yet, there is reason to believe that a new set of social relations may be
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unfolding across caste lines in some villages. In a symbolic but important act, SC and ST
members sit side-by-side people from different caste backgrounds on the samejajham or
carpet (used to designate a space of public authority). In the words of one SC ward
panch:
Now we are here in the panchayat, sitting next to them [upper caste
Brahmins]. We sit on the jajham, they serve us tea. They know that if they
need something they will have to come to us, they will have to greet us
and say namaskar [a formal greeting of respect]. 46
A Scheduled Caste man in Kota who previously served as sarpanch reflected on his
experience, recalling that before his election he had never socialized with members of the
upper castes. After his election, he was courted by members of the upper castes:
When I became sarpanch everyone started calling me, inviting me, as if I
turned into a high caste person just by being a sarpanch. But, after all, I
am a Meghwal [SC]. They will talk to me, respect me, tell me "Sarpanch
Sahib." They will take food from my hands.14
Gender norms, however, appear stickier than those related to caste - perhaps
because female panchayat members are so easily controlled by their own, male family
members. And yet, even with regard to gender, there are glimmers of change. To cite one
example, a tribal woman in Udaipur who used to be a panchayat member has become a
well-known activist and broker in her village, even though she no longer holds political
office. She proudly wears a mobile phone around her neck, and has the phone numbers of
block and district administrators on speed dial. She explains:
I know the system. I know who to call, and they will not ignore my call.
And so everyone comes to me now with their problems. Even men who
147Author interview, Bargaon, Udaipur, December 17, 2010.147 Author interview, Sangod block, Kota district, February 24, 2011.
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before did not think a woman could do this work know that I am the one
who can assist them. 148
In sum, political reservations at the panchayat level are a mixed bag. They are
easily manipulated by local elites and thus limited in their ability to alter the day-to-day
functioning of the panchayat. And yet, even when their hands are partially tied, those
who fill these seats are inserted into new public spaces. In so doing, they gain exposure to
new contexts and people across caste, class, gender, and village lines. The experience of
these individuals does not appear to directly influence the exposure of others in the same
villages, and yet reservations are slowly beginning to change the village environment in
ways that are difficult to quantify. Over time new norms of social interaction are
emerging that foster greater exposure across caste, gender, and other social boundaries.
Civil society interventions
The woman quoted above did not acquire her political savvy through membership in the
panchayat alone. Rather, she was part of a NGO-led training program that targeted
panchayat women in the hopes of instilling in them the skills to carry out their office.
Such efforts by civil society organizations create additional spaces in which women and
members of the SC and ST may engage in local politics. Civil society organizations,
however, remain relatively thin on the ground; only six percent of the sample report non-
governmental or social movement organization activity in their village. Given these small
numbers, there is no discernible statistical difference between the exposure of residents in
villages with and without such organizations. Yet, drawing on qualitative accounts, there
is reason to believe that - where present - these groups play a critical role in promoting
148 Author observation of NGO training sessions of elected panchayat women, with translation by NGO
staff, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, April 14, 2009.
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both social and spatial exposure across caste, gender, and (to a lesser extent) class
boundaries.
I encountered a number of civil society organizations in the course of the
fieldwork, all of which were engaged in forms of local "institution building" aimed at
promoting the participation of traditionally disadvantaged groups. Different organizations
applied different models, ranging from efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Gram
Panchayat and its elected members, to supporting local alternatives to the elected
panchayat, to movement-based work that seeks to hold elected officials accountable by
organizing large-scale protests. While the approach varied, all of these civil society
interventions sought to bring marginalized groups into the public arena. In so doing, they
promoted new forms of engagement across local boundaries of caste, gender, and class.
To the extent that their work spans more than one locality, they also promoted interaction
across village lines.
Take, for example, Vidhya Bhavan, a civil society organization headquartered in
Udaipur city. This organization conducts an outreach and training program for newly
elected panchayat members that specifically targets women and Scheduled Caste and
Tribe members. Field staff attend and monitor panchayat meetings and reach out to
elected members, providing them with training materials. Elected members are also
invited to attend trainings, seminars, and "exposure" trips where they meet with public
officials and with members of other panchayats. In this way, Vidhya Bhavan seeks to
strengthen the potential of panchayat reservations by further drawing women and
members of the lower castes beyond their immediate communities and localities.
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In a second example, another Udaipur-based NGO, Seva Mandir, is working to
develop village institutions formed around a "self-governance" model influenced by the
Gandhian philosophy of swaraj ("self-rule"). Seva Mandir's institution building work
promotes exposure by explicitly requiring the presence and participation of multiple caste
communities as well as men and women at its village-level meetings. In one village, for
example, Seva Mandir helped to create and support a "Citizens' Forum" which operates
as a parallel (and in some senses alternative) platform to the elected Gram Panchayat.
The Citizen's Forum draws together men and women from different neighborhoods and
castes, holding elections and community meetings to decide on programs and the
allocation of (NGO-allocated) funds. It also seeks to build support across class lines, for
example, by working on issues (such as solid waste management) that will mobilize a
broad range of socioeconomic groups since "everyone can get behind picking up the
garbage."1 49
In another village, Seva Mandir has worked to create new spaces for women in
local governance by advocating for their presence in traditional caste panchayat meetings
that have for generations been a male-only space. This is slow, incremental work that has
met with considerable opposition. Over time, however, Seva Mandir staff managed to
persuade local caste leaders to allow women from the community (most of whom had
received training from the NGO) to attend caste panchayat meetings dedicated to the
discussion of social issues that specifically impact women (such as child marriage or
marital disputes). It is unlikely that women's presence in these meetings will, in the short-
term, make any difference to the decisions of the caste panchayat. However, the act of
simply attending a caste meeting from which women were formerly excluded marks a
149 Author interview with Seva Mandir staff member, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, April 9, 2010.
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powerful departure from traditional practice. In these ways and others, the NGO seeks to
challenge caste and gender norms at the village level, and to promote movement across
such boundaries.
The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), a Rajasthan-based farmers and
workers movement, provides a third and very different example of a civil society
intervention that has fostered both social and spatial exposure. MKSS describes itself as a
"non-party" people's movement that campaigns on issues such as the right to work, right
to food, and access to social security. MKSS attempts to draw together people under a
common class-based identity of "workers and farmers" as opposed to members of
disparate caste communities. In contrast to Seva Mandir and Vidhya Bhavan's efforts to
build village-level institutions, MKSS seeks mass mobilization via street theater, public
rallies, marches, sit-ins, hunger strikes, and other forms of media-savvy protest. MKSS
organizers travel from village to village by jeep, using a bull horn and puppet shows to
spread information about their campaigns, and transport people to rallies and other
protest events. In this way, MKSS encourages both social (cross-caste) as well as spatial
(extra-village) exposure.
It is important to note, however, that these examples are the exception and not the
rule since, as noted, the majority of villagers are not exposed to any kind of NGO or civil
society organization. And yet it is clear that civil society interventions have the potential
to drive exposure across caste, gender, village, and (in some cases) class lines.
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6. Individual experience and exposure
Exposure, as we have seen, may be driven by a multiplicity of factors ranging
from the structure of the rural economy, to institutional interventions such as political
reservations for marginalized groups and the targeted efforts of civil society
organizations to bring such groups into the public arena. These economic and social
forces of change are not, however, uniformly experienced; rather, they are mediated by
individual circumstances and experience. The multiplicity of factors that drive exposure
across both social and spatial dimensions combine in unique ways; no two people
experience the same local environment in the same way. As a result, there is a degree of
contingency - as well as agency - involved in determining whether and how a person
engages beyond his or her community or locality.
Let's return, for example, to village C, the majority upper caste village on the
outskirts of Udaipur city (introduced in chapter 3). The village is spatially divided along
caste lines, with the upper caste majority residing in the main village, an SC
neighborhood located on the outskirts, and ST hamlets at some distance away. The spatial
divisions mirror strong social divides and a tendency for people in the village to "keep to
their own." A SC man, for example, explained "The whole village is [mostly] Brahmin,
and we [SC] Meghwal are very few. And so people cut each other and get in each other's
way. The village belongs to them [Brahmins]." 150 There were, however, some notable
exceptions who appeared more likely to reach across caste lines. The first was Mr. P, a
young, secondary school educated man who held the (SC reserved) position of GP ward
panch (councilor). He noted: "Reservations make some small difference. It has given us a
chance to be with them [the Brahmin]. I sit, drink, and eat with them in the GP
150 Author interview, with translation, December 15, 2010, Bargaon block, Udaipur district.
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meetings." 51 This is not, however, just a story of political reservations. When asked why
he ran for the position of ward panch, Mr. P responded:
Not any crazy person can hold the position. I'm educated; that's why
people approached me. That, and they know my father [a former Congress
activist]. Also, I travel often to Udaipur for work [in a nearby marble
factory], and so I'm aware of the goings on outside of this place. You need
to be aware in order to fill this seat.
This series of factors related to his family history, education, and occupation combined to
put Mr. P in a position to run for local office. His election, in turn, further increased his
exposure to others in the village across caste lines.
In another example, traditional caste institutions worked to foster rather than
inhibit exposure. Mr. R, an elderly SC man, exhibited a tendency to engage in cross-caste
strategies of claim-making, including approaching elders in the Brahmin community for
assistance, and attending village meetings to petition higher-level officials and agencies.
In contrast to most other SC residents who refer to their neighborhood as being clearly
demarcated form the rest of the Brahmin village, Mr. R. refers to the village as a whole
("our village," "hamare gaon"). While providing me with a walking tour, he approached
and greeted Brahmin men by name (an uncommon practice among other SC)." The
fluidity with which Mr. R moved across these caste lines is due in large part to his
occupation. He, like his father before him, fills the traditional position of "damar" in
which he is contracted by the Brahmin to announce community meetings and events like
births, marriages, and deaths. Carrying a drum, he goes house-to-house to inform people
and call them to meetings. As a result, Mr. R comes into frequent contact with the upper-
caste sections of the village.
151 Author interview, with translation, December 18, 2010, Bargaon block, Udaipur district.
152 Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 21, 2010.
229
A third example concerns Brahmin women in the same village, the majority of
whom report rarely engaging with the Gram Panchayat or other levels of government.
Very few work outside of the home, and rarely venture into public spaces unaccompanied
by male relatives. An exception is Mrs. G (who we met in chapter 3) and who others in
the village consistently referred to as an "active woman." She was one of the small group
of women who raised issues of water supply (and demands for tap connections) with the
panchayat and with politicians. The key factors that position Mrs. G as an "active
woman" are related to her family and personal history. She is the wife of an influential
Brahmin (GC) man who describes himself as a "social worker." About 15 years ago, Mrs.
G was encouraged by her husband to run for panchayat office, and she was elected vice-
president of the GP. She served only one term, but has remained active in village affairs,
having "learned how administration works." Mrs. G has no formal position today, but her
past experience has given her ties to the panchayat, the administration, and diverse
groups in the village that influence her claim-making repertoire today.
What are we to learn from these stories of how particular individuals gain
exposure? What we see is that economic and social forces (related to occupation,
education, political reservations, and family history) shape - but do not determine - the
extent to which a person interacts beyond his or her community and locality. In each
case, a person is propelled across caste, class, neighborhood, or village lines through a
unique constellation of factors. In each case we can try to trace out why a given person is
more exposed than another; we will encounter an infinite numbers of stories and
scenarios. Indeed, no single variable can adequately explain whether and how a person is
exposed to other people and places. However, once set in motion (for whatever set of
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reasons), socio-spatial exposure is a critical resource for claim-making.
7. Conclusion
An examination of the drivers of exposure suggests that economic and social
changes are unfolding in rural India - a finding that is supported by other recent
scholarship. Lines between the village and urban centers are becoming more porous as
people increasingly look beyond the village for employment. Traditional caste-based
occupational barriers are beginning to erode, resulting in a diversification of occupation
and the entry of members of the lower castes and tribes into new sectors. Educational
opportunities are also increasing in rural India, as are rates of rural-urban migration.
Levels of economic and educational attainment and occupation are no longer a purely
caste-bound affair.
This marks a moment of transition in rural India: one in which models of Indian
politics and society in which caste is the primary social cleavage (cf. Chandra, 2004;
Manor, 1990; Weiner, 1989, 200 1) are giving way to newer models in which caste, while
still salient, emerges as a more malleable set of social as well as economic and political
constructs. The data examined in this dissertation, collected in a single state at a single
point of time, cannot adequately capture such broad patterns of change. The patterns of
socio-spatial exposure observed, however, are consistent with such changes. Through the
survey and in interviews, residents describe a set of social and economic interactions that
cut across caste as well as class and village lines. Simply put, people move about within
their communities, villages, and beyond; social, economic, and political relationships are
not static. However, change has not come to all places, groups, or people equally. As a
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result, different individuals develop different social and occupational ties and, as such,
are differently exposed. This divergence in socio-spatial exposure, in turn, accounts for





In its most basic terms, this dissertation is an attempt to understand relationships between
ordinary citizens and the state and, as an extension, patterns and determinants of local
political participation. Through an exploration of citizens' experiences in rural Rajasthan,
I have asked: why do some people engage the state while others disengage? What
accounts for the diversity of practices (direct and mediated, formal and informal) through
which citizens voice their demands? In other words, who participates, why, and how?
I have examined a particular form of political participation: citizen claim-making
with regard to public services. Access to public services, broadly defined, is a critical
indicator of both levels of development and governmental accountability. Yet, as a visit
to an Indian village quickly demonstrates, so-called "public" goods and services are
rarely purely public. Rather, they are allocated in a discretionary manner by public
officials and, as such, are the objects of political contestation. Claim-making, in this
sense, represents one of the most common - and critical - sites of local citizen-state
interaction.
My fieldwork has revealed divergent patterns of claim-making, ranging from
those individuals who do not make claims at all; to those who directly contact public
officials, to those who seek assistance from a wide range of mediating actors and
institutions. This variation in claim-making practice, we have seen, persists across and
within districts, blocks, Gram Panchayats, and villages within a single state.
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This divergence in both the incidence as well as the practice of claim-making
posed the central set of puzzles examined in this dissertation. First, in contrast to popular
and academic portrayals of a distant state and disconnected citizenry, there are high levels
of claim-making: a large majority report engaging officials around issues of public
service delivery. Second, the claim-making strategies employed are diverse. People
combine both direct and mediated practices, and a majority reports engaging more than
one kind of claim-making channel. Not all rural residents are locked into singular or
static patronage structures; rather citizens can and do pursue a variety of channels of
access to the state. Third, different people navigate the same local environments
differently, to different claim-making ends. Claim-making practice cannot be reduced to
a matter of formal governance institutions or administration, which are held constant at
the level of the state, district, and Gram Panchayat. Neither can it be explained by village-
level differences in economic development or demography. At the level of the individual,
measures of class and caste similarly fail to consistently predict whether and how a
person engages the state.
Instead, I have argued, claim-making practice is shaped by the extent to which a
person is exposed to people and settings across socioeconomic and spatial lines,
traversing boundaries of caste, class, neighborhood, and village. Through "weak" ties that
extend beyond a person's primary social groups and immediate locality, and through
"bridging" ties that cut across caste, class, or other social markers, citizens come into
contact with broad sources of information and ideas about the state. This includes
procedural information about public services, as well as narratives of entitlement (ideas
about what the state should do) and political efficacy (ideas about whether participation is
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worthwhile). Individuals with such weak and bridging ties are also exposed to a greater
number and diversity of potential links to the state, manifest in multiple points of access
to public officials. Thus, I have argued, socio-spatial exposure increases both the
knowledge and access to the state necessary for claim-making.
Those individuals with greater social and spatial exposure, the theory predicts,
will be more likely to engage the state to seek access to public services than those who
are less exposed. I tested this theory through a combination of quantitative data drawn
from the citizen survey and qualitative data drawn from interviews with village residents.
I found, controlling for a wide range of village and individual-level attributes, that those
situated in networks that cut across caste and class and extend beyond the village are
more likely to engage in claim-making, and do so through more diverse practices, than
those embedded in more "parochial" networks. I assessed exposure along several
dimensions that capture primary social and spatial cleavages in the rural Indian context,
namely: cross-neighborhood exposure within a village, cross-caste workplace exposure,
and extra-village exposure (measured by proxy by the village land-to-labor ratio). People
who socialize in different neighborhoods, who work in a multi-caste environment, and
who travel beyond the village are - all else equal - more active claim makers than those
who do not possess the same weak and bridging ties.
The sources of socio-spatial exposure, I have argued, are largely exogenous to an
individual's claim-making practice. There is no single driver of exposure. Rather,
exposure is the product of a number of forces of change in rural India that, in an uneven
manner, foster engagement across caste and class lines and create more porous
boundaries between village and city. Population growth and land scarcity - reflected in
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declining land-to-labor ratios - make local agricultural employment less productive and
so compel people to seek opportunities beyond the village, or to engage in new sectors
within a village that challenge caste-based norms of occupation. These changes in the
rural labor market are accompanied by changing social practices reflected in new patterns
of social interaction across caste lines, as well as increased rates of engagement beyond
the village. At the same time, I have argued, institutional interventions such as the
reservation of panchayat seats for women and the lower castes and tribes or the
intervention of NGOs are creating opportunities for traditionally marginalized groups to
engage in multi-caste and mixed-gender settings in the village and beyond. In these ways
and others, people encounter broad, cross-cutting networks that foster exposure across
social and spatial lines.
This final chapter has three objectives. First, in sections 2 and 3, I examine the
consequences of claim-making, both material and political. Section 2 takes up a set of
questions about the material outcomes of claim-making. While I am unable to draw a
direct causal link between claim-making and access to services, I find that a large
majority of those involved in claim-making report that it is indeed an effective means of
problem solving. Section 3 examines claim-making alongside other political activities,
including voting, campaigning, attending village planning meetings, and acts of large-
scale protest. I document a relationship between claim-making and broader patterns of
political participation, arguing that claim-making both contributes to and is the product of
a deepening sense of entitlement and rising expectations of the state.
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Second, in sections 4 and 5, I reflect on the implications and applications of my
study. Taken together, the theory and findings of this dissertation carry important
implications for our understanding of both distributive politics (who gets what from the
state) and democratic practice (who participates and how). The core finding of my study
is that socio-spatial exposure makes claim-making more likely. In other words,
individuals who are exposed to a diversity of people and contexts appear to be more
active in their engagement of the state. Moreover, socio-spatial exposure broadens the
channels - direct and mediated - through which citizens pursue the state and its
resources. Section 4 highlights contributions to the literatures on participation, social
network theory, and ethnic politics. Section 5 examines potential applications of the
theory both in addressing challenges of service delivery and in creating institutions that
promote citizen participation.
Third, sections 6 and 7 examine the broader implications of the study beyond
Rajasthan and, beyond this dissertation, suggest an agenda for future research. Section 6
considers the extent to which the theory carries over beyond the rural Indian context,
briefly examining evidence from urban India as well as comparative work in Latin
America. Section 7 concludes by discussing a number of open questions for additional
investigation and reflection.
2. Claim-making and access to services
Much of the motivation for this project rests upon an observation that claim-making
matters, both in material terms for access to public services and in political terms as a
form of local political participation. Thus far, however, I have primarily explored the
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"demand-side" of these dynamics: that is, whether and how people make claims on the
state. A corollary set of questions asks whether and how officials and representatives
respond to these claims.
A wide range of "supply-side" factors, ranging from technocratic and political
decision-making at the national, state, and local levels, to issues of administrative
capacity inform the allocation of public goods and services. It would therefore be
misleading to attempt to attribute access to services exclusively to bottom-up processes of
claim-making. Goods and services in certain sectors, for example in healthcare, are often
allocated in a "top-down" manner through programs designed far from the village.
Mothers in many villages, for example, avail of nutritional supplements for their children
distributed through the daycare center. Access to these supplements is the product of
active outreach by local public health officials. Similarly, children's access to vaccines is
often the result of campaigns by the state and local administration. However, even in
sectors where there is a heavy "top-down" component to the supply of services, there
remains a role for citizen claim-making. This is particularly true in contexts marked by
public sector inefficiencies and corruption (including high levels of staff absenteeism).
Top-down health campaigns, for example, ground to a halt when nurses fail to report to
work, or when a health center or daycare center does not keep regular hours. In these
instances, claim-making plays a key role in holding local officials to account.
Other goods and services are demand-driven by nature. Access to employment on
a government worksite under the NREGS scheme, for example, is explicitly demand-
driven, as are pensions, rations, and Below Poverty Line cards - all of which require
applications and other kinds of "seeking" behavior by citizens. Village and neighborhood
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infrastructure, such as drinking water sources or paved roads, are also the common
subjects of citizen demands, and are allocated both through panchayat budgets and
through extra-budgetary channels such as a politician's constituency development funds.
Indeed, it is clear that - across a wide range of sectors - claim-making is a necessary,
although not sufficient, condition for access to services. In the words of one man in
Udaipur, Rajasthan:
Programs are there, schemes are there. But if you sit quietly with your
arms crossed, who will possibly hear you? Only those people who go
forward and are active capture the ear of officials.15 3
Claim-making, then, plays at least a partial role in determining who gets what
from the state. In this sense, claim-making carries material consequences. The survey,
however, is somewhat limited in its power to directly explain the material distribution of
goods and services. Given the static nature of the data, which capture levels of access to
goods at a given moment in time, it is not altogether surprising to find that the data do not
reveal a significant statistical relationship between claim-making and access to services.
On the one hand, we might expect people with poor access to services to engage in more
claim-making, and so we might therefore expect to find a "negative" relationship where
poor access is correlated with high claims. At the same time, when claim-making is
successful we would expect to see a "positive" relationship between claim-making and
access to services. Because the data are collected at a single point in time, I am unable to
disentangle these two sets of dynamics, and the overall effect of claim-making may
simply be "washed out."
The survey provides a second, more subjective measure of the outcomes of claim-
153 Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 15, 2010.
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making, reflected in citizens' own assessments of its efficacy. Here there is a
preponderance of evidence that claim-making does, in fact, have a material impact on the
lives of those who engage in it. Indeed, more than two-thirds of respondents engaged in
claim-making report that it is an effective means of problem solving. I assess "efficacy"
in terms of the proportion of people who report engaging in a particular practice who also
report that it was an effective' 5 4 means of resolving the problem at hand.
Table 6.1 presents data on the perceived effectiveness of each claim-making
practice. I first present the data for the whole sample (A). Second, I present the data
conditional on whether or not the respondent lives in a village where the channel of
claim-making in question is present (B) since, as we have seen in chapter 2, not every
village is home to the same array of mediating institutions). Third, and most revealing, I
present the data conditional on whether the respondent actually engages in a given
practice (C).
When all practices are considered together across the whole sample (including
both people who make claims and those who do not), slightly less than one-third reported
that they found their claim-making efforts to be effective. However, this number rises to
68 percent when we examine only those who actually make claims. In other words,
people who pursue claim-making are by and large convinced that it is a worthwhile
activity.
154 Following a series of questions concerning their claim-making activity through a given channel,
respondents were then asked how "effective" that channel was as a means of problem solving. If a channel
was reported as being either "somewhat" or "very" effective it was, in binary terms, coded as being
perceived as an effective channel.
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Table 6.1. Perceived effectiveness of claim-making practice
A. Perceived effectiveness Obs. % Effective Std. Dev.
Across whole sample
Contact GP 2210 0.56 0.50
Contact bureaucrat 2210 0.30 0.46
Contact party 2210 0.20 0.40
Contact NH Assoc. 2210 0.23 0.42
Contact Vill. Assoc. 2210 0.19 0.39
Contact Civil Society Org. 2210 0.12 0.33
Contact caste leader 2210 0.54 0.50
Contact inter-caste leader 2210 0.20 0.40
B. Given presence of channel
Contact GP 2210 0.56 0.50
Contact bureaucrat 2210 0.30 0.46
Contact party 2210 0.20 0.40
Contact NH Assoc. 696 0.72 0.45
Contact Vill. Assoc. 539 0.77 0.42
Contact Civil Society Org. 367 0.28 0.45
Contact caste leader 1463 0.82 0.38
Contact inter-caste leader 620 0.70 0.46
C. Given claim-making
Contact GP 1375 0.67 0.47
Contact bureaucrat 459 0.57 0.50
Contact party 480 0.40 0.49
Contact NH Assoc. 479 0.83 0.38
Contact Vill. Assoc. 338 0.84 0.36
Contact Civil Society Org. 239 0.79 0.41
Contact caste leader 519 0.76 0.43
Contact inter-caste leader 303 0.83 0.38
The survey also sheds light on the perceived efficacy of different kinds of claim-
making practice. The data largely reflect the centrality of the Gram Panchayat which, as
we have seen, stands head and shoulders above all other channels as a site of citizen
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claim-making; it is, by design, the first port of call for most residents seeking the services
of the state. Among those who contact the GP, more than two-thirds (67 percent) report
that panchayat members are effective in solving the problem at hand.
However, the data also reveal some of the weaknesses of the panchayat, reflected
in lower rates of satisfaction relative to mediated channels of claim-making. More than
80 percent of those who contact local village or neighborhood associations report that this
is an effective practice, as do 79 percent of those who contact civil society organizations.
Three-quarters of those who turn to caste leaders for assistance report that they are
effective problem solvers, along with more than 80 percent of those who contact inter-
caste leaders. These mediated strategies, however, are far less common; each is pursued
by less than a quarter of the sample. Moreover, it is important to recall that direct and
mediated practices are not mutually exclusive. The most effective approach appears to be
to combine both direct and mediated strategies. Indeed, as we saw in chapter 2, among
those who contact the GP just 20 percent do so as a single strategy, while a full 67
percent combine contact with the GP with other, mediated approaches.
There is, in addition, qualitative evidence of the effectiveness of claim-making. In
a large majority (over two-thirds) of semi-structured interviews, people narrated at least
one example of successful claim-making. This is, however, a somewhat imprecise metric,
since respondents were asked to describe an existing service and then asked to explain the
process through which it was obtained. In this sense, the interviews are biased towards
accounts of success. Even so, the interviews help to highlight the material consequences
of claim-making and its complexity: it was rare to encounter a case in which a citizen
simply contacted the official under whose jurisdiction the good or service fell. Rather, the
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process described was often long and involved, involving multiple efforts through
multiple channels. These efforts, however, paid off at least some of the time. In concrete
terms, this meant the difference between whether or not a hand pump was repaired,
whether or not a road is paved, whether or not an absent teacher was held to account,
whether rations were obtained, and so on.
3. Claim-making and political participation
Not only does claim-making matter in these material terms, but it is also of political
consequence as one of the most local and common spheres in which citizens encounter
the state. In what follows, I examine the relationship between claim-making and broader
patterns of political participation. I find, first, that claim-making shapes (and is shaped
by) citizen views of the state and, as such, is associated with notions of entitlement and of
political efficacy. Active claim-makers expect more from the state and also are more
likely to expect that their voices will be heard. Second, claim-making is associated with a
high level of citizen-state engagement, reflected in other forms electoral, deliberative, and
contentious of political participation.
Citizen views of the state: entitlement and efficacy
Claim-making, we have seen, requires both a sense of entitlement and a sense of political
efficacy; people must be aware of the existence of public goods and services, feel that
they are entitled to them, and feel that it is worth their while to voice demands. As such,
claim-making is part of a cycle of dynamics that produce and reinforce the conditions for
citizen engagement of the state.
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The citizen survey casts additional light on these dynamics by allowing us to
examine the relationship between claim-making and citizens' views of the state and of
public service delivery. The survey included a number of questions designed to capture
citizens' opinions and expectations of the state (Table 6.2). First, respondents were asked
whether they found the level of public investment in their locality fair compared to other
places. This question provides a sense of citizens' expectations for and satisfaction with
service delivery. Second, respondents were asked whether they thought local officials
gave villagers a chance to express their views and, next, whether officials respect those
views and take them into account when making decisions. These questions provide
insight into whether respondents they believe that their demands will be heard.
Table 6.2. Views on the state and service delivery
Question (0 = no, 1 = yes) Mean Std. Dev.
Are levels of public investment in this locality fair? 0.26 0.44
Do officials allow villagers to express their views? 0.59 0.49
Do officials respect villagers' views? 0.35 0.48
I find that claim-making is associated with a significant increase in both sense of
entitlement to services and of political efficacy. 155 People who make claims on the state
think that the state should deliver more. Active claim-makers are a full 35 percent less
likely to think that levels of service delivery in a locality are fair, compared to other
places (p-value = 0.001) (Table 6.3), reflecting a sense of grievance and entitlement that
emerges through comparison of one's own locality to others. As people see goods and
155 The multivariate models employed here follow the same structure as those in chapters 4 and 5. The
outcomes of interest are questions related to citizen opinions on the state and service delivery. Claim-
making (both incidence and repertoire) are, in separate models, treated as explanatory variables, alongside a
range of individual, household, and village controls with GP fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the village level. The model and full results are presented in the Appendix (A6).
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services in other neighborhoods and villages, they come to expect similar levels of
service themselves - and express a sense of injustice if they do not.
Table 6.3. Claim-making, entitlement, and political efficacy
Effect of claim-making: Marginal Std. Err. p-value % change
entitlement & political efficacy Effect
Local public investment is fair -0.092 0.030 0.001 -35%
Officials allow villagers to express views 0.135 0.031 0.000 23%
Officials respect villagers' views 0.048 0.030 0.112 14%
Claim-making is also correlated with greater expectations of government
responsiveness. Claim-makers are 23 percent more likely to think that local officials will
give citizens a chance to express their views, (p-value < 0.001), and are 14 percent more
likely to think that those views will be respected (p-value = 0.112). The same is true of
the claim-making repertoire; people who engage in a broader array of claim-making
strategies are more likely to expect that officials will heed citizens' views.156 This reflects
an expectation on the part of claim-making citizens that their voices will not go unheard.
These expectations of government response, however, sit alongside a portrayal -
expressed both in academic accounts and in citizens' own words - of a distant and
inaccessible Indian state. These divergent views, where on the one hand people appear to
have low expectations of the state and on the other hand exhibit high levels of demand for
services, are reconciled - at least in part - by revisiting the nature of claim-making in the
rural Indian context. Claim-making, as we have seen, is neither a singular act nor a linear
affair. People do not necessarily expect to receive a response the first time they raise an
issue. Nor do they necessarily expect to have an issue resolved by contacting the
156 The size of the effects, however, are relatively small. A one unit increase on an index of claim-making
practices (for example, moving from one practice to two) is associated with a seven percent increase in the
expectation that villagers are given a chance to express their views (p = 0.000), and with a three percent
increase in expectation that these views will be respected (p-value = 0. 099).
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"correct" official or agency. Rather, they engage in lengthy, complex, and often
circuitous claim-making strategies with the expectation that - at some point in this
process, at least some of the time - their demands will be met. Claim-making also takes
place in the context of a large and expanding pool of public resources. People see goods
and services all around them, even if they themselves do not enjoy access to them. This,
as we have seen, is linked to a sense of grievance and entitlement, as well as to rising
expectations that officials will heed citizens' demands.
Broader participation in politics
Rural citizens actively seek and engage local officials around issues of service delivery.
Is participation limited to localized activity centered on demand for public services? Or is
claim-making part of a broader pattern of citizen activism? Using the citizen survey, I
assess claim-making alongside participation that is (1) electoral (examining voter
participation and campaign activity), (2) deliberative (attending panchayat-level planning
meetings), and (3) contentious in nature (engaging in acts of protest), each of which are
discussed in turn below (Table 6.4).
Table 6.4. Participation in electoral, deliberative, and contentious politics
Political Activity Mean Std. Dev.
Voting: Gram Panchayat 0.97 0.18
Voting: State Legislative Assembly 0.93 0.26
Voting: National Parliament 0.90 0.30
Campaign activities 0.24 0.42
Attending Gram Sabha 0.37 0.48
Protest activity (strikes, rallies) 0.17 0.37
I find that many, but not all, kinds of political engagement are positively
associated with claim-making; active claim-makers are also active in other political
arenas (Table 6.5).
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Table 6.5: Claim-making and other forms of participation157
Claim-making correlated with Marginal S. F p-value % change
other political participation Effect
Voting: Gram Panchayat 0.004 0.004 0.298 0%
Voting: State Legislative Assembly -0.004 0.007 0.639 0%
Voting: National Parliament -0.018 0.009 0.069 -2%
Campaign activities 0.062 0.018 0.002 26%
Attending Gram Sabha 0.169 0.038 0.000 45%
Protest activity (strikes, rallies) 0.105 0.015 0.000 62%
First, the relationship between claim-making and electoral participation is mixed.
Voting, which occurs only periodically and is a relatively costless activity, sets a rather
"low bar" for participation. Involvement in political campaigns, however, sets a higher
bar as it involves investments of time, money, or social capital. To capture these
dynamics, I assess a bundle of "campaign activity," which includes canvassing for a
political candidate, handing out pamphlets, attending party meetings, giving or writing
campaign speeches, or making financial or in-kind contributions to a campaign. I find
that people who make claims are a full 26 percent more likely to engage with a campaign
(p-value = 0.002). Claim-making, in this sense, appears to spill over into broader
patronage politics through engagement with politicians and their campaigns.
These dynamics, however, do not appear to carry over to the voting booth, as
there is little significant relationship between voting and claim-making.15 8 Under a direct
patronage model, we might expect to see a significant correlations between claim-making
and voting. The reality, however, is that there is little evidence of a material clientelistic
157 Reported rates of voter participation are very high, and exceed national rates (which hover around-65
percent). This, I believe, reflects the normative value attached to voting which may have resulted in some
respondents feeling pressure to report that they voted. For these reasons, the numbers attached to voting
should be viewed with caution (making it all the less surprising that there is a lack of significant
relationship between voting and claim-making). The other kinds of participation examined here
(campaigning, attending the Gram Sabha, and protest) do not have the same normative value attached to
them, and are therefore much less likely to suffer from over-reporting.
158 Given suspected over-reported of voting, this lack of significant relationship is all the less surprising.
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bargain between voters and politicians. For national parliamentary elections, claim-
making is associated with a small (2 percent) drop in turnout, while there is no significant
relationship between claim-making and voting at the local (GP) or state levels. While
patronage abounds in Indian politics, it does not appear to take place through a direct
exchange of votes for services. Indeed, numerous villagers cited the "empty promises" of
politicians who only appear at election time never to be seen again.' 59
Second, the Gram Sabha (GS) is a constitutionally-mandated panchayat level
meeting, held two times each year. The GS is a deliberative institution (described as the
"village parliament") in which residents are expected to discuss and vote on the
panchayat budget and its allocation, as well as on beneficiary selection for poverty
reduction schemes. In this sense, the GS is - by design - an arena for claim-making.
Attending the Gram Sabha, however, is a more public, visible, and formal act than other
claim-making activity, which takes place on a day-to-day basis through contact (often of
a more informal nature) with officials or brokers. The Gram Sabha meetings are
mandated from the top down by constitutional decree, and are widely perceived to be a
formal government arena. It is therefore not surprising to find that relatively small
numbers (37 percent) report attending these meetings. As we would expect, however,
there is a strong relationship between GS attendance and claim-making; claim-makers are
a full 45 percent more likely to participate in these meetings (p-value = 0.000).
159 In contrast to a direct exchange model of patronage, some observers of Indian electoral politics suggest
that voting is "akin to taking out an insurance policy. Voters do not necessarily receive any benefits for
casting their votes..., nor does the politician necessarily monitor voters to prevent them from reneging on
the clientelistic bargain. Rather, voters simply do what they can to maximize the likelihood that the
politician in power will be receptive to the voters' requests for assistance, in the event that they need help in
securing favorable policy implementation" (Ziegfeld, 2009, p. 16).
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Third, what is the relationship between claim-making and contentious politics?
Protest here is defined in terms of participation in strikes, blockades, marches, or rallies.
These are collective, large-scale events that are more visible than other forms of claim-
making, and therefore also imply an element of risk. The subjects of protest were
undefined in the survey, and so could span anything from protest over public goods (itself
a form of claim-making), to other issues unrelated to service delivery (for example,
matters such as price inflation, or the allocation of caste reservations). A small proportion
(just 17 percent) of people report having participated in such protest activity. The
correlation with claim-making, however, is large and strong, reflected in a 62 percent
increase in the likelihood of attending a protest (p-value = 0.000).
In sum, claim-making is associated with other kinds of political activity that
extend beyond the local arena and beyond service delivery. To be clear, I do not suggest
that this is a unidirectional causal relationship, as these different kinds of political
participation may feed one another. It is nonetheless evident that claim-making is
reflective of participation in a broader sense, and of active and engaged citizenry.
4. Claim-making and democratic practice: theoretical implications
By asking who makes claims, I am able to examine why, under the same formal
democratic frameworks, some citizens appear more likely to engage the state than others.
Second, by asking how claims are made, my study documents diverse patterns of citizen-
state relations, highlighting issues of distance, accessibility, and the different lines of
accountability that are at play.
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Who makes claims? Socio-spatial exposure as a driver of participation
The data from rural Rajasthan reveal that people who are exposed to people and settings
beyond their own, immediate community and locality are - holding all else equal - more
active in making demands on public officials than those who move in more
circumscribed circles. In other words, people with greater socio-spatial exposure are
more likely to exercise political voice. This core finding carries with it important
implications for our understanding of local political participation, drawing our attention
beyond the electoral arena to one of the most common sites of citizen-state interaction:
local service delivery. In so doing, my study contributes to three bodies of literature
(introduced in greater depth in chapter 3).
First, the findings cast new light on resource-based theories of participation, and
challenge the conventional wisdom concerning the relationship between socioeconomic
status and participation. As we have seen, the linkages between socioeconomic status and
participation observed in studies of (primarily electoral) participation elsewhere
(primarily in the West) do not appear to hold among citizens claiming services from the
state in rural India. Broadly stated, claim-making is not correlated with economic
development in a locality or socioeconomic status among individuals. Nor is it
adequately explained by markers of social standing, such as caste. An examination of
socio-spatial exposure takes us a long way towards understanding such variation:
controlling for class, caste, gender, and a wide range of other individual features, people
who are exposed to different people and settings are more active in their engagement of
the state. These findings highlight a set of social, rather than material, resources that
shape whether and how a person engages the state. In particular, they highlight the
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critical role of weak and bridging ties through which individuals are exposed to
information, ideas, and contacts that make claim-making possible.
Second, however, the findings that emerge in the rural Indian context call into
question the mechanisms that underlie the relationship between social capital and
participation. Prevailing theories of social capital examine the collective action
capabilities of a given group, arguing that horizontal ties and shared norms of trust and
reciprocity foster the cooperation that makes civic and political engagement possible.
Socio-spatial exposure, however, does not necessarily lead to the development of
horizontal ties - features that are often absent in rural Indian villages marked by caste
hierarchies and inequality. Socio-spatial exposure fosters primarily weak rather than
strong ties that reach beyond insular groups of kinship or ethnicity and, as such, are
critical conduits for information.
Weak ties, however, play a role above and beyond exposure to information. In an
environment marked by weak rule of law and the discretionary allocation of public
resources, citizens require much more than information. First, they require exposure to
ideas and narratives that foster a sense of entitlement and political efficacy, thereby
motivating participation. Second, they require channels of access to the state through
which to act upon these ideas. While most work on social capital examines the internal
relationships within a group or community, the theory of socio-spatial exposure
emphasizes the bridges an individual is able to build beyond his or her locality and
community and, in particular, his or her outward-reaching linkages to the state. In these
ways, socio-spatial exposure facilitates claim-making not through the promotion of
internal stocks of social capital, but rather does so by externally expanding the pool of
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information, knowledge, and contacts that a person brings to bear in seeking resources
from the state. As such, the theory demonstrates how information and resources flow
within social networks even in the absence of horizontal ties and trust.
Third, my study contributes to work within the ethnic politics literature on social
cleavages and their political consequences. Much of this literature sees diversity as an
obstacle to collective action and, by extension, political participation. The experience in
Rajasthan, however, suggests that exposure to diversity can in fact promote certain kinds
of participation, such as claim-making. This echoes findings in the political psychology
literature that suggest that individuals increase their political knowledge, and as a result
their participation, through interaction with diverse groups. Importantly, it is not simply
diversity per se that drives these dynamics; people living in highly diverse or
homogenous villages are no more or less likely to make claims on the state. Rather, the
effects of diversity are contingent upon the nature of a person's social ties, where
bridging rather than bonding ties are required to allow for the exchange of information
and ideas across established cleavages and social boundaries.
In sum, my study of claim-making reveals an important set of dynamics that
underlie participation, emphasizing the role of social (as opposed to simply material)
resources and, in particular, the role of weak and bridging ties in generating exposure to
those resources. While a degree of caution is necessary to avoid extrapolating too far to
all forms of political participation, claim-making is correlated with a broader set of
participatory activities that extend beyond the village and beyond issues of public goods
delivery.
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How are claims made? A bottom-up view of citizen-state relations
How do citizens in rural India seek and encounter the state? How do experiences of the
state vary among differently placed (and differently exposed) individuals? We find a
diverse and uneven local environment in which citizens pursue myriad strategies in their
efforts to secure essential services. The patterns of citizen claim-making that emerge
highlight different channels and degrees of citizen access to the state and its resources.
This bottom-up view challenges a number of common conceptions of Indian citizen-state
relations.
First, the high rates of claim-making observed highlight the presence of an active
citizenry that seeks resources from the state in large numbers. This stands in stark
contrast to portrayals of a rural Indian citizenry that is passive and disconnected from the
state. There are still echoes of Barrington Moore's (1966) famous discussion of the
"docility" of Indian peasants to be found in popular and academic press today (cf.
Birtchnell, 2009). A sizeable literature also laments the distance, impenetrability, and
exclusionary practices of the Indian state. Yet, without denying the physical and psychic
distance from the state that many citizens experience, it is also clear that people in rural
India clearly can and do engage the state.
The strategies employed, however, are not necessarily those that the literatures on
representation and participation would predict. A large literature, developed primarily in
the West, examines a range of institutions - political parties, civil society organizations,
NGOs - that link citizens to the state and the channels through which citizens articulate
their interests. Parties, however, lack deep rural roots, and are pursued as a channel of
claim-making by less than a quarter of the sample. Civil society organizations and NGOs,
while growing in number, remain few and far between, present in just 16 percent of
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villages and pursued by just eleven percent of the sample. In sum, some of the major
institutions that are commonly cited as providing citizen-state linkages are remarkably
absent from the village environment.
Instead, the experiences of rural Rajasthanis reveal that the Gram Panchayat is the
most common site of citizen-state engagement, utilized by almost two-thirds of the
sample. However, as discussed in chapter 2, the panchayat is an often maligned
institution, referred to by scholars of Indian politics as little more than a "paper tiger"
captured by elite interests, under the thumb of bureaucrats and politicians, and removed
from the fabric of village life. There is certainly a good deal of truth to these critiques.
And yet the data from rural Rajasthan reveal that citizens actively seek assistance from
the panchayat at high rates. Moreover, among those citizens who are the most often
marginalized in politics (members of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and women), the
Gram Panchayat emerges as the single most important point of contact with the state. The
importance of the panchayat in the lives and livelihoods of India's rural citizens cannot
be overlooked.
At the same time, we observe that direct contact with the GP is accompanied by a
wide range of mediated practices. There is, in particular, a role for brokers - individuals
who act as gatekeepers and go-betweens, facilitating linkages between ordinary citizens
and officials. This is consistent with the findings of other studies in rural India. Anirudh
Krishna (2002, 2011), for example, has documented the role of a new class of social and
political entrepreneurs who work across caste lines at the village level, linking citizens to
bureaucrats and politicians. My study of citizen claim-making in rural Rajasthan confirms
the presence of such cross-caste brokers, but finds that they come in different shapes and
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sizes, including both the "new" leaders (young, educated, lower-caste) encountered in
Krishna's study, as well as more traditional leaders (elders and the leader of traditional
village institutions).
Different people possess claim-making repertoires of different breadth, ranging
from those who do not make claims on the state through any channel (roughly one
quarter), to those who are dependent on a single point of contact (roughly one-fifth), to
those (over one-half) who combine practices to pursue an array of channels of access.
Rather than being confined to singular caste or party-based patronage networks, I found
that most people making claims on the state engage with a multiplicity of local
institutions, brokers, and officials. A majority pursues more than one kind of claim-
making strategy, and direct practices are most often combined with some kind of
mediation. There is (constrained) room to maneuver at the local level, but the range of
options looks different to different people, who navigate the same environments to
different claim-making ends.
5. Potential applications
From an applied perspective, my study of claim-making carries important implications
for local administrators and development practitioners concerned with increasing
citizens' access to and engagement of the state. There are two broad areas in which the
findings of the study might inform practice. First, the bottom-up view of citizen claim-
making practice suggests the need for an approach to service delivery that takes into
account the diversity of citizen experiences of the state. Second, the empirical
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relationship between socio-spatial exposure and claim-making suggests avenues through
which to promote inclusive patterns of participation.
A bottom up view of service delivery
The study of claim-making focuses attention on the need for a deeper understanding of
how ordinary citizens navigate the state. The diversity of claim-making practice should
give those charged with service delivery pause to ask: who makes demands and how?
These questions are all the more important under decentralized and "demand-driven"
policy environments designed to devolve responsibility for service delivery to the local
levels and, ostensibly, to increase both the accountability of service providers and the
participation of consumers. Demand-driven models of service delivery are increasingly
popular in policy circles. The World Bank's (2004) Making Services Workfor the Poor,
for example, places citizen "voice" and participation at the center of its analysis, arguing
that service delivery can be improved by "putting poor people at the center of service
provision: by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers, by amplifying
their voice in policymaking, and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the
poor" (p. 1). Expressions of citizen voice, in this view, are largely conflated with voting,
where: "raising poor citizens' voice, through the ballot box and widely available
information, can increase their influence with policymakers" (p. 2).
Yet voting in local elections, in and of itself, appears to have little effect on
household level access to public goods and services, and there is little indication that
people vote on public goods as opposed to other issues. Rather, citizens make demands in
myriad other ways, both formal and informal, direct and indirect. Moreover, some
citizens (a full one-quarter of the sample) do not make demands or claims on the state.
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Officials and administrators must therefore ask: who is making demands, and through
what channels? An exclusive focus on formal institutions misses the many informal and
mediated approaches to the state that citizens may pursue.
Demand-driven initiatives range from the implementation of user fees (where
citizens are expected to "vote with their wallets"), to the co-production of services by
both public and private sector actors (Joshi & Moore, 2004; Ostrom, 1996), to efforts to
promote participatory budgeting and planning (cf. Fung, 2011; Fung & Wright, 2003), to
a wide array of "community-based" initiatives to promote citizen involvement in the
implementation and monitoring of service delivery (Bjorkman & Svensson, 2009;
Narayan, 1999). In India, the trend towards demand-driven service delivery is
encapsulated in the constitutionally mandated, bi-annual Gram Sabha meetings, intended
to serve as a sphere for participatory budgeting, and in a proliferation of state-sponsored
village level "committees" for education, water management, health, sanitation, forest
management, and so on. And yet a majority of village residents report that they do not
attend the Gram Sabha, and only a small fraction report participating in any of this range
of committees. Such "community-based" initiatives must be carefully examined and the
notion of community unpacked; without careful attention to the question of who
participates, such interventions risk simply reinforcing patterns of elite capture and the
exclusion of traditionally marginalized groups.
Promoting participation
The study of claim-making also suggests avenues through which to foster citizen-state
engagement. If we believe that the state has a duty to provide and citizens have a right to
access public services, then claim-making emerges as an essential element of citizenship
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practice. And if it is a normatively good thing to have an active and engaged citizenry, we
must then ask: what can be done to increase participation in this sense, to encourage
citizens' demands for responsive service delivery?
More than access to information
Information about government programs and services, as we have seen, is a necessary but
insufficient condition for claim-making. An extensive literature examines the role of
information in promoting citizens demands for services (cf. Bjorkman & Svensson, 2009;
Krishna, 2007b; Stromberg, 2004) as well as in creating the incentives for responsive
government (cf. Besley & Burgess, 2002; Ferraz & Finan, 2008). Efforts to increase
access to information run the gamut from initiatives to increase the reach of different
sources of media; to attempts to increase rural consumption of information through
access to technology (for example, through the distribution of cell phones, as
implemented by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh); to government-sponsored public
education campaigns; to transparency initiatives that publicize governmental
performance. India's Right to Information Act (RTI) provides the legal framework in
which citizens have the ability to request information on government programs and
performance. In some places in rural India, civil society organizations have effectively
used this legislation to increase transparency in local government, requiring panchayats to
post their budgets and spending accounts in publicly accessible places.
Access to information in and of itself, however, does little to ensure demand for
services or citizen participation. As I have shown in chapter 3, procedural information
about public services is of little use in service delivery environments where there is no
guarantee that contacting the "correct" channels will produce results. This gap between
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information and citizen action is also found in other studies of service delivery. Banerjee,
Deaton, & Duflo (2004), for example, find that providing information about nurse
absenteeism did not generate increased demands by citizens for healthcare services in
Rajasthan, since this information was not tied to wider efforts to channel that information
towards citizen action. Moreover, under certain conditions, information may have a
demobilizing effect. A recent study in Mexico, for example, demonstrates that exposure
to information on corruption and poor government performance can, in fact, prompt
citizens to withdraw from, rather than engage in, the political process (Chong, De La 0,
& Karlan, 2012).
More than information is therefore required to spur citizen action. First,
information about public services and government performance will not be put to use in
the absence of people's belief that they are entitled to services and the expectation that
officials will respond. Networks are particularly important in this regard since, as we
have seen, social and occupational ties are conduits for narratives and ideas that shape
expectations of the state. The narratives that circulate are not, of course, uniformly
positive; but the more extensive a person's network, the more likely he or she is to
encounter examples of successful claim-making. These "social" sources of information
and ideas may also be more trusted than impersonal sources such as sources of media or
public service announcements. In sum, socio-spatial exposure is critical to the production
and consumption of information and ideas, as well as to creating the channels through
which this knowledge may be put to use in state-targeted claim-making. What conditions
and institutional interventions might promote exposure of this kind, particularly among
marginalized groups whose access to the state and its resources is otherwise restricted?
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Sites for interaction
Extrapolating from the rural Rajasthani experience, my study calls our attention to the
need for investments in spaces and institutions that promote contact and exposure across
established social cleavages and spatial boundaries. This might occur through the
development and maintenance ofpublic spaces (meeting halls, community centers, or
chabutras (public platforms in the center of the village)). These kinds of spaces, in and of
themselves, do nothing to ensure exposure across caste, class, or gender lines, but they do
provide opportunities for increased contact. Similarly, investments in rural
transportation (roads, buses) create the means for people to move around, creating more
porous village boundaries and increased opportunities for exposure beyond the village.
In Udaipur and Kota, for example, it was very common to encounter villagers who
commuted on a daily basis to work as laborers in nearby towns and cities. This movement
is made possible through recent investments in Rajasthan's roads and highways and by an
expansion of rural bus service. Buses, as well as bus stops (and the ubiquitous tea stalls
attached to them), emerge as focal points where people from different neighborhoods and
villages meet and exchange news.
Political institutions and exposure by design
The creation of legally mandated spaces for marginalized groups to participate in local
governance also creates opportunities for socio-spatial exposure. India's Panchayati Raj
institutions offer a powerful example. Since their constitutional guarantee in 1993,
millions of women, SC, and ST across India have served in reserved panchayat seats.
Political reservations of this kind, as we have seen, play a dual role. First, they create
formal spaces in which traditionally excluded groups participate in politics and, in so
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doing, engage with men from the upper castes and classes. This engagement ranges from
symbolic acts of drinking tea alongside the local elite, to traveling to government offices
and meetings beyond the village. Second, they create potential linkages to the state for
women and lower caste and tribe members who are "represented" by other women or by
their co-ethnics. Political reservations certainly are not perfect institutions; women are
often informally represented by their husbands (the sarpanchpati), and SC and ST
members are frequently manipulated by members of the upper castes. Nonetheless,
political reservations represent an important potential space for exposure across caste,
class, and gender, as well as village, lines.
Non-governmental efforts to promote empowered citizens
NGOs can also play a critical role in creating spaces for interaction among otherwise
disparate groups. In Rajasthan, as noted, a number of NGOs have begun to promote
"citizens' institutions" that, by design, bring together diverse constituents including
women and men from across a village. By organizing training events, or by establishing
organizations that span multiple communities, NGO interventions may foster both social
and spatial exposure. Finally, NGOs may also play a role in establishing linkages to the
state and platforms for citizen participation. In Rajasthan, for example, civil society
groups offer training to elected panchayat members, or help train and organize groups of
citizens who go on to advocate for services from local government. In this sense, NGO
advocacy may serve to complement and foster citizen engagement of the state.
However, NGOs may just as easily reinforce local cleavages by targeting specific
groups on the basis of their caste or class. This kind of targeting may be necessary in
order to reach groups with the greatest need, but it runs the risk of further dividing and
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creating resentment among village populations. Moreover, NGOs may also provide
alternatives to the state by acting as private service providers or by establishing informal
governance bodies that operate in parallel to the panchayat. In these instances, NGOs
actually may have a substitutive effect that causes citizen to withdraw from, rather than
engage, the state.
6. Beyond Rajasthan
How far might the lessons from this study extend beyond the rural Indian context?
Further empirical work is necessary to assess the generalizability of the theory of socio-
spatial exposure to different settings. I suggest, however, that the theory may be broadly
applicable to other contexts in India and beyond. In particular, I expect that two sets of
conditions will hold across a variety of contexts. First, that claim-making occurs through
diverse practices that are both formal and informal, direct and mediated. Second, that
people who are exposed to sources of difference - to people and settings unlike their own
- will engage in more as well as more diverse claim-making practice. The precise
strategies and channels through which claim-making occurs, however, will vary from
context to context, as will the salience of different social and spatial cleavages.
A small number of other studies have investigated patterns of citizen-state
relations and access to services in India. These studies, drawn from both rural and urban
India, broadly confirm the diversity of claim-making strategies highlighted in the
Rajasthani case. Applying a sub-national comparative framework, Bussell (2011)
documents the range of strategies for accessing state resources across India's regions and
states. Citizens, she finds, seek services through both "normal" (institutionalized) and
"alternative" channels. She notes variation in patterns across states, but also finds that
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this variation cannot be explained by regional differences between north and south India,
by levels of economic or social development in the state, by demographic factors such as
population density, or by electoral competition in a state. As such, Bussell sets that stage
for more micro analysis of dynamics within states - such as that carried out in this
dissertation.
Anirudh Krishna (2002; 2011) pursues both an intra- and inter-state analysis,
examining the strategies that citizens pursue to gain access to public services both in
Rajasthan and neighboring Madhya Pradesh and, for comparison, in the more affluent,
southern state of Andhra Pradesh. In all three states, he finds that different people seek
assistance through different kinds of mediating actors and institutions. Krishna
emphasizes the role of the naya neta (new leader), who is younger and more educated
than traditional leaders and who typically hails from the lower castes. These actors are
certainly present in my data from Rajasthan, but appear to play a smaller role than in
Krishna's study. 160 Despite these differences, the patterns that emerge from my study of
Rajasthan are broadly consistent with Krishna's in that mediated channels are critical for
access to the state, as are actors (whether they are "new" or "traditional") who work
across caste lines.
Shifting to an urban environment, two studies carried out in Delhi also document
citizens' service-seeking strategies. Harriss (2005; 2009) finds that Delhi's poor are
active in state-targeted "problem solving," and that levels of citizen activity cannot be
reduced simply to wealth or socioeconomic status. Harriss also documents a much larger
role for political parties as a vehicle for citizen interest articulation in Delhi compared to
160 Some of these differences might be attributed to the structure of the survey questions (as discussed in
chapter 2).
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my study of Rajasthan - a finding that is echoed in Jha, Woolcok, & Rao's (2007) study
of Delhi's slums. The role of parties in an urban setting (and, in particular, in the capital
city Delhi), however, is to be expected where, unlike in rural areas, party offices and
headquarters are located in close proximity to their constituents. Jha et al. also document
an important difference between Delhi's older, ethnically homogenous slums and newer,
ethnically diverse slums. Consistent with the theory of socio-spatial exposure, residents
of these newer slums - who are less caste bound and come into contact with a greater
diversity of people and institutions - pursue a wider range of practices than those who
reside in ethnically homogenous slums where a narrower range of caste-based, rural
institutions are recreated.
Moving beyond India, I expect the theory of socio-spatial exposure to be broadly
applicable in other settings best described - employing Chandra's (2004) term - as
patronage-democracies. Institutionally, these are procedural democracies marked by
relatively weak rule of law, manifest in high levels of discretionary (as opposed to rule-
bound) allocation of goods and services. Chandra, while describing India as a classic
patronage-democracy, is quick to point out that similar conditions are found elsewhere in
Asia and Africa "where colonial rule left behind a legacy of state-dominated economies"
and in the "postcommunist world" where "sprawling state apparatuses [are] inherited
from communist rule (p. 7). Other scholars have documented a similar set of dynamics
across a range of "Third Wave" democracies, where:
... electoral democracy is robust but longstanding political exclusion,
authoritarian political and social institutions, and clientelist networks
result in particularistic and differentiated treatment by state agents. As a
result large social groups have unequal access to legally mandated goods
such as healthcare, sanitation, and security (public goods, in short),
injuring their citizenship and life chances (Houtzager & Acharya, 2010, p.
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2).
This is an apt description of numerous developing democracies ranging from India to
South Africa and to much of Latin America (Collier & Handlin, 2009; Heller, 2001;
Houtzager et al., 2002).
Recent studies in Latin America have also documented the diversity of strategies
through which citizens articulate their interests vis a vis the state. Dunning (2009)
documents the "problem-solving repertoires" of individuals living in Latin American
cities, distinguishing between direct and mediated strategies. Houtzager et al. (2010;
2002) similarly demarcate "institutionalized" approaches to the state from "informal
brokerage." Both studies reveal a large role for civic organizations and for
"associational" modes of organizing in Latin America that far exceed those in the Indian
context - a fact that highlights the difference in civil society environments across these
regions. Yet, despite these differences, it is clear that across these diverse contexts people
pursue different pathways to government and services. The precise nature of those
pathways vary; there is a greater role for parties in an urban environment compared to
rural India, a greater role for civil society organizations in a Latin American context, or a
larger role for ethnic structures such as caste in India. In all cases, however, the extent
and nature of citizen-state engagement can be understood as a product of social networks
and, in particular, social and occupational ties that create resources and opportunities for
citizen action and interest articulation.
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7. Conclusion
I conclude by setting forth a number of open-ended questions that might orient future
scholarship. One set of questions concentrates on the "supply side" of service delivery.
This dissertation has examined the claim-making process from the perspective of the
citizens engaged in it, asking whether and how different people make claims. A clear
corollary is to ask whether, how, and when officials respond to claim-making. There is an
implicit assumption in much of the political science literature (including in this study)
that officials care about citizen demands and, while not equally sensitive to all
constituents, are attentive to citizens' interests and demands. This assumption is reflected
in policy frameworks that emphasize the importance of citizen voice and "demand-
driven" service delivery. But, given the high levels of demand and diversity of practices,
how do officials react to claim-making?
More research is required to investigate this "supply side" set of dynamics: to
focus on public officials' perceptions of and responses to claim-making. A series of
questions emerge. Do officials react differently to different kinds of claims (direct or
mediated) through different channels? To what degree are officials in fact driven by vote-
maximizing strategies or by ties to their co-ethnics (as the patronage literature suggests)?
To what degree do they respond to incentives and constraints in the structure of the local
bureaucracy (e.g. how much or how little discretion is available)? Are some kinds of
officials (at particular levels of government, or in certain sectors) more likely to respond
in a partisan fashion, while others are more likely to work in programmatic (rather than
particularistic) terms?
Another set of issues concerns local state capacity to absorb and respond to high
levels of citizen demands. Throughout this project I have portrayed claim-making as
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normatively desirable: a manifestation of local participation as citizens claim entitlements
from the state. But can there be "too much of a good thing"? Could claims by citizens on
local governments overwhelm local administrative capacity and resources, leading to
deterioration, rather than improvement, in services? And if, over time, citizens' demands
are unmet, what impact will this have on citizens' sense of entitlement, expectations of
the state, and sense of political efficacy? Might unmet demands lead to increased claim-
making, perhaps through greater mobilization of protest or other contentious acts? Or, to
the contrary, could unmet demands contribute to a withdrawal from politics, as people
turn inward to their support networks to devise coping strategies or turn to the private
sector for alternatives to public services?
There are also questions concerning equity and the material distribution of public
goods and services. Again, high levels of citizen demand might be held up as evidence of
an engaged citizenry seeking to secure entitlements from the state. But, as we have seen,
claim-making is uneven; some citizens make more demands on the state than others.
Under these conditions, might high levels of citizens' demands lead to increased
particularlism and to growing levels of inequity in access to public resources? If so,
might citizen claim-making (particularly under the conditions of patronage-democracy)
have a pernicious effect on issues of equity in the distribution of goods and services?
Finally, there are questions about what actually constitutes "democratic practice."
High levels of claim-making and a multiplicity of claim-making practices might, on the
one hand, suggest a dynamic local democratic environment where - in a pluralist view of
democracy - individuals, by virtue of their cross-cutting ties, carve out a wide array of
strategies of action. The diversity of claim-making, from this perspective, might be
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viewed as proof of a citizenry which, far from being dependent on singular patron-client
relationships, navigate their local environment in a diversity of ways. High rates of claim-
making might be taken as evidence of "remarkable access" to public officials and
representatives by some of India's poorest (Jha et al., 2007) and, as such, as a democratic
success.
On the other hand, a darker interpretation might reveal a democratic deficit, where
citizens are forced to pursue a wide array of channels because of the impenetrability of
the state and the lack of clear lines of access and accountability. In this view, the
multiplicity of actors and prevalence of mediators necessary for claim-making are seen as
evidence of the inaccessibility of the state. High rates of claim-making through a
diversity of brokers and intermediaries, from this perspective, could indicate "dependence
and precisely the lack of that political equality that is quite fundamental to the democratic
ideal" (Harriss, 2009). Perhaps, then, it is political exclusion and inequality, rather than a
vibrant local democratic environment, that drives people to seek out diverse strategies of
claim-making?
The experiences of rural Rajasthanis suggest that both of these views may
simultaneously contain some truth. People do engage the state in large numbers, but do
not always do so in ways that conform to egalitarian ideals of democratic practice. At a
most basic level, we are presented with the fact that rural residents - including many of
the poor and lower castes - actively demand public services in one of India's poorest
states. Moreover, much of the claim-making activity that we observe involves direct,
face-to-face contact between citizens and their elected representatives (most notably at
the level of the panchayat). This, in and of itself, is remarkable given many scholarly
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portrayals of both a distant, exclusionary state and a passive, disengaged rural citizenry.
That said, claim-making does not always take place through regular and institutionalized
channels, and a great deal of citizen access to officials is mediated by a wide range of
local power-brokers. Under these conditions the lines between democratic practice and
patronage politics become blurry.
I conclude, however, on a more hopeful note. Across India, there are growing
demands for economic and political reform, manifest in a groundswell of popular and
media attention to issues of public sector accountability and corruption. At the national
level, major scandals and exposes (for example, surrounding the allocation of wireless
telecom licenses, or budgetary malfeasance in the organization of the Commonwealth
Games) have fueled mass protests over corruption. Most of these manifestations have
occurred in urban India, and have been carried forward by middleclass Indians. 161 Rural
India, however, has also witnessed a new surge in civil society action against corruption,
much of it led by NGOs. In Rajasthan, for example, the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan
(MKSS) has organized protests (marches, strikes, sit-ins; one of which notably lasted for
over a month at the state capital) to call for increased transparency in public spending.
While much of this activity is organized in a top-down fashion by civil society
leaders, there has been some spillover to the village level. In certain areas (notably those
supported by NGOs), residents have demanded that panchayats publicly post detailed
information on budgets and expenditure, and have used "social audits" to uncover (and in
some instances address) cases of local corruption. Where these activities take place, there
may be a newfound sense of political efficacy and a new set of expectations concerning




government accountability and responsiveness. These examples are not yet widespread.
And yet, as rural citizens continue to move around, crossing social and spatial boundaries
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A.2. Supplementary material for chapter 2
Table A2.1: Village and panchayat descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Population 1664 1263 212 6265
Dispersion 1.87 1.43 0.41 9.38
Distance to town (km) 32.71 20.63 6 101
% Literate 0.44 0.12 0.18 0.73
Mean land ownership 13.14 11.21 1.17 70.92
Mean assets ownership 3.82 1.16 1.40 6.25
% Scheduled Tribe 0.19 0.28 0.00 0.99
% Scheduled Cribe 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.67
Caste fractionalization 0.59 0.24 0.01 0.90
Vill. pop./ GP pop. 0.35 0.24 0.05 1.00
GP headquarter village 0.42 0.49 0 1
Sarpanch village 0.35 0.48 0 1
No. villages in GP 4.22 1.73 1 8
GP population 4749 1442 2782 8945
Woman Sarpanch 0.23 0.42 0 1
ST Sarpanch 0.09 0.28 0 1
SC Sarpanch 0.09 0.29 0 1
OBC Sarpanch 0.34 0.47 0 1
Notes: Presents summary statistics of the main control variables at the village and panchayat (GP) level.
"ST", "SC", and "OBC" refer to members of Scheduled Tribe, Scheduled Caste, and Other Backward Class
respectively.
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Table A2.2: Direct practices combined with other practice
Of those who contact the GP Obs Mean Std. Dev.
GP only (single channel) 1375 0.20 0.40
plus mediated channels 1375 0.67 0.47
plus brokered channels 1375 0.53 0.50
plus contact bureaucrat 1375 0.31 0.46
plus contact politician 1375 0.32 0.47
plus contact NH assoc 1375 0.29 0.45
plus contact village assoc 1375 0.21 0.41
plus contact civ. soc. org 1375 0.13 0.34
plus contact caste leader 1375 0.30 0.46
plus contact inter-caste leader 1375 0.19 0.39
plus contact fixer 1375 0.22 0.41
Of those who contact politicians
Politician only (single channel) 480 0.04 0.20
plus mediated channels 480 0.74 0.44
plus brokered channels 480 0.60 0.49
plus contact GP 480 0.91 0.29
plus contact bureaucrat 480 0.47 0.50
plus contact NH assoc 480 0.29 0.45
plus contact village assoc 480 0.24 0.43
plus contact civ. soc. org 480 0.17 0.38
plus contact caste leader 480 0.35 0.48
plus contact inter-caste leader 480 0.25 0.44
plus contact fixer 480 0.28 0.45
Notes: Presents the combination of claim-making strategies pursued by households in the sample. "NH
assoc" refers to neighborhood association, while "civ. soc. org" refers to a civil society organization. "ST",
"SC", and "OBC" refer to members of Scheduled Tribe, Scheduled Caste, and Other Backward Class
respectively.
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EMPIRICAL MODEL: CORRELATES OF CLAIM-MAKING
The following tables present the data and multivariate analysis referred to in Chapter 2.
Unless otherwise noted, the model employed is:
Y = a + y(individual) + X(household) + (village) + 8(GP) + Q(district fixed effects) + F
Y is the claim-making outcome of interest. The unit of observation is the individual, with
one observation per household. For dichotomous outcomes, such as the incidence of
claim-making overall or of a given practice, I employ maximum likelihood estimation
using probit models (reporting marginal effects, dF/dx). For non-dichotomous outcomes,
such as the index of practices representing the claim-making repertoire, I use OLS
(reporting the coefficients).
y represents a vector of individual-level controls, including: socioeconomic status
(quintile of landownership, asset-ownership (as an index), assets-squared); occupation
(whether a person farms his/her own land, agricultural laborer on other's land, non-farm
laborer, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme laborer, small-enterprise,
salaried employee, or student); level of education (primary, secondary, or higher -
compared to those with none); identity (gender, age, age-squared, and caste-category (ST,
SC, and OBC - compared to GC)); caste-gender interaction effects (ST, SC, and OBC
women compared to GC women); whether the respondent shares caste or gender with the
GP president ("identity match"); patronage ties (party membership and personal ties to
GP officials; ties to specific parties (Congress or BJP) are assessed separately); and social
capital, including measures of trust and reciprocity (willingness to lend to others in need,
contributions to communal projects).
X represents controls for household size, and the number of children & elderly.
o represents village controls, including population size, population dispersion (pop/area),
distance to an urban center, literacy rate, average landownership, average asset-
ownership; caste fractionalization (1- Z (caste) 2, where i is the number of each caste in
the village); whether or not the village is partisan (a majority of residents identify
with/are members of one party over another); and the number of informal governance
institutions (neighborhood or village associations, caste or inter-caste associations, or
NGOs) in a village.
8 represents controls for features of the Gram Panchayat and the village in relation to the
GP, including GP population, whether the village is the GP administrative headquarter,
whether the village is home to the GP president, whether the village caste composition
matches the GP caste composition, and whether the seat of president is reserved for
members of the SC, ST, or OBC caste community or women.
All models include district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table A2.3: Effects of Village and GP Characteristics on Claim-making
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incidence Direct Mediated Repertoire
Village population 1.48e-05 3.08e-05 7.47e-06 9.38e-05
(2.35e-05) (2.97e-05) (2.58e-05) (9.57e-05)
Population density -0.00418 -0.0177 -0.00961 -0.0144
(0.0119) (0.0150) (0.0123) (0.0437)
Distance to urban center -0.000592 -0.000414 0.000707 -0.000428
(0.000752) (0.00102) (0.000868) (0.00324)
Village literacy 0.139 0.235 -0.105 0.332
(0.175) (0.222) (0.229) (0.822)
Village land -0.00255 -0.00207 -0.00393** -0.00254
(0.00180) (0.00261) (0.00191) (0.00758)
Village assets -0.0397** -0.0643*** 0.0445* -0.0530
(0.0188) (0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0785)
Caste fractionalization -0.0739 -0.101 -0.0302 -0.243
(0.0762) (0.0994) (0.0950) (0.349)
President's village -0.0380 -0.0631 -0.0136 -0.215
(0.0494) (0.0567) (0.0518) (0.172)
GP headquarter 0.0758* 0.109* 0.0374 0.226
(0.0449) (0.0578) (0.0479) (0.192)
GP population -2.30e-06 -1.34e-05 1. 15e-06 -8.28e-05
(1.46e-05) (1.89e-05) (1.82e-05) (6.74e-05)
ST match -0.0425 -0.127* -0.0114 -0.279
(0.0573) (0.0652) (0.0757) (0.220)
SC match -0.109 -0.0782 -0.0438 -0.104
(0.0713) (0.0845) (0.0853) (0.284)
OBC match 0.0340 -0.00736 0.00403 -0.249
(0.0494) (0.0694) (0.0761) (0.246)
Female match -0.0196 -0.0253 0.0834** 0.235
(0.0323) (0.0401) (0.0414) (0.152)
Observations 1,914 1,914 1,914 1,914
R-squared 0.201 0.174 0.136 0.273
Additional characteristics (run in separate regressions due to high collinearity)
Percent ST -0.170** -0.135 -0.0260 -0.00194
(0.0790) (0.101) (0.111) (0.390)
Percent SC -0.191 -0.265 0.0612 -0.0826
(0.198) (0.238) (0.198) (0.750)
Village pop./GP pop. 0.450* 0.0184 0.674** 0.451
(0.251) (0.306) (0.301) (1.040)
Notes: "Incidence" is a binary variable equal to 1 if the household engaged in any manner of claim-making.
"Direct" is a binary variable equal to 1 if the household directly approached the government. "Mediated" is
a binary variable equal to 1 if the household approached the government using an intermediary.
"Repertoire" is an index (0-9) comprising all claim-making strategies. "ST match", "SC match", "OBC
match", and "Female match" are equal to 1 if the respondent's identity matches that of the Sarpanch.
"Percent ST" and "Percent SC" are estimated separately since they are used to create "Caste
Fractionalization" variable. "Village pop./GP pop." is run separately since population is already included.
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Table A2.4: Effects of Institutional Environment on Claim-making
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incidence Direct Mediated Repertoire
Civil society association 0.0559 -0.0203 0.170** 0.428
(0.0474) (0.0793) (0.0708) (0.277)
Village association -0.0643 -0.0992 -0.0657 -0.0289
(0.0678) (0.0733) (0.0816) (0.265)
Neighborhood association 0.0924*** 0. 118** 0.167*** 0.641***
(0.0348) (0.0482) (0.0548) (0.212)
Caste association -0.136*** -0.218*** 0.100* -0.190
(0.0311) (0.0428) (0.0537) (0.198)
Inter-caste association -0.0393 -0.0720 0.0422 -0.0116
(0.0442) (0.0584) (0.0544) (0.211)
Observations 1,914 1,914 1,914 1,914
R-squared 0.219 0.193 0.143 0.284
Notes: Reports estimations with claim-making as the outcome variable, as described in Table A2.3 above.
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Table A2.5: Effects of Individual and Household Characteristics on Claim-making
(1) (2) (3) (4)



























































































































































Notes: Reports estimations with claim-making as the outcome variable, as described in Table A2.3 above.
Left out categories are "Land Quintile 5", "No education", and "General Class" respectively. "ST", "SC",
and "OBC" refer to members of Scheduled Tribe, Scheduled Caste, and Other Backward Class
respectively.
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A.4. Supplementary material for chapter 4
EMPIRICAL MODEL: SOCIO-SPATIAL EXPOSURE AND CLAIM-MAKING
The following tables present the data and multivariate analysis referred to in Chapter 4.
Unless otherwise noted, the model employed is:
Y = a + P(exposure) + y(individual) + X(household) + (village) + Q(GP fixed effects)+ 6
Y is the claim-making outcome of interest. The unit of observation is the individual, with
one observation per household, unless otherwise noted. For dichotomous outcomes, such
as the incidence of claim-making overall or of a given practice, I employ maximum
likelihood estimation using probit models (reporting marginal effects, dF/dx). For non-
dichotomous outcomes, such as the index of practices representing the claim-making
repertoire, I use OLS (reporting the coefficients).
P estimates the effects on claim-making associated with different measures of socio-
spatial exposure: cross-neighborhood, cross-caste workplace, land-to-labor ratio, and
migration.
y represents a vector of individual-level controls, including: socioeconomic status
(quintile of landownership, asset-ownership (as an index), assets-squared); occupation
(whether a person farms his/her own land, agricultural laborer on other's land, non-farm
laborer, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme laborer, small-enterprise,
salaried employee, or student); level of education (primary, secondary, or higher -
compared to those with none); identity (gender, age, age-squared, and caste-category (ST,
SC, and OBC - compared to GC); caste-gender interaction effects (ST, SC, and OBC
women compared to GC women); whether the respondent shares caste or gender with the
GP president ("identity match"); patronage ties (party membership, and personal ties to
GP officials; ties to specific parties (Congress or BJP) are assessed separately); and social
capital, including measures of trust and reciprocity (willingness to lend to others in need,
contributions to communal projects).
X represents controls for household size, and the number of children & elderly.
o represents village controls, including population size, population dispersion (pop/area),
distance to an urban center, literacy rate, average landownership, average asset-
ownership; caste fractionalization (1- Z (caste,)2, where i is the number of each caste in
the village); whether or not the village is partisan (a majority of residents identify
with/are members of one party over another); and the number of informal governance
institutions (neighborhood or village associations, caste or inter-caste associations, or
NGOs) in a village.
All models include GP fixed effects (Q), unless otherwise noted. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level.
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Table A4.1: Effects of Exposure on Claim-making, Holding Panchayat Constant
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incidence Direct Mediated Repertoire Admin GP Bureaucrat Party
InterNH 0.113*** 0.167*** 0.0965*** 0.551*** 0.170*** 0.166*** 0.0662*** 0.0507***
(0.0194) (0.0221) (0.0274) (0.0794) (0.0245) (0.0235) (0.0187) (0.0177)
Intercaste 0.127*** 0.146*** 0.112*** 0.326*** 0.150*** 0.145*** 0.0368 0.0609**
(0.0317) (0.0350) (0.0338) (0.100) (0.0354) (0.0368) (0.0236) (0.0257)
Migration 0.00640 0.00622 0.00575 0.0557 -0.00389 0.00630 -0.0304 0.0373
(0.0236) (0.0282) (0.0342) (0.107) (0.0295) (0.0291) (0.0220) (0.0260)
Land/labor -0.0605*** -0.0478* -0.0751*** -0.158*** -0.0539** -0.0637** -0.00301 0.00538
(0.0222) (0.0264) (0.0188) (0.0515) (0.0265) (0.0253) (0.0112) (0.0154)
Obs 2,038 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080
PANEL B
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Assoc. NH Village CSO Broker Caste InterCaste Fixer
InterNH 0.171*** 0.0794*** 0.0911*** 0.00727 0.0541* 0.0562*** 0.0635*** 0.00447
(0.0259) (0.0195) (0.0148) (0.0109) (0.0290) (0.0199) (0.0123) (0.0194)
Intercaste 0.0217 0.0271 0.00608 -0.0151 0.0897*** 0.0119 0.0476*** 0.0747***
(0.0359) (0.0297) (0.0221) (0.0175) (0.0339) (0.0311) (0.0161) (0.0179)
igration 0.0372 0.0663** 0.00588 0.00947 0.00724 -0.0492** 0.00240 0.0408**
(0.0318) (0.0300) (0.0182) (0.0133) (0.0342) (0.0250) (0.0172) (0.0207)
Land/labor -0.0296** -0.0449*** -0.00904 0.0112 -0.0744*** -0.121*** 0.0109 -0.0250**
(0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0147) (0.00829) (0.0198) (0.0358) (0.00901) (0.0121)
Obs 2,080 2,026 2,033 1,977 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080
Notes: Reports estimations with claim-making as the outcome variable. "Incidence" is a binary variable
equal to 1 if the household engaged in any manner of claim-making. "Direct" is a binary variable equal to 1
if the household directly approached the government. "Mediated" is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
household approached the government using an intermediary. "Repertoire" is an index (0-9) comprising of
all claim-making strategies. "Admin" refers to contacting either the Gram Panchayat ("GP") or a higher
level bureaucrat. "Assoc" refers to contacting either a neighborhood ("NH"), village, or civil society
("CSO") association. "Broker" refers to contacting either a caste or intercaste intermediary, or a "fixer" (an
individual broker). Each of the following explanatory variables is included in a separate regression (along
with all the controls described above): "InterNH", the frequency of cross-neighborhood exposure, assessed
as an index from 0-3; "Intercaste", or cross-caste workplace exposure, a binary variable equal to 1 if the
respondent works in a mixed caste environment; "Migration", a binary variable equal to 1 if a member of
the household lives outside the village for more than one month in the year; and "Land/labor", the ratio of
cultivable land (in hectares) to the agricultural workforce.
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Table A4.2: Effects of Exposure on Claim-making, Holding Block Constant
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incidence Direct Mediated Repertoire Admin GP Bureaucrat Party
InterNH 0.117*** 0.165*** 0.0963*** 0.566*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 0.0631*** 0.0540***
(0.0208) (0.0236) (0.0283) (0.0841) (0.0256) (0.0246) (0.0203) (0.0194)
Intercaste 0.129*** 0.140*** 0.107*** 0.308*** 0.144*** 0.141*** 0.0298 0.0563**
(0.0329) (0.0357) (0.0350) (0.105) (0.0357) (0.0376) (0.0245) (0.0279)
igration 0.00925 0.00568 0.0139 0.0742 -0.00422 0.00268 -0.0263 0.0392
(0.0251) (0.0288) (0.0331) (0.107) (0.0299) (0.0295) (0.0234) (0.0260)
Land/labor -0.0485*** -0.0560** -0.0285 -0.154*** -0.0565** -0.0628*** -0.00938 -0.0156
(0.0179) (0.0222) (0.0182) (0.0510) (0.0227) (0.0224) (0.0110) (0.0167)
Obs 1,991 2,033 2,033 2,033 2,033 2,033 2,033 2,033
PANELB
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Assoc. NH Village CSO Broker Caste InterCaste Fixer
InterNH 0.171*** 0.0820*** 0.0855*** 0.0176 ' 0.0571* 0.0555*** 0.0613*** 0.00992
(0.0269) (0.0202) (0.0156) (0.0115) (0.0302) (0.0206) (0.0124) (0.0206)
Intercaste 0.0186 0.0207 0.00203 -0.0151 0.0870** 0.00909 0.0495*** 0.0753***
(0.0369) (0.0294) (0.0233) (0.0174) (0.0349) (0.0322) (0.0174) (0.0197)
Migration 0.0397 0.0672** 0.0103 0.00383 0.0175 -0.0474* 0.00519 0.0478**
(0.0316) (0.0294) (0.0184) (0.0134) (0.0339) (0.0257) (0.0179) (0.0219)
Land/labor -0.0244* -0.0364*** -0.00901 -0.00204 -0.0308** -0.0380** -0.00828 -0.0150
(0.0125) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.00560) (0.0145) (0.0178) (0.00815) (0.0102)
Obs 2,033 2,033 2,033 2,033 2,033 2,033 2,033 2,033
Notes: Reports estimations with claim-making as the outcome variable, with all variables as in Table A4.1
above with the exception of block fixed effects in place of GP fixed effects. Each sub-panel and column
refers to a separate regression.
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Table A4.3: Effects of Exposure on Claim-making, Holding Village Constant
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incidence Direct Mediated Repertoire Admin GP Bureaucrat Party
InterNH 0.121*** 0.165*** 0.0921*** 0.474*** 0.167*** 0.161*** 0.0620*** 0.0641***
(0.0216) (0.0238) (0.0301) (0.0777) (0.0275) (0.0267) (0.0205) (0.0200)
Intercaste 0.126*** 0.138*** 0.103** 0.245** 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.0328 0.0595*
(0.0386) (0.0427) (0.0401) (0.103) (0.0425) (0.0437) (0.0277) (0.0312)
Migration 0.0255 0.0231 0.00372 0.0495 0.0115 0.0224 -0.0334 0.0242
(0.0287) (0.0318) (0.0375) (0.109) (0.0337) (0.0338) (0.0259) (0.0307)
Obs 1,888 2,084 2,101 2,120 2,084 2,084 1,938 1,888
PANEL B
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Assoc. NH Village CSO Broker Caste InterCaste Fixer
InterNH 0.169*** 0.0889*** 0.0981*** 0.0136 0.0564* 0.0592** 0.0694*** 0.00831
(0.0297) (0.0228) (0.0201) (0.0180) (0.0317) (0.0250) (0.0148) (0.0201)
Intercaste 0.0110 0.0218 0.00643 -0.0310 0.0803** -0.0150 0.0532*** 0.0789***
(0.0402) (0.0355) (0.0312) (0.0285) (0.0373) (0.0427) (0.0196) (0.0169)
Migration 0.0462 0.0751** 0.00856 0.0238 0.00125 -0.0671** 0.0142 0.0298
(0.0343) (0.0332) (0.0240) (0.0233) (0.0382) (0.0336) (0.0229) (0.0212)
Obs 2,067 1,881 1,729 1,489 2,069 1,747 1,833 1,855
Notes: Reports estimations with claim-making as the outcome variable, with all variables as in Table A4.1
above with the exception of village fixed effects in place of GP fixed effects. The "Land/labor" ratio drops
out since it is a village level variable. Each sub-panel and column refers to a separate regression.
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Table A4.4: Effects of Exposure on Claim-making, Holding Panchayat Constant (Joint Regression)
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incidence Direct Mediated Repertoire Admin GP Bureaucrat Party
InterNH 0.0975*** 0.153*** 0.0845*** 0.527*** 0.155*** 0.152*** 0.0624*** 0.0480***
(0.0198) (0.0225) (0.0274) (0.0801) (0.0247) (0.0240) (0.0192) (0.0175)
Intercaste 0.0973*** 0.107*** 0.0926*** 0.188* 0.112*** 0.108*** 0.0241 0.0517*
(0.0304) (0.0354) (0.0334) (0.0964) (0.0352) (0.0374) (0.0252) (0.0271)
Migration 0.00900 0.00990 0.00929 0.0829 -0.000346 0.0108 -0.0267 0.0413
(0.0231) (0.0274) (0.0344) (0.107) (0.0287) (0.0284) (0.0221) (0.0261)
Obs. 2,038 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080
R-squared 0.249 0.239 0.173 0.336 0.231 0.220 0.205 0.231
PANEL B
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Assoc. NH Village CSO Broker Caste InterCaste Fixer
InterNH 0.176*** 0.0816*** 0.0930*** 0.00985 0.0446 0.0554*** 0.0593*** -0.000997
(0.0262) (0.0197) (0.0156) (0.0110) (0.0289) (0.0203) (0.0121) (0.0185)
Intercaste -0.0241 0.00570 -0.0152 -0.0176 0.0807** 0.00161 0.0341** 0.0738***
(0.0372) (0.0311) (0.0246) (0.0181) (0.0338) (0.0322) (0.0164) (0.0180)
Migration 0.0493 0.0721** 0.0115 0.00960 0.00730 -0.0485* 0.00671 0.0376*
(0.0332) (0.0309) (0.0176) (0.0132) (0.0343) (0.0251) (0.0167) (0.0204)
Obs. 2,080 2,026 2,033 1,977 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080
R-squared 0.200 0.188 0.214 0.247 0.156 0.153 0.217 0.162
Notes: Reports estimations with claim-making as the outcome variable, with all variables as in Table A4.1
above. The explanatory variables are included jointly, while the "land/labor" ratio is dropped since it is
meant to be a proxy for exposure.
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Table A4.5: Effects of Individual and Household Characteristics on Claim-making
(1) (2) (3) (4)



























































































































































Notes: Reports estimations with claim-making as the outcome variable, as described in Table A4.4 above.
Left out categories are "Land Quintile 5", "No education", and "General Class" respectively. "ST", "SC",
and "OBC" refer to members of Scheduled Tribe, Scheduled Caste, and Other Backward Class
respectively.
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Table A4.6: Effects of Alternative Individual Characteristics on Claim-making
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incidence Direct Mediated Repertoire
Reads newspaper 0.102*** 0.124*** 0.0703* 0.479***
(0.0266) (0.0319) (0.0378) (0.107)
TV/Radio exposure 0.0380 0.0188 0.0645* 0.0620
(0.0265) (0.0341) (0.0378) (0.0999)
Knows about Gram Sabha 0.0924*** 0.122*** 0.0985** 0.228*
(0.0321) (0.0426) (0.0392) (0.120)
Knows about RTI 0.0495 0.0632 0.119** 0.441**
(0.0404) (0.0440) (0.0549) (0.183)
Has official ties 0.0585** 0.0749** 0.102*** 0.374***
(0.0252) (0.0291) (0.0338) (0.102)
Party ties -0.0272 0.0436 0.0152 0.0413
(0.0233) (0.0301) (0.0291) (0.0312)
Participates in cultural group 0.0811*** 0.0431 0.143*** 0.480***
(0.0228) (0.0334) (0.0370) (0.120)
Observations 2,038 2,080 2,080 2,080
R-squared 0.249 0.239 0.173 0.336
Notes: Reports estimations with claim-making as the outcome variable, as described in Table A4.4 above.
Left out categories are "Land Quintile 5" and "No education". "RTI" refers to the Right to Information Act.
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Table A4.7: Effects of Exposure by Caste/Gender on Claim-making
(1) (2) (3) (4)


















































0.00180 0.0631 -0.0297 0.00864
(0.0459) (0.0535) (0.0665) (0.187)
0.0492 0.00882 0.0282 -0.372
(0.0655) (0.0901) (0.115) (0.371)
-0.161* -0.189* -0.106 -0.638***
(0.0956) (0.105) (0.0925) (0.236)
0.0440 0.0427 0.0184 -0.154
(0.0585) (0.0786) (0.0932) (0.239)
0.0180 0.109** 0.00596 0.0356
(0.0410) (0.0445) (0.0504) (0.165)
0.0295 -0.0947 0.0380 0.0590
(0.0792) (0.103) (0.0951) (0.272)
0.0708 0.110 0.0501 0.305
(0.0703) (0.0800) (0.121) (0.339)
0.0170 0.0657 -0.0269 0.216
(0.0590) (0.0641) (0.0679) (0.236)
0.00534 -0.00254 -0.0112 0.0566
(0.0149) (0.0171) (0.0224) (0.0512)
0.0201 0.0485** -0.0116 -0.0270
(0.0225) (0.0245) (0.0332) (0.0988)
-0.0317 -0.00239 0.00985 0.0233
(0.0294) (0.0284) (0.0419) (0.112)
0.00612 0.0317 -0.0255 -0.0426
(0.0220) (0.0246) (0.0277) (0.0939)
2,038 2,080 2,080 2,080
Notes: Reports estimations with claim-making as the outcome variable, as described in Table A4.1 above,
and interactions of the main exposure variables with identity categories. "ST", "SC", and "OBC" refer to
members of Scheduled Tribe, Scheduled Caste, and Other Backward Class respectively. Each panel and
column refers to a separate regression.
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Table A4.8: Effects of Village and GP Characteristics on Claim-making
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incidence Direct Mediated Repertoire
Village population 4.68e-05 7.86e-05** 1.12e-05 0.000167*
(3.12e-05) (3.45e-05) (3.13e-05) (9.73e-05)
Population density -0.00346 -0.00712 -0.0562* -0.0805
(0.0246) (0.0308) (0.0292) (0.102)
Distance to urban center -0.00830*** -0.00900*** -0.00224 -0.0302***
(0.00240) (0.00288) (0.00321) (0.0104)
Village literacy 0.195 0.544** -0.0757 0.725
(0.196) (0.267) (0.286) (0.942)
Village land -0.00188 -0.00128 -0.00536** -0.00557
(0.00225) (0.00300) (0.00256) (0.00791)
Village assets -0.0628*** -0.102*** 0.0631** -0.103
(0.0220) (0.0284) (0.0321) (0.0970)
Caste fractionalization -0.140 -0.179 -0.00838 -0.103
(0.112) (0.138) (0.129) (0.441)
President's village -0.0640 -0.0789 -0.0476 -0.338*
(0.0578) (0.0587) (0.0616) (0.190)
Observations 2,038 2,080 2,080 2,080
R-squared 0.249 0.239 0.173 0.336
Notes: Reports estimations with claim-making as the outcome variable, as described in Table A4.4 above.
Independent variables are all at the village level.
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Notes: Each observation is a village. Reports separate estimations with average claim-making at the village
level as the outcome variable, and average levels of exposure as the independent variables.
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Table A4.9: Effects of Exposure on Village Level Claim-making
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incidence Direct Mediated Repertoire
InterNH 0.341*** 0.481*** 0.172 1.371***
(0.112) (0.118) (0.138) (0.516)
Intercaste 0.334** 0.246 0.175 0.280
(0.149) (0.166) (0.178) (0.695)
Migration -0.0633 -0.00928 -0.0294 0.315
(0.159) (0.174) (0.186) (0.720)
Land/labor -0.0431*** -0.0349** -0.0131 -0.0903
(0.0155) (0.0173) (0.0189) (0.0728)
Obs 103 103 103 103
Table A4.10: Effects of Exposure on Collective and Selective Claim-making
Collective Selective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incidence Repertoire Incidence Repertoire
InterNH 0.133*** 0.575*** 0.132*** 0.548***
(0.0218) (0.0788) (0.0244) (0.0740)
Intercaste 0.130*** 0.342*** 0.129*** 0.227**
(0.0329) (0.108) (0.0347) (0.102)
Migration 0.000868 0.0303 -0.0391 -0.158*
(0.0264) (0.107) (0.0296) (0.0943)
Land/labor -0.0546*** -0.130*** -0.0570** -0.125***
(0.0204) (0.0411) (0.0227) (0.0393)
Observations 2,120 2,120 2,120 2,120
Notes: Reports separate estimations with claim-making for collective goods (village public goods) or
selective goods (government schemes that benefit individual households) as the outcome variables.
"Incidence" is a binary variable equal to 1 if the household engaged in any manner of claim-making for that
particular good. "Repertoire" is an index (0-9) comprising of all claim-making strategies for that particular
good.
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A.5. Supplementary material for chapter 5
EMPIRICAL MODEL: CORRELATES OF SOCIO-SPATIAL EXPOSURE
The following tables present the data and multivariate analysis referred to in Chapter 5.
Unless otherwise noted, the model employed is:
Y = cc + y(individual) + X(household) + (village) + 6(GP) + Q(block fixed effects) + 8
Y is an outcome related to individual-level socio-spatial exposure, including cross-
neighborhood exposure, cross-caste workplace exposure, and migration. The unit of
observation is the individual, with one observation per household, unless otherwise noted.
The land-to-labor ratio is a village-level factor that we expect to be exogenous to the
model, and is therefore not included in the analysis. For dichotomous outcomes (cross-
caste workplace exposure and migration), I employ maximum likelihood estimation using
probit models (reporting marginal effects, dF/dx). For non-dichotomous outcomes (cross-
neighborhood exposure), I use OLS (reporting the coefficients).
y represents a vector of individual-level controls, including: socioeconomic status
(quintile of landownership, asset-ownership (as an index), assets-squared); occupation
(whether a person farms his/her own land, agricultural laborer on other's land, non-farm
laborer, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme laborer, small-enterprise,
salaried employee, or student); level of education (primary, secondary, or higher -
compared to those with none); identity (gender, age, age-squared, and caste-category (ST,
SC, and OBC - compared to GC); caste*gender interaction effects (ST, SC, and OBC
women compared to GC women); whether the respondent shares caste or gender with the
GP president ("identity match"); patronage ties (party membership, and personal ties to
GP officials; ties to specific parties (Congress or BJP) are assessed separately); and social
capital (participation in cultural groups). % represents controls for household size and
number of children and elderly.
o represents village controls, including population size, dispersion (pop/area), distance to
an urban center, literacy rate, average landownership, average asset-ownership; caste
fractionalization (1- E (caste) 2, where i is the number of each caste in the village);
whether the village is partisan (a majority of residents identify with/are members of one
party over another); and the number of informal governance institutions (neighborhood or
village associations, caste or inter-caste associations, or NGOs) in a village.
5 represents controls for features of the Gram Panchayat and the village in relation to the
GP, including GP population, whether the village is the GP administrative headquarter,
whether the village is home to the GP president, whether the village caste composition
matches the GP caste composition, and whether the seat of president is reserved for
members of the SC, ST, or OBC caste community or women.
All models include block fixed effects (0). Standard errors are clustered at the village
level.
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Notes: Reports estimations with the following socio-spatial exposure variables as the outcome: "InterNH",
the frequency of cross-neighborhood exposure, assessed as an index from 0-3; "Intercaste", or cross-caste
workplace exposure, a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent works in a mixed caste environment; and
"Migration", a binary variable equal to 1 if a member of the household lives outside the village for more
than one month in the year.
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Table A5.1: Village Characteristics and Socio-spatial Exposure
(1) (2) (3)
InterNH Intercaste Migration
Village population 1.6le-05 1.57e-05 2.22e-06
(1.46e-05) (1.48e-05) (2.3 1e-05)
Population density -0.00859 -0.0141 0.0120
(0.00938) (0.00982) (0.0125)
Distance to urban center 0.000807 0.000151 -0.00104
(0.000942) (0.000661) (0.00129)
Village literacy -0.0180 -0.144 0.241
(0.123) (0.147) (0.167)
Village land 0.000657 -0.000398 -0.00187
(0.00146) (0.00133) (0.00212)
Village assets -0.00287 -0.0545*** 0.00599
(0.0155) (0.0168) (0.0257)
Caste fractionalization -0.0258 0.0628 -0.229***
(0.0543) (0.0517) (0.0865)
Observations 1,914 1,914 1,913
R-squared 0.174 0.139 0.166
Land/labor -0.0225** -0.0100 -0.0212**
(0.0103) (0.0104) (0.00838)





















































































































Notes: Reports estimations with socio-spatial exposure as the outcome variable, as described in Table A5.1
above. Left out categories are "Land Quintile 5", "No education", and "Unemployed" respectively.
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Notes: Reports estimations with socio-spatial exposure as the outcome variable, as described in Table A5.1
above. Left out categories is "General class". "Identity match ST (Scheduled Tribe)", "Identity match SC
(Scheduled Caste)", "Identity match OBC (Other Backward Class)", and "Identity match Female" are equal
to 1 if the respondent's identity matches that of the Sarpanch.
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Table A5.3: Caste, Political Characteristics and Socio-spatial Exposure
(1) (2) (3)
InterNH Intercaste Migration
ST -0.0111 -0.0189 -0.0604
(0.0831) (0.0742) (0.0575)
SC -0.0673 0.0161 -0.0841**
(0.0647) (0.0474) (0.0390)
OBC -0.0528 0.0346 -0.115***
(0.0634) (0.0514) (0.0380)
ST woman 0.130 0.0656* 0.0787
(0.0824) (0.0390) (0.0659)
SC woman 0.196** 0.0518 -0.00881
(0.0847) (0.0477) (0.0514)
OBC woman 0.0449 0.0609* 0.0973
(0.0741) (0.0354) (0.0615)
Identity match SC -0.0463 0.00417 -0.0166
(0.0996) (0.0839) (0.0661)
Identity match ST -0.0275 -0.0329 -0.0803
(0.0908) (0.0774) (0.0540)
Identity match OBC 0.0511 -0.0683 0.0612
(0.0629) (0.0694) (0.0588)
Identity match Woman -0.00309 -0.0160 0.000272
(0.0595) (0.0305) (0.0372)
Holding office -0.0409 0.0413** 0.0521*
(0.0366) (0.0205) (0.0270)
Observations 1,913 1,914 1,914
R-squared 0.165 0.173 0.141
A.6. Supplementary material for chapter 6
EMPIRICAL MODEL: CLAIM-MAKING AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
The following tables present the data and multivariate analysis referred to in Chapter 6.
Unless otherwise noted, the model employed is:
Y = cc + p(claim-making) + y(individual) + X(household) + (village) + Q(GP fixed effects)+ ,
Y is an outcome related to individual-level political participation, including voting and
campaigning activities, or political affect. The unit of observation is the individual, with
one observation per household. The main explanatory variables are the incidence and
repertoire of claim-making. As all outcomes are dichotomous, I employ maximum
likelihood estimation using probit models (reporting marginal effects, dF/dx).
y represents a vector of individual-level controls, including: socioeconomic status
(quintile of landownership, asset-ownership (as an index), assets-squared); occupation
(whether a person farms his/her own land, agricultural laborer on other's land, non-farm
laborer, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme laborer, small-enterprise,
salaried employee, or student); level of education (primary, secondary, or higher -
compared to those with none); identity (gender, age, age-squared, and caste-category (ST,
SC, and OBC - compared to GC); caste*gender interaction effects (ST, SC, and OBC
women compared to GC women); whether the respondent shares caste or gender with the
GP president ("identity match"); patronage ties (party membership, and personal ties to
GP officials; ties to specific parties (Congress or BJP) are assessed separately); and social
capital, including measures of trust and reciprocity (willingness to lend to others in need,
contributions to communal projects).
k represents controls for household size and number of children and elderly.
o represents village controls, including population size, population dispersion (pop/area),
distance to an urban center, literacy rate, average landownership, average asset-
ownership; caste fractionalization (1- Z (castei)2, where i is the number of each caste in
the village); whether or not the village is partisan (a majority of residents identify
with/are members of one party over another); and the number of informal governance
institutions (neighborhood or village associations, caste or inter-caste associations, or
NGOs) in a village.
6 represents controls for features of the Gram Panchayat and the village in relation to the
GP, including GP population, whether the village is the GP administrative headquarter,
whether the village is home to the GP president, whether the village caste composition
matches the GP caste composition, and whether the seat of president is reserved for
members of the SC, ST, or OBC caste community or women.
All models include GP fixed effects (Q). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table A6.1: Claim-making and Political Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Voting: GP Voting: MLA Voting: MP Campaign Attend GS Protest
CM Incidence 0.00377 -0.00370 -0.0183** 0.0620*** 0.169*** 0.105***
(0.00407) (0.00748) (0.00904) (0.0181) (0.0384) (0.0149)
Observations 1,505 1,674 1,826 2,075 1,698 2,081
R-squared 0.376 0.346 0.288 0.429 0.250 0.242
CM Repertoire 0.00114 0.00166 -0.00412 0.0234*** 0.0717*** 0.0332***
(0.000923) (0.00203) (0.00281) (0.00520) (0.00825) (0.00478)
Observations 1,505 1,674 1,826 2,075 1,698 2,081
R-squared 0.377 0.347 0.287 0.433 0.270 0.257
Notes: Reports estimations with political participation variables as the outcomes. "Voting: GP" refers to
voting in the local (Gram Panchayat) elections. "Voting: MLA" refers to voting in elections for the state
Legislative Assembly. "Voting: MP" refers to voting in elections for the national Parliament. "Campaign"
refers to participating in any one of a number of campaigning activities, including distributing fliers,
participating in party meetings, or contributing cash or in-kind to a campaign. "Attend GS" refers to
attending the Gram Sabha (town hall) meeting. "Protest" refers to participating in any organized protest.
"CM Incidence" is a binary variable equal to 1 if the household engaged in any manner of claim-making.
"CM Repertoire" is an index (0-9) comprising of all claim-making strategies.
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Notes: Reports estimations with political affect variables as the outcomes. "Fair investment" is a binary
variable equal to 1 if respondent believes that "government investment in this village is fair and reasonable
compared to other villages". "Express views" is a binary variable equal to 1 if respondent agrees that
"officials give villagers a chance to express their views". "Respect views" is a binary variable equal to 1 if
respondent agrees that "officials respect and take into account villagers' views".
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Table A6.2: Claim-making and Political Affect
(1) (2) (3)
Fair investment Express views Respect views
CM Incidence -0.0923*** 0.135*** 0.0484
(0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0297)
Observations 2,045 2,061 2,060
R-squared 0.166 0.121 0.125
CM Repertoire -0.0154** 0.0426*** 0.0136*
(0.00689) (0.00850) (0.00822)
Observations 2,045 2,061 2,060
R-squared 0.163 0.125 0.126
